Archive for September, 2007
By D.B.S. Jeyaraj
“They seek him here;they seek him there; they seek him everywhere”.
These lines from a doggerel about the scarlet pimpernel perfectly sums up the life and times of KP – the elusive chief procurer of arms and armaments for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
The latest round of excitement is over the reported arrest of the man in Thailand. New Delhi and Colombo are supposedly requesting Bangkok to extradite KP to their respective countries. But there is a hitch. Despite the initial blaze of publicity about KP’s arrest the Thai authorities are now denying that the arrest ever took place.
Obviously there is something here that just does not seem “right” but as Andy Warhol observed famously every one is entitled to fifteen minutes of fame. Now KP is having more than fifteen minutes of fame or is it notoriety?
But who is this man and what has he been doing?
The man known as KP was born on on April – 6th – 1955 in the northern coastal town of Kankesanthurai (KKS). His name was Pathmanathan and his father’s name was Selvarajah . Though he was known by a number of names and aliases in later life KP’s real name was Selvarajah Pathmanathan.
KP though born at the KKS hospital was a native of Myliddy also a coastal area in the Valigamam north region.. Myliddy was essentially an agriculture cum fisheries area but also had a proud tradition of rearing the finest racing bulls. Myliddy carters used to win almost all “vandil chavaris” (cart races) held in Jaffna during more peaceful and prosperous times.
Myliddy was one of the earliest places in Jaffna to be affected by the escalating ethnic crisis. It is adjacent to Palaly – Vasavilan on one side and on the other to Thaiyiddy – Oorany – KKS. During peaceful times the army and air force stationed at Palaly enjoyed a friendly relationship with Myliddy people. Young Pathmanathan himself was a frequent visitor to Palaly base as one of his first cousins was an airman.
But all this changed after 1983 and Myliddy people being neighbours of the Palaly base found themselves prone and vulnerable to suspicion, danger and harassment. The people started leaving slowly and by 1985 it was virtually deserted. Later it was annexed as part of the high security zone. Currently the Palaly – Myliddy – KKS “triangle” area serves as the main base complex of all three defence services.
Pathmanathan was one of eight children. His father Selvarajah was a fisherman from Veeramanickthevanthurai in Myliddy. The traditional occupation of the people here was fishing but they were originally not of a fishing caste. The place derives its name from a Maravar chieftain named Veeramanickathevan from Ramanathapuram in Tamil Nadu , who settled in Myliddy with his clan centuries ago. The Maravars are of the Mukkulathor warrior caste and the people of Veeramanickathevanthurai also trace their lineage as being Kshatriya.
Pathmanathan had his education at Nadeswara College, KKS and Mahajana College, Thellipalai. He was involved in the politics of the Federal Party(FP) and later the Tamil United Liberation Front(TULF). Pathmanathan’s radicalisation was mainly through another native of Myliddy Pushparajan who succumbed to cancer some months ago. Pushparajan was one of those who pioneered the Tamil Ilaingar Peravai or youth front in the seventies and was detained without trial for many years then.
Pathmanathan’s pet name at home was Kutty (pup or cub). This was the name most Myliddy people called him also.During his childhood he was very thin and so nicknamed “oosi” (needle) in school.. Pathmanathan was not a very bright student and required more than one attempt to qualify for his OL and AL. He entered the Jaffna university in his twenties. He followed a BA course with political science and history as main subjects.
It was during his campus days that the letters “KP” attached on to him. Apparently there were two Pathmanathans in the same batch and in order to differentiate he became KP. Since he was also known as Kutty the K in Kutty and the P in Pathmanathan became KP.The tall, light – skinned , hansome KP was a big hit with the girls.
While at the Jaffna campus KP was attracted to Tamil militancy. Initially he joined the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization(TELO) led by the legendary Thangathurai and Kuttimani. KP doubled up as a TELO militant while being an undergrad. His nom de guerre in the TELO was “Kumaran”. Kumaran participated as a look – out in the Thinnevely bank robbery where 10. 8 lakhs was robbed.
There was a major split in the original LTTE in 1980. Kandiah Umamaheswaran broke away with a large number and formed the Peoples Liberation organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE). The residual cadres under Velupillai Prabakharan were a dejected lot. For about two years the LTTE under Prabha tied up with the TELO under Thangathurai – Kuttimani. It was then that KP began interacting with Prabakharan.
The Neervely robbery on March 25th 1981 was a watershed in the history of the Tamil militant movement. The peoples Bank van was collecting hard cash from the branches in the Vadamarachy sector and returning to Jaffna along the Jaffna – Point Pedro road. It was waylaid at Neervely and a massive sum of 8. 1 million rupees robbed.
This was a combined TELO – LTTE operation.. KP’s role in this was to ride a motor cycle behind the Peoples bank van and its escort police vehicle. There were no walkie – talkies or cellular phones then. At one point KP had to speed up ahead of the vehicles and alert the militants lying in wait that the target was approaching. KP did his part and sped away. He did not participate in the robbery directly.
But suspicious officials had noted the motor cycle number down. Actually it did not belong to KP but to a fellow undergrad Wimalaraja who had absolutely no idea that KP had borrowed it to use it for a robbery. The motor cycle was traced and the innocent Wimalaraja arrested. This led to a massive varsity demonstration demanding his release. But KP had flown.
In what was perhaps the first of his many escapes from the law KP simply abandoned everything and fled to India. He was then staying at 180 KKS rd in Jaffna. KP was then in theBA final year but was compelled to give up studies. He never completed his degree.
After fleeing to India KP dropped out of Tamil militancy for a while. He teamed up with “vakeel” Kandaswamy a smuggler cum racketeer on the fringes of the Tamil militant movement. Some other militants like Sellakkili also joined “Vakeel” as helpers. One motivating reason was survival as they had no funds.
KP worked for Vakeel in Bombay now Mumbai and also on the Indo – Pak and Indo – Nepal borders. He also undertook smuggling trips to Singapore and back on false passports. This life came to an end after the July 1983 pogrom.
Sellakili had returned earlier to LTTE folds and was killed in the Thinnevely attack on Julky 23rd that triggered off the Island – wide anti – Tamil violence. KP went down to Madras now Chennai and enlisted himself in militant ranks again. This time he joined the LTTE and not his former outfit the TELO.
Since Thangathurai and Kuttimani were no more and the TELO was under Sree Sabaratnam so KP preferred to join the LTTE as he had struck up good rapport with Prabakharan.KP had once come down to Madurai in 1982 with Sellakili and stayed for some days with Prabakharan during which period the LTTE leader had invited him to join the tigers whenever he wanted.
After inducting KP into the LTTE , Prabakharan did not make him take up formal arms training. Prabakharan recogized that KP’s talents lay elsewhere. KP was asked to use the contacts and experience he had gained through the “Vakeel” Kandasamy connection to raise funds and buy arms for the LTTE.This he began doing and soon “vakeel” himself became KP’s unofficial deputy.
Together with helpers from the LTTE as well as the Indian underworld KP began acquiring arms and equipment for the LTTE. Some of these clandestine acts were done without even Indian authorities knowing. Some of KP’s original aides in India were Vakeel, Radha, Thavam, Eesan, Kumar, Ranjith and Shankar.
As time progressed KP’s duties began expanding. He was required to travel to many countries in the middle – east, Africa, Europe, Australia, North America and South – East Asia and meet Tamil expatriate groups to mobilise funds. This was a time when several Tamil militant groups were active and competing for expatriate funds so it was indeed a formidable task to generate funds.
The overseas fund raising also involved the setting up of LTTE branches and appointment of tiger representatives abroad. This responsibility too became that of KP’s. In the eighties and early nineties it was KP who controlled and co-ordinated the LTTE overseas branches. His objective was to garner as much funds as possible and utilise it for purchase of arms.
In addition to raising funds and administering the overseas branches KP also had the daunting task of scouring the international illicit arms bazaar and do shopping. He travelled to many parts of the world and bought up arms and armaments. He also had to make arrangements to ship them clandestinely to India first and later directly to North – East Sri Lanka..
There was no beaten track or set procedures. It was a case of playing it by ear.KP was a pioneering pathfinder as he had to improvise and evolve on the job.Much of the early accomplishments was through trial and error.
In 1983 KP himself was arrested in Mumbai when coming from Singapore with 4 million worth of gold. Again in 1984 he was arrested in Chennai in possession of smuggled gold. In both instances KP was out in a jiffy as the LTTE was then in the good books of India.
KP was also arrested at Heathrow in 1989 when travelling on a false Indian passport to London. He was detained for 10 days and deported to India. But he was back in the UK within weeks. He was detained in 1990 in Penang when Malaysian authorities seized the LTTE ship “Sunbird”. But thanks to efforts of Malaysian Tamil nationals the man was out quickly.
KP also has had some narrow shaves. He was detained and quizzed on suspicion at least on three occasions in Europe . The suspicion was not over his arms dealings but over his travel documents. This happened in Paris, Frankfurt and Amsterdam in the late eighties.Apparently KP had exploited the relaxed EU procedures of the time and made refugee claims under different names in different European countries and obtained travel documents valid in Europe then.
KP also spent six months as “Rajan” in Canada in 1988. During this time he frequently visited the USA. KP re- structured and re – organized the LTTE outfits in Canada during this time. He also did much fund raising in the US and Canada and purchased much technological, electronic, aeronautical and communications equipment during this time. It was after KP left that Canadian officials became aware of his true identity.
A few years ago the Pakistani authorities were tipped off that KP was travelling by plane from Karachi. When the officials swooped on the aircraft they found one seat vacant. KP travelling on a false alias had simply not boarded the plane. It was like a scene from a movie. It is said that KP had another escape recently when LTTE linked arms smugglers were arrested in Indonesia.
In the early days KP travelled on a Sri Lankan passport numbered J – 803500. His national ID card number was 550971231 – V. Later he used two Indian passports. One was E – 277582 under his own name Selvarajah Pathmanathan. The other numbered E – 432432 under his well – known alias Tharmalingam Kumaran Shanmugam which many think is his real name.
But nowadays KP does not use these out – dated , worthless documents.It is said that KP has around 35 – 40 travel documents from many countries under 20 – 25 different names. Indian officials were fuming a few years ago when it was belatedly discovered that KP had been at Navrang Hotel in Delhi under an alias Venkatraman from Chennai.
KP was not involved in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination directly. His name is not included in the 41 name charge sheet. But he was staying in Mumbai on May 21st 1991 and left India on May 26th. The CBI thinks that the 2.4 mm SEG pellets in the Suicide killers explosive belt and also the 9mm pistol in Sivarasans hands were supplied by KP. There is also a belief that KP financed the assassination squad.
So they want to question him and have got Interpol to issue an alert. The CBI also sent rogatory letters to law – enforcement authorities in 19 countries seeking assistance to apprehend KP. Indian officials have also toured 23 countries for the purpose of tracing Pathmanathan.
Incidently the Indian investigation revealed that KP was living with a beautiful Indian woman in Bombay. It appears that KP had a soft spot for pretty women. Though the LTTE leader is a stickler for puritan discipline he seems to have been quite tolerant of KP in this respect due perhaps to the importance of his work.
KP’s greatest achievement has been his ability to raise funds, acquire arms and then transport them to the LTTE in the Island. He is a globe – trotter in this regard having garnered armaments from diverse sources such as Maronite Christian groups in Lebanon. Eritrean rebels, ex – Mujahiyadeen from Afghanistam, KPNLF circles in Kampuchea , the underworld in Marseilles and arms dealers in Ukraine, Russia and Georgia etc.
The extensive range of arms in quality and quantity that KP has bought and shipped is mind – boggling. What is remarkable is that this supply of arms has been steadily flowing despite the overwhelming odds against such a perlious exercise.
Sri Lanka being an Island is obviously dependent on the sea for many things. For a guerilla movement like the LTTE sea transport has been of crucial importance. A continuous supply of arms and ammunition is essential to keep fighting. For this Soosai’s sea tigers and KP’s overseas purchases dept have been of great service. KP has been single – handedly responsible in providing constant and consistent supply of arms.
KP is also responsible for setting up the elaborate world – wide shipping network of the LTTE.He was helped to a great extent in this by Tamils involved in shipping as ship captains, chandlers and freight insurance. The first known company was registered in Singapore as Arasu maritime pvt ltd. It was this firm that leased the first LTTE ship “MV Cholan”. KP himself was a director and provided the paid up capital.
A second Shipping firm Plymouth shipping co was started later in Singapore. The heads of both firms were Tamil ship captains. Another shipping firm was Vikram Holding pvt lts registered in Kualalumpore with three Malaysian Tamils as partners with KP. Later another company Point Pedro shipping was registered in Panama. KP also had dealings with Orient Shipping in Germany.
Since the names of these firms became public knowledge the LTTE does not use them anymore. The LTTE ships whose names are known are also not in visible use now. But the LTTE shipping fleet has grown and is a viablecommercial entity on its own apart from its original mission of ferrying arms.
The fronts, owning, leasing or chartering the ships are unknown. The companies are registered in one country while ships fly flags of convenience from other countries.The captains and crew are mainly from non – Tamil communities though a few Tamils may be part of the crew.
But when armaments and equipment is shipped to the LTTE in Sri Lanka the crew and captain are Sri Lankan Tamils posing as nationals of South Asian countries. The names of the ships are also changed during the mission.
KP has established worldwide contacts not only with arms dealers and the underworld but also with legitimate officials. He is known under different names to many customs, immigration and Police officers of different countries. He is also well known in shipping circles. Apart from some diplomastic contacts KP is also believed to be in touch with intelligence operatives of some powerful western nations after Sep 11th 2001.
The tried and tested modus operandi in the dangerous game of arms running has been the appropriate usage of bribes, political influence and coercion to achieve results. These methods had their roots in the smuggling ethos of Prabakharan’s native place Valvettithurai.
KP perhaps taking a cue from VVT smuggler methodology had perfected the art over the years. He always carried a bundle of notes to bribe minions. The big shots were entertained lavishly and presented expensive gifts. Local politcians with some clout in Police, Customs, immigration and shipping circles were assiduously cultivated. Where necessary thuggery and intimidation was deployed.
There was a time when KP was in charge of three important functions in the LTTE. The first was overseas fund raising and investment.The second was macro – supervision of LTTE branches anroad. The third was of course acquisition of arms , armaments, ammunition, and transport .
But after the ceasefire came into force in 2002 Prabakharan has re- vamped the LTTE. KP was relieved of two duties namely overseas finance management and general administration. This was because the work involved had become too much for one man and the LTTE leader wanted KP to focus on what was most important to the tigers.
Overseas finance management was entrusted to “Aiya Annai” and administration to Castro. Aiya being a KP disciple follows in his mentors footsteps and performs his duty without much hassle. But Castro in his vanity discontinued all the people installed by KP in the overseas branches and appointed his lackeys.
Today the tigers abroad are in vast disarray and a far cry from the times of KP. with different people jockeying for control. Factionalism is rampant. Fund raising as opposed to financial management was put under Financec chief Thamilendhi’s control. This too has resulted in confusion.When KP was in charge things ran smoothly.
But KP’s sphere of control known by the euphemism overseas purchasing dept or simply as KP dept continues to function efficiently. Until recently KP’s ships were discharging cargo at midsea without mishap. But this streak of good luck seems to be running out if recent claims of success by the navy are any indication.
KP himself does not travel much these days due to ill – health (diabetes , blood pressure, cardiac trouble etc) and also because he is a much wanted man in many countries.
But KP’s deputies trained by him are doing the filedwork now though KP directs and supervises. Interestingly his seconds in command are changed frequently for security reasons. But whoever is no 2 to to KP at any given time is always given the nom de guerre “David”.
Though he is “officially” a citizen of at least four countries KP in recent times has confined himself to Scandinavia and the ASEAN nations. He is married to a Thai woman who worked at the export firm “palmax”run by KP in Bangkok. It appears that the LTTE too relies much on Thailand as a logistical base. A recent Janes Defence weekly report highlights this -
“While Cambodia is the hub of the LTTE East Asia Network, Thailand continues to serve as the most important country for trans-shipment of munitions and coordination of logistics… its excellent communications infrastructure, proximity to former war zones in both Cambodia and [Burma] and its western coastline facing the Bay of Bengal and Sri Lanka beyond have made Thailand the ancient interface between the LTTE’s war zone.” the Janes report says.
KP has been known to have set foot in Sri Lanka through the Katunayake International Airport only twice after 1981. The first was in 1987 after the Indo – Lanka accord and the second was in 1989 after the Premadasa talks. At that time he returned with Prabakharan’s wife Mathivathany and the elder kids Charles Anthony and Thuvaraga staying in Denmark.
KP kept away from Sri Lanka even when his mother and sister died when the boat they were travelling capsized at sea.But he is known to have made several trips clandestinely by sea to Mullaitheevu coast.
Selvarajah Pathmanathan is now widely known as KP. But within the upper echelons of the LTTE there is another name for him. It is “Kazhuthai” or Donkey. This was a name bestowed affectionately by Prabakharan himself. The donkey is an animal that carries loads on its back. KP is a man whose efforts result in loads of arms being supplied to the LTTE. Hence the name donkey to KP.
It is astounding that Selvarajah Pathmanathan a man of humble origins from Myliddy is has metamorphosed into KP the transnational purchaser and transporter of arms.It is amazing to think that this arts undergrad is now dealing successfully with dangerous arms merchants in many parts of the globe.
The chief procurer of arms for the LTTE is a man who has made himself almost indispensable for the LTTE. He like Prabakharan is very much responsible for the growth of the LTTE. KP is a man whose knowledge and information would be of great value not only to Sri Lanka but to intelligence agencies of several countries.
If KP has really been arrested by Thai authorities then that could be the single biggest blow received by the LTTE supremo in recent times.The truism about no man being indispensable may be correct but as far as the LTTE is concerned KP is simply not dispensable.
While Sri Lanka was reportedly sending a top police team to interrogate KP in Thailand Indan Foreign minister Pranab Mukherjee was already in Bangkok an a pre-arranged official visit. He sought clarification with Thai authorities on KP . This is what a PTI report datelined Bangkok said
“LTTE leader K Padmanathan, an accused in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case, has not been detained in Thailand, External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee said here today.
“We have been informed that the person (Padmanathan) is not yet detained,” the Minister said when asked about reports of the LTTE leader’s detention here this week.
This information was conveyed by the Thai government to the Indian mission in Bangkok and “we are depending on that”, he said.”
If this PTI report is correct about what was told to Mukherjee that means KP remains as elusive as ever. If so it is once again a case of “catch me if you can”
September 16th, 2007
By Charu Hogg
(We reproduce below the text of testimony by Human Rights Watch researcher on Sri Lanka, Charulata Hogg at the European Parliament on Sep 11th 2007)
Your Excellencies and Colleagues,
Thank you for giving us the opportunity to discuss our recent report on Sri Lanka at this gathering.
Human Rights Watch has consistently documented abuses by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), in particular its abominable use of child soldiers and coercive fundraising tactics in Canada and the UK, as well as targeted killings and other serious violations of Sri Lankan and international law. We have called for the UN to impose targeted sanctions against the LTTE due to its “repeat offender” status with regard to child soldiers. Our research on the LTTE’s international fund-raising tactics is presented on the government’s Peace Secretariat website and the Sri Lankan government has used our report on that topic in its advocacy to get the LTTE proscribed in Europe.
It was with a deep sense of sadness and dismay that we researched and released this report on human rights violations by the government in Sri Lanka. This report documents violations by the government because we see serious back-sliding in the government’s human rights record since the resumption of major hostilities in mid-2006. We determined through our research that the Sri Lankan government has not taken adequate care to minimize harm to the civilian population during the fighting, nor has it acted to uphold the basic human rights of all Sri Lankans. As our report shows, government security forces have been implicated in enforced disappearances, forcible returns of internally displaced persons to unsafe areas, restrictions on the media that undermine press freedom, apparent complicity with the abusive Karuna group, and widespread impunity for serious human rights violations.
Human rights defenders, community leaders, and humanitarian workers are under attack in Sri Lanka. In September, figures published by a respected human rights organization showed that 43 humanitarian workers had been killed in Sri Lanka since January 2006.
What is obvious since we published our “”report is that the government has shown itself unable or unwilling to stem the tide of ongoing human rights violations by state forces. In June Sri Lankan police arrested 16 people, including four policemen and a member of the air force, in connection with the spate of burgeoning abductions, and claimed to have broken the back of the racket. While disappearances and abductions showed a temporary lull in the capital Colombo, in the rest of the country, families continued to report abductions of relatives by unknown persons. The National Human Rights Commission in Jaffna reported that, in the first three weeks of August 2007 alone, 21 cases of enforced disappearances and 13 cases of unlawful killings took place. On September 3, the ICRC reported that in the previous three weeks, it had documented 34 such abductions countrywide.
In the east of the country, despite numerous promises, the government has not made any apparent progress in its investigations of alleged state complicity in abductions by the Karuna group. On the contrary, the abductions and unlawful practices of the group continue.
The condition of internally displaced persons continues to be cause for alarm. The Sri Lankan government retains primary responsibility for ensuring the protection and security of displaced persons within the country. Since fighting in 2006, some 315,000 people have had to flee their homes in the north and east. At present around 290,000 people largely Tamil and Muslim continue to remain displaced. Many have been displaced multiple times. Over the past year, government authorities have in some instances forced internally displaced persons to return to areas that remained insecure. Protection for the displaced has been very weak despite the presence of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, with regular threats and occasional violence, including abductions, by both the LTTE and pro-government armed groups. Others will never be able to return to their homes following the government’s announcement in May of the creation of “High Security Zones” that include “special economic areas” on the lands where thousands of families once lived. These people have been left languishing in makeshift camps. Those who have returned have often faced reprisals.
The concerns regarding displaced persons we cited in our report are coming to the fore yet again. Fresh fighting between government troops and the LTTE over the past week have caused more than 3,000 people to flee their homes in north-west Sri Lanka’s disputed Mannar district. One of the features of the eastern military operations being repeated in the northern campaign has been the use of the air force to bomb LTTE targets – the military has failed in its past use of aerial bombings to take all feasible precautions to minimize civilian loss. There are also severe protection and humanitarian concerns for those caught in the cross-fire and though the government has claimed that this campaign is being conducted without any civilian casualties, more than a dozen civilians have been killed since security forces launched their Mannar offensive.
Sri Lanka suffers from a long-standing climate of impunity. The Sri Lankan government has failed to hold perpetrators accountable for abuses. Key parts of the criminal justice system, such as the police and the Attorney General’s office, have not effectively investigated human rights violations or brought perpetrators to justice. The high level of violence has created an atmosphere of fear and insecurity for civilians, particularly ethnic Tamils. Victims of violence by the security forces and non-state armed groups are apprehensive about complaining to the police or other authorities for fear of retaliation, especially in the absence of functioning victim and witness protection mechanisms. The draft witness protection bill is still pending, which has further frustrated effective investigation.
In areas under its control, the LTTE has prevented the development of any independent and effective human rights institutions. Domestic human rights organizations critical of the LTTE have justifiable concerns for their safety.
The country’s Human Rights Commission, set up in 1996, has a mandate to investigate incidents of specific violations and recommend redress. But time and again it has been unable to fulfill its mandate, primarily due to the lack of cooperation from the government and the LTTE. The Human Rights Commission lacks sufficient political weight to ensure implementation of its recommendations. Furthermore, its capacity to monitor the human rights situation and investigate specific incidents in conflict areas is limited. The independence of the Human Rights Commission and other constitutional bodies was undermined in 2006 when Sri Lanka’s President directly appointed commission members, contrary to the Constitution. It is important that the Constitutional Council be reinstated to comply with the 17th Amendment of the Constitution.
The Presidential Commission of Inquiry is not a deterrent for current and on-going human rights abuses. The commission is only advisory. It can only recommend to the government the steps to take, including by the attorney general, but there is no legal obligation for the president to act on them or make the findings public. The mandate of the commission allows a high level of participation by the attorney general’s office and the police. The International Independent Group of Eminent Persons (IIGEP) has expressed concern about the role of the attorney general’s office in the investigations, citing a potential conflict of interest because investigators “may find that they are investigating themselves.”
The Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission’s (SLMM) difficult task has been made impossible. The SLMM has found it especially difficult to verify abuses after the recent escalation in armed conflict because the government has denied its monitors access to areas after certain incidents (including, for instance, to Mutur in Trincomalee district, where 17 humanitarian workers were murdered in August 2006). Further, both the government and LTTE have frequently failed to act on recommendations of the SLMM.
In our report, we argued that given the failure of domestic mechanisms and the continuing culture of impunity, the setting up of a United Nations human rights monitoring mission is essential to save lives in Sri Lanka. Since we released our report on August 6, protection needs in Sri Lanka have increased, not decreased. It is even more vital for the international community to act now.
We have been surprised and disappointed that instead of looking into the information presented in this report, the government quickly dismissed our findings as “tendentious” and “generalized”. It seems like only yesterday that the LTTE was accusing us of bias and the government was quoting our reports at the UN and elsewhere favorably. When we spoke out in Toronto and London against LTTE intimidation against the Tamil communities there, the government applauded and the EU acted.
We haven’t changed our standards. What has changed is the reality on the ground. The research in this report–as in all our reports covering more than 70 countries across the world–is based on thorough and contemporary reporting, which is subjected to a rigorous process of fact-checking and review. Our reporting is based primarily on interviews with witnesses, victims, human rights defenders, humanitarian aid workers and others with direct experience on the ground. We also make inquiries to governments and non-state actors, as we did with the Sri Lankan government for this report. The government has accused us of having an agenda. This is true. It is to protect the human rights of all people. That’s it. There is no more to it.
Instead of using the report as a reason to turn its attention to address human rights violations, conduct effective investigations and stem the culture of impunity, the government has dismissed critics as “traitors,” “terrorist sympathizers,” and “supporters of the LTTE.” Yet in August 2007 chief government whip and Cabinet Minister Jeyaraj Fernandupulle called UN under-secretary for humanitarian affairs and emergency relief John Holmes a “terrorist” after Mr. Holmes appropriately described Sri Lanka as “one of the most dangerous places for aid workers in the world.” A few days after Mr. Holmes’ comment, two aid workers–one, a Tamil staff member of the Danish Demining Group, and the second, an employee of Sewalanka–were shot dead in the army held Jaffna peninsula.
The suggestion that we are somehow anti-government or pro-LTTE, or naively promoting the LTTE’s agenda, is absurd and beneath the Sri Lankan government. Instead of attacking the messenger, the government would do well to address the issues raised by Human Rights Watch and other serious organizations.
We would encourage the European Parliament to pass a strong resolution on Sri Lanka which would condemn violations both by the government and the LTTE and support a resolution calling for a UN human rights monitoring mission in Sri Lanka at the Human Rights Council in Geneva.
We stand ready to cooperate with the Sri Lankan government to promote and protect human rights in Sri Lanka. That should be our shared, and primary, goal.
Thank You.
September 12th, 2007
By Sumanasiri Liyanage
In his Mahaweera Day speech in 2005, Vellupillai Pirapaharan, the LTTE leader, depicted Ranil Wickremesinghe as a calculating fox who tried to deceive everyone by entering into a ceasefire agreement with the LTTE. Ranil Wickremesinghe has once again shown his foxy behaviour in his comments on the capture of Thoppigala by the security forces of the Government of Sri Lanka. His initial position was that capturing Thoppigala would be a useless exercise as it is worthy only for collectors of fire-wood.
However, at the signing of a MoU with the SLFP (M), Ranil Wickremesinghe claimed that under the Wijetunga-Wickremesinghe regime, Thoppigala was captured by the security forces. Did he mean that Thoppigala was strategically important then but not now? As I have no knowledge in military strategy and I have no idea to get an access to that sphere of knowledge, I do not wish to comment on his current position on the strategic importance of Thoppigala.
The UNP leader has said repeatedly that the security forces allowed the LTTE leaders including Ramesh and its cadres to escape from Thoppigala with military hardware that includes multi-barrel rocket launchers. Wickremesinghe told the press that this order that the LTTE leaders and cadres should be allowed to escape through an arranged route came directly from Colombo, allegedly from the political leadership of the Mahinda Rajapaksa government. In other words, the UNP leader is worried that the security forces failed to “annihilate the enemy” so that the victory became uncompleted and unfinished. It appeared that Ranil Wickremesinghe was highly worried because Thoppigala and its surrounding areas were not adequately littered by the dead corpses of LTTE cadres. He may recollect his memories about the operations by the security forces in the South in the dark days of the late 1980s and may be sad that it did not recur this time around Thoppigala. One may also pose the question: was the victory under the Wijetunga-Wickremesinghe regime a complete and finished affair?
On the other hand, the Mahinda Rajapaksa regime organized a big ‘thamasha’ to mark the military victory over the LTTE in the Eastern Province although there was no great enthusiasm among ordinary folks. The developments in the last few weeks have shown that his government’s parliamentary majority may dwindle in the immediate future as there is a possibility of SLMC and CWC changing their allegiance. The SLMC leader has already expressed his dissatisfaction about the way in which things are being handled in the Eastern Province. Thoppigala poses Mahinda Rajapaksa two options:
The first option is an extension of the Military victory beyond the Eastern Province to the Northern Province by attacking tiger strongholds there. Such a policy would please the JVP and JHU. It would also please, for different reasons, the UNP and SLFP (M). IF Mahinda Rajapaksa refuses to follow this option, Ranil Wickremesinghe would say that it proves their allegation that there is a secret deal between the GoSL and the LTTE.
The second option is focus on socio-economic and political reconstruction of the Eastern Province thus delaying the military campaign against the LTTE in the North even with or without a deal with the LTTE. This policy package includes inter alia holding of Provincial Council election, handing over the reconstruction and development efforts to newly elected PC, addressing human right issues. Reconstruction effort would face two main contradictions. As the event in Mavil Aru shows, the government politicians and their bureaucratic allies would engage in corrupt practices so that the people in the area will not be allowed to reap the benefits of the process. Secondly, there is a possibility of grabbing the control and the ownership of the process by the Colombo-centred government and its line ministries, I/NGOs and Colombo-based NGOs. These two problems can be avoided if the sole responsibility of the process is handed over to an elected Provincial Council or to an interim authority that comprises the Parliamentarians of the Province.
If Mahinda Rajapaksa goes for the first option, his government will be made unpopular in the South and it will be rejected as a legitimate government by Tamils especially in the North and East thus allowing new alliances to emerge and to topple the government. Increasing war expenditure would have adverse effects on the living standard, inflation and economic growth. So it is a trap. The UNP, SLFP (M), JVP and JHU intentionally or unintentionally are seeking to place the government in this trap. And all the indication suggests that Mahinda Rajapaksa would fall into it for multiple reasons. First, his own chauvinistic thinking would not allow him to develop an amicable solution to the national question as shown in the recent SLFP proposals that are regressive and backward. Secondly, as the concept of entrapment in conflict literature suggests that parties who have made investment in fomenting violence incur certain ’sunk costs’ so that they are forced to continue in order to “make good” on prior investments.
If MR prefers the second option because of the pressure of the economy or the international community, he would be able to get a breathing space and use that respite to reorganize the economy, the international stature of the country, and to receive foreign assistance for Eastern development. So it has, as I call it, an instrumental rational basis, but it at the same time transcends instrumental rationality because it gives new space for Tamils to negotiate with the government and Sinhala politics. So it would be a best confidence-building measure to win over the Tamils.
Mahinda Rajapakse can either choose the path of destruction or the path of reconstruction. [Courtesy: Montage]
September 7th, 2007
By Kusal Perera
We are annually wasting over 40% of the national budget says the Organisation for Professional Organisations (OPA), in a shocking exposure. It’s “waste” in the form of corruption, and due to corruption. Giving the OPA credit for this exposure, an editorial of an English daily took many professions, Doctors, Engineers and Journalists to task for this corruption and gave politicians pride of place for almost all corruption. The private sector was also accused for deals with politicians that sought to rob public funds.
The editorial said an invitation made by the OPA to political parties for a discourse to find ways and means to reduce corruption and waste if not to eliminate, was not even heeded by any political party. Looking for politicians to eliminate corruption and waste is like “pouring water on a duck’s back” said the editorial, while reminding the OPA that it should also turn towards their own member organisations to cut back on corruption.
All that is true but it is not the whole truth . It is only a part of the game. There’s more to it than all that.
While there is corruption in the private sector, in local bodies, within law enforcement agencies and in provincial life, let’s first agree that all corruption that affects the national budget and things national, has to first hatch and emerge within official rooms of government ministries.
All tenders, all procurements, all projects and all service agreements are the responsibility of relevant ministries, even if the implementing organisation is a corporation, a department or a District or Divisional Secretariat. All cabinet papers that arrange for tenders, procurements and projects are drafted and prepared at the highest levels of officialdom in the ministries. No contract, no deal or agreement that would allow for corruption goes without a ministry “nod”. And in all and every ministry, the “Chief Accounting Officer” for both administration and finances is the Ministry Secretary. In administrative terms they have to be from among the seniors in the Sri Lanka Administrative Service (SLAS).
Therefore the Sri Lanka Administrative Service (SLAS) cannot go without answering how such “deals” if there are any within a ministry, go without their members conniving to allow such deals. It is not the politician in the ministry who does the necessary documentation that allows for corruption.
In fact in most instances, it is the ministry official who provides the answers for corruption to go unchecked and unnoticed, or make robbing seem legal on documents. And there has emerged a trend by now, where officials, especially Secretaries follow their favourite Ministers to any ministry or get recommended to another. That perhaps is the reason why with 40% waste in public funds in the form of corruption we don’t see any Ministry Secretary dissenting with what the politician Minister wants .That therefore is the source of corruption in this country and its here that the finger should be pointed at.
While public awareness is very much a necessity to shout a ‘halt’ to all such corruption, it is also necessary to have systems and legal checks to stall corruption; and also authorities and agencies for their effective implementation too from whom the society could demand action.
One such major provision at hand is the law that requires the Declaration of Assets and Liabilities. The law as regards politicians requires all candidates to declare theirs and their family assets and liabilities when handing over nominations for any election and thereafter annually, if elected.
The law is clear that elected or not, every candidate has to declare his or her assets including those in the family either before swearing in as the elected representative or within 03 months of the election for defeated candidates, if they don’t provide declarations at the time of nominations.
The law also provides for the public to have access to them, which makes the process a public and a transparent process. If this law is effectively enforced, it would to a great extent control corruption in most ministries and at many levels of public administration.
Unfortunately the Commissioner of Elections who should implement this piece of law at every elections has to date never exercised his authority to do so. There is an unexplained hesitancy on the part of the Elections Commissioner in putting this law into practice. Politicians too don’t adhere to the practice of declaring their assets under this law and they are all in unison for keeping this law ineffective.
What is far worse is that even those who campaign for free and fair elections, transparency – accountability and good governance and new political cultures don’t seem to want this law enforced. Yet it’s one very important piece of law in this country, more important than even the Bribery and Fraud Investigation Bureau Act. All such acts and laws we have are basically there to catch culprits and punish.
Corruption like all crimes in society keeps accumulating and therefore needs to be prevented. This law on declaration of assets and liabilities is one that’s more preventive than cure. It’s a barrier against accumulation of wealth that can not be explained in public and justified. That’s precisely why that law is so important in curbing corruption in society. And that’s also why implementation of this law needs to be agitated for.
It would therefore augur well for the OPA to take up the issue of declaration of assets and liabilities with the Election Commissioner. Its time for a campaign to demand the Election Commissioner to play his role in implementing this law. And it is also time to demand that political parties would make it a disciplinary issue with their party members.
The very campaign for the enforcement of this law may probably reduce the 40% waste through corruption to a manageable level and its worth the effort. [Courtesy: Daily Mirror]
September 7th, 2007
by Col R Hariharan (retd.)
The Sri Lanka security forces in a swift operation on September 2, 2007 took over control of the western coastal area south of Mannar along Arippu-Silvatturai-Kondachchi. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) who had been expecting this move for some time now, made a tactical pull out, without offering much resistance, though they appear to have lost a dozen cadres. The region was under the nebulous control of the LTTE who used Silvatturai and other points to smuggle their needs and also to off load supplies from mother ships. After the operation the security forces recovered a suicide boat, 25 boats with outboard motors, and a large stock of anti-personnel and some Claymore mines and assorted ammunition. Though this was not a major LTTE base, its loss will further constrict Sea Tiger’s operational area on the west. The LTTE movement to Tamilnadu coast will now be a little more risky. Tactically, it makes the LTTE’s sea based infiltration operations into Puttalam-Negombo-Colombo coast more difficult.
[Col. R.Hariharan - File Photo by Dushiyanthini Kanagasabapathipillai]
If taking control of the coast to prevent illegal LTTE boat operations was the objective, the security forces will have to expand their hold further south, along the Portugal Bay coast. That will require clearing the area further down to Marthondikulam-Manchchukkadi ending at Kudremalai point. This would effectively cut off the LTTE infiltration into Wilpattu sanctuary, posing a threat to Sinhala villages on its periphery. Presumably this is what the security forces would do in the coming days, though the defence spokesman had said this operation was not the beginning of the northern offensive.
In July, the security forces had expanded the forward defended lines from west of Omanthai short of Paraiyanalankulam near Madhu-Iranai Iluppaikulam . If we correlate the capture of the coastal area with the July operations, the security forces gain clear operational advantages for their northern offensive. In all probability we can expect the opening up of the alternate axis Puttalam-Mannar road when Kudremalai point is linked up from the north. This will enable greater flexibility to build up troops as well as their maintenance. It also pushes any surprise LTTE threat from the west to the A9 axis farther. It also makes LTTE’s lateral movements between east and western halves of A9 highway more difficult.
After the loss of east, lack of adequate reinforcements is a reality the LTTE has to face. This could explain the LTTE’s pull out from the Arippu-Silvatturai coast without a counter offensive to draw off troops. Two other possible reasons are (1) to conserve strength to defend a more compact area when northern offensive comes and (2) inability to shift troops to the area due to forward contact of troops along the Mannar axis.
The LTTE had been proactively defending its forward defended lines elsewhere in north. Its artillery had been targeting Palali once again. However, it must be worried about its inability to infiltrate cadres both across the Jaffna Lagoon as well as Point Pedro coast in sizeable numbers. As the forward troops are tying down the LTTE along the forward lines, the LTTE has to combine its infiltration tactics to its main offensive on Jaffna. To this extent the security forces have succeeded in taking over the operational initiative from the LTTE to prevent such a build up.
The repeated failure of the Sea Tigers to operate freely in the coastal seas of Jaffna peninsula and increasingly along the Alampil Sea is the main reason for the LTTE’s current impasse. The LTTE chief Prabhakaran is reported to have made a rare public appearance at the funeral of the third rung leader of the Sea Tigers, Chandrasekaran Pillai alias Thiyagan, at Pudukkudiruppu. Thiyagan was killed in an encounter with the Sri Lanka navy off Trincomalee coast on August 13, 2007. According to some reports quoting Sri Lanka MI sources, Cheliyan has taken over as the commander of Sea Tigers, after Soosai, the veteran Sea Tiger commander, was seriously injured in an explosion triggered during a training exercise. If this is correct, the Sea Tigers are probably in the process of being revamped.
In this backdrop, perhaps the time is ripe for a LTTE offensive action that would give a big psychological boost to its cadres and improve its sagging image. For this the best option for the LTTE appears to be to develop offensive action along Welioya-Kokkuthoduvai area, which is the comparatively weak underbelly of the security forces. This option has three advantages for the LTTE: it poses a direct threat to Sinhala villages along the periphery and with its public fall out on LTTE capabilities, it takes the attention of security forces away from the main A9 axis, and it has the close support of heavy weaponry and probably Sea Tiger support from Wanni.
What are the chances of the security forces launching the northern offensive? The Army Commander Gen Fonseka has recently replaced the commanders of almost all field formations in Mannar sub sector and the entire northern sector. Though the changes could be to beef up the command element for launching an offensive, the new commanders are likely to take sometime to ease up the battle plans. Perhaps, the Silvatturai operation was in a test for the operational coordination of new commanders
What is the impact of the continuing “victories” of security forces on the peace process that has been in coma, and the All Party Representative Committee’s peace formulation exercise? Though military gains are valuable to the government to stabilise its parliamentary and political support, each one of them makes it more difficult to go back to a peace process that was designed for an entirely different mindset.
As far as the APRC is concerned, President Rajapaksa’s emphatic statement in a recent interview that federalism was “a negative word in Sri Lanka because people think it (is) synonymous with dividing the country. Also, I prefer the phrase ‘power sharing’ to ‘devolution’,” has cleared any illusions about the APRC deliberations. And his candid admission, “I cannot change history or my own political circumstances overnight. You must remember my political legacy and constraints. During my election I received few Tamil votes because of the LTTE-enforced boycott. I was elected primarily by a Sinhala constituency on an election manifesto which made it clear that an ultimate solution to the ethnic crisis could be evolved only on the basis of a unitary state. In any peace settlement I have to carry the Sinhala voters with me. I cannot unilaterally impose a settlement-it has to be the outcome of a political process-an outcome that must be long-lasting and acceptable to the people,” should put a stop to speculations about any value addition from the APRC exercise.
[Col. R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90. E-mail: colhari@yahoo.com]
September 7th, 2007
Dr. A.R.M. Imtiyaz
The recent Special Report No. 26 on the East of Sri Lanka by University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna) commonly known as UTHR (J), is entitled “Can the East be won through Human Culling?” The report attempts to expose the post-liberation reality and trend of Eastern Sri Lanka from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), an ethno-political movement, claiming to fight for self-determination for ethnic Tamils for a little more than two decades.
The LTTE is commonly labelled as a terrorist outfit both by the Government controlled by the majority Sinhalese and the minority Muslims whose political and economic elites generally cooperate with the successive governments for their perks, positions and privileges in the name of the interests of the Muslim masses.
The purpose of this piece is not to examine whether the UTHR’s reporting on the post-liberation East is accurate or whether it reflects a correct understanding about the current trends in the corner of Eastern Sri Lanka, particularly after what the LTTE calls its strategic withdrawal this summer. The aim here is to give some thoughts on its use of the existence of what it calls violent Muslim Jihadists in the Eastern province.
The UTHR’s use of Jihadists
The UTHR Special Report 26 section 3.2 titled “Muslim Extremism and Military Patronage” deals with the existence of what I call violent Muslim movements. The report points that there are violent Muslim elements existing in Eastern Sri Lanka. They are called Muslim home guards and Jihadists. According to UTHR, the former have been functioning under full-state security force patronage and “collect their weapons from the police station when going for duty and return them.” The latter are largely ideology-oriented Muslim extremists some of whom hail from the former.
According to the report, “Some home guards have sold their weapons to jihadist elements, some bought them from cadres on the run after the LTTE split and recently the security forces have also given weapons to them. The Police have given up trying to account for weapons. In Valaichchenai jihadists operate under military patronage parallel to the Karuna group in Tamil areas and novel things happen, such as a parallel legal system with the Military turning a blind eye” (emphases are not in the original).
Also, UTHR (J) seems to be well aware of the Jihadists’ nature, their estimated membership, and their activities including their collaboration with the state-supported Tamil paramilitary Karuna-group, as well as its intimidation of the rich local Muslim farmers and traders. UTHR (J) maintains that “in Valaichchenai itself there are an estimated 300 jihadists – the figure is also a reflection on unemployment [there]. While both home guards and jihadists operate with the security forces, the former are fairly well paid. The latter like the Karuna group support themselves by extortion, so that the Government gets their services for free…There is far reaching intimidation of the local Muslim populace as extortionists go around demanding money and threatening dire consequences for non-payment, particularly from those better off, parallel to what Karuna and Pillaiyan are doing among the Tamils…After the LTTE evacuated, Karuna’s men and the Jihadists once close, are now prone to clash” (emphases are not in the original).
Are Muslims using Jihadists?
There is a theoretical understanding about the existence of violent Muslim groups in the volatile Eastern region. Academically speaking, social, political, and/or economic grievances motivate communities to rebel violently against the dominant actors, particularly when they effectively exhaust options of dealing with the political moderates and liberals. This understanding can be applied to read the trend of radicalization of the Eastern Muslims.
It is true that, “there is discontent among Muslims, particularly among the young in some areas” and a section of the youth has been turning their attention to violent alternatives. However, the key question is this: can such discontent be linked to Jihadism led by Jihadists as UTHR (J) emphatically claims? If UTHR says yes, then we have at least two more questions to help understand the existence of Jihadists of the Eastern province. They are: what form does Jihadists’ violence take? And who is financing it? This article is not intended to seek answers to these two questions (which I take up separately in an article being submitted to an academic journal).
I am not thoroughly denying the existence of violent Muslim movements in the East or attempting to say that these violent elements have not received any state support to attack the Tamils or to defend their community.
I am honestly aware of the reality and admit that some violent elements do exist among the Muslims of the East and they are reasonably influenced by both domestic and global political environment.
Also, there is an increase of interest among the Muslims of Sri Lanka in Islamic faith. Non-mainstream Islamic views and those who hold such views, for example, Sufism and Sufis, have been brutally and violently targeted by violent elements attached to mainstream camps.
However, what is also true is that such violent activities remain disproportionately limited among Sri Lanka’s Muslims of the East and there is no reason to believe that these violent elements deserve to be called Jihadists. In fact, the term Jihadist is ideologically and politically heavy and constitutes many political implications.
Also, the term has been used and abused in the post-post-cold war political environment where culture (religion) and ethnicity replace the role played by class-oriented politics during the cold-war area. In Sri Lanka, Tamil nationalists often attempt to portray violent Muslim activists as Jihadists to draw global political attention and in order to exploit easily forthcoming global help.
It seems Muslims are not very comfortable with the post-post-cold war world order. They believe that the global powers systematically marginalize the legitimate concerns and aspirations of the Muslims and classify their political activities into a broader Jihadism. Many Sri Lankan Muslims feel this way. Thus the UTHR (J)’s employment of the term Jihadists more likely brings unwelcome, perhaps even unfair, global attention on the Muslims of Sri Lanka, since its reports are widely read by western scholars on South Asia, particularly Sri Lanka.
Beyond the label
Sri Lanka Muslims who are evolving from an isolated religious community into a separate group based on the Islamic faith, are at the crossroad. They are subject to discrimination and unfair treatment as well as negative media coverage both by the Sinhalese polity and the Tamil polity.
It is undeniably true that there is increasing discontent among Sri Lanka Muslims of the East over the delivery of democratic Muslim political representatives and thus a certain section of the Muslim youths have been slowly turning their interests towards non-democratic channels and working actively and independently to seek a new non-traditional leadership, and are associated with the Sinhalese-dominated state security forces.
However, the labelling of such violent activism simply as Jihadism may not in anyway help to weaken the violent tendency and interests among Sri Lanka Muslims. Rather it may serve counter-productively and could strengthen Muslim interests toward Jihadism at a stage where democratic political representatives totally fail their Muslim constituencies. [sundaytimes.lk]
[The author is a Sri Lankan political scientist who is currently affiliated as a visiting scholar at the Department of Political Science, Temple University, USA.]
September 6th, 2007
A large gathering of 250 or so persons met at the Indian YMCA Building in Central London on 26 August, the eightieth birthday of the late Hon. A. Amirthalingam, the undisputed Tamil leader for well over a decade and former Leader of the Opposition , to celebrate his life and work. It was organized by the Amirthalingam Trust, with Dr. Baheerathan Amirthalingam, his younger son, doing much of the behind the scenes work. Sumptuous eats in neat boxes were served for the guests who had travelled great distances.
A major event that evening was the release of a book on Mr. Amirthalingam containing some of his important speeches of historic value.
Dr. Nicholas Pillai, President of the London TULF Branch presided. Mr. V. Anandasangari, and Mrs. Mangayatkarasi Amirthalingam spoke and Professor Ratnajeevan Hoole, introduced by Dr. Neethirajah, delivered the Eightieth Birth-anniversary Memorial Lecture. Mr. R. Sampanthan and Mr. Ram of the Hindu were the speakers at the Seventy-fifth anniversary Lecture. The vote of thanks was delivered Mr. Kandeepan Amirthalingam, Mr. Amirthalingam’s eldest son
Prof. Hoole’s 90-minute talk, was titled “A Time for Tamil Introspection and Reassessment in the midst of Myth and Propaganda” and was also published as a booklet by the Amirthalingam Trust. His speech was richly accompanied by slides illustrating his points. The theme of his talk was that Tamils suffer from several myths. He specifically pointed to five myths: (1) Tamils b elieving their own propaganda without verification and acting on it; (2) Tamils declaring anyone who disagrees with them to be a traitor ; (3) Overseas Tamils presuming to be Tamil Representatives — he had amusing examples of the antics of overseas Tamils, particularly from the Ilangaith Thamil Changam ; (4) Tamils believing Tamil histories to be right and Sinhalese histories to be propaganda; and (5) Tamils presuming Tamils to be a Monolithic Community.
He argued that as a result of playing cards they do not have, Tamils together as a people have slipped in numbers behind the Muslims to second minority and therefore there is a crisis upon the community calling for an urgent change of course. Stating that things would have been much better under the Indo-Lanka Accord or the constitutional proposals pushed by Dr. Neelan Tiruchelvan, he asserted that Mr. Amirthalingam was so right in going for the Accord and that Tamils as a people did not give space to their leaders to lead. If either the Accord or the Tiruchelvam proposals had been implemented, he asserted that with safety in the North-East, Tamils would have fared much better. “Is there anyone today who still does not accept this?”, he poignantly asked.
Prof. Hoole adduced that the course of cooperation has been tried and failed in that those Tamils who deal with the state come back empty handed and as a result lose standing among the people. Muslims who tried it are now taken for granted as Sinhalese are settled in the Moothoor area and the Muslim leadership is too scared to protest. Mr. Arumugam Thondaman is sidelined into silence with caste insults, completely taken for granted.
Going on, Prof. Hoole stated that the course of war has failed as Tamils flee the war and the community is effectively facing extinction. The war, he said, has brought out the worst in Tamils making them turn their guns on themselves and the Muslims. In his view, if the government keeps up the war for another five years, there would be no Tamil community left to speak of.
He concluded that the only path to survival as a people is for Tamils to make a real commitment to human rights and speak of violations against the community by the government as well as internal violations. Unless Tamils did this, he said, no one would take them seriously as they complained to the International Community of only violations by the government. It was his thesis that only the International Community can force the Sri Lankan state to give Tamils their due and this requires Tamils putting their house in order and showing that they truly cared for Tamil rights. And for this, he said that Tamils must be seen as being serious about Tamil rights, wherever assaults come from.
Using examples from engineering, he put forward his thesis that the practicable second best is effectively better than the impossible best. That is, a second best federal state where Tamils can live in safety, practicing their culture, is always better than the impossible separate state.
Stating that he had no influence with the LTTE, he urged overseas Tamils who work with the LTTE to persuade them that it is in the Tamil self-interest to make this correction in course.
The text of the booklet published by the Amirthalingam trust can be read on www.federalidea.com.
September 5th, 2007
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