transcurrents

Anandasangaree, Deplores Attacks on Press and Parliamentarian

The conduct of the unidentified gang in attacking and burning down the Leader News Paper Press is highly deplorable and should be very strongly condemned by every right-thinking person and by those who value democratic norms. Writing should be met by writing and not by thuggery or by any other undemocratic means. When the country is trying hard to reinstall democracy that had deteriorated to a great extent, it is indeed annoying and disturbing to see democracy eroding further day by day. The Government in it’s own interest and to save its name should go all out to trace the culprits and punish them which I hope will not be difficult at all.

Who-ever is responsible for this dastardly act or instrumental for it, should not go with the impression that they have achieved something great, forgetting the fact that it will boomerang on them one day, not far away. This type of actives will not help anybody other than brining ruin to the democratic principles and disgrace to the country.

Every citizen should take it as an offence committed against everyone of us and therefore should go all out to bring the culprits to book by giving all information they have or can gather about this incident, to the authorities.

A petrol bomb thrown at the residence of Hon. Mr. Sooriyarachchi, Member of Parliament is equally deplorable. This act in inhuman and cowardly and should not be encouraged by any body under any circumstances. This should not happen even to the worst enemy. A big tragedy is averted, by his wife and four children escaping unhurt.

A question everyone of us should ask ourselves is whether we should tolerate this type of brutal acts in our society which is living in constant fear and tension and had suffered to the maximum due to the on-going war.

V. Anandasangaree,
President-TULF.

November 23rd, 2007

Report of Field visit to Trincomalee and Mutur

1st-3rd Nov. 2007-Preliminary report-14th November 2007:

Ruki Fernando, Law & Society Trust ( LST )
1. Introduction:

This visit was undertaken in order to gain a better understanding of the human rights and humanitarian situation in and around Trincomalee district, on the invitation of a local human rights defender.

It aims to highlight key issues of concern faced by residents of Trincomalee, people still living in IDP camps and people who have returned after being displaced. It is not and does not attempt to be a comprehensive report of the human rights and humanitarian situation in the Trincomalee district.

Discussions were held with several local government officials (Grama Sewakas) in Mutur, officials of the Trincomalee district Human Rights Commission, staff of UN agencies, international and local humanitarian NGOs, human rights defenders and displaced people. There were also informal conversations with soldiers and policemen.

Areas visited include the Trincomalee town and surrounding areas in Mutur such as Ralkuly, Ichalampattu, Ilangaturai, Kallady, Karikamunai, Munchenai, Jinna Nagar.

LST gratefully acknowledges the time given by people met and views shared and in particular, the accompaniment and hospitality of human rights defenders working in the areas visited, whose names are withheld at their request, for security reasons.

2. General situation in and around Trincomalee:

Trincomalee remains heavily militarized and tense. In the short stretch of around 85km between Habarana and Trincomalee, the bus I traveled on was stopped at five checkpoints, forcing people to alight with all their belongings and walk a few hundred meters in the hot sun. Consideration was extended though to older people and women with children. At every checkpoint, Tamil passengers were singled out for intense checking and questioning.

After 7pm, Trinco town is almost deserted. At midnight on Saturday, when I was returning after a meeting, not a single vehicle was encountered on the road.

While I was in Mutur, a man had been shot dead in Karikamunai, in the Eechchilampathu division, where several displaced people had come back to resettle. Local people told me he was member of the Karuna group.

Another man had been killed due to shelling in, Ralkuly while the Grama Seweka in charge of the Manalchchenai transit camp had also been shot dead. (See below for further details)

According to the Human Rights Commission’s (HRC) Trincomalee office, abductions and disappearances continue to be reported almost on a daily basis -24 had been reported in August and 39 in September. “We are also told of other cases, but these are not included as no formal complaint is made-many people don’t complain to us or the Police due to fear of reprisals,” said one official.

The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) had reported killings, abductions and arrests from the Trincomalee district, in their recent weekly reports. Abuses by the Tamileela Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP / Karuna faction) also continue to be reported, but I heard that their strength seems to be dwindling. They now have two offices in Trincomalee, while they had about 10 offices before.

One issue that was highlighted by several people was the inability to obtain death certificates for several people killed in shelling in Kadiravelly, near Vakarai, in 2006. This has also made it impossible for family members to obtain relief and compensation. Although agencies such as the Human Rights Commission and UNHCR seem aware of this, there has been no satisfactory response to the family members after more than a year.

The HRC seems to monitor the situation and intervene on some violations, including abuses by non state actors, but it doesn’t seem to have a significant impact. In the case of three high profile cases (Killing of 5 students in Jan. 2006, killing of 17 aid workers of ACF in Aug. 2006 and killing of Buddhist Monk, Ven. Nandarathna Thero) in Trincomalee district, the HRC had made its own investigations and submitted a report to its headquarters in Colombo. Progress had apparently come to a standstill at that point. The IDP Unit in the HRC seemed up-to-date with information on the IDP situation and issues affecting IDPs. They had also been visiting IDP camps. But again, the level of strong interventions to protect and ensure IDP’s rights was not clear.

3. Situation and key issues relating to IDPs-in camps and those returned:

Thousands of IDPs still stay in camps and with friends and relatives. With regard to camps, there are several around Trincomalee town, while there are three identified as transit camps on the outskirts of Mutur, as mentioned below.

i. Killiveddy

ii. Paddiththidal

iii. Manalchchenai

Key issues:

i. High Security Zone (HSZ) in Sampoor

* Government created a HSZ by gazette dated 30th May 2007

* There was no official figure of the number that would permanently lose their traditional lands and homes due the establishment of the High Security Zone in Sampoor by the government. According to statistics I got from the Human Rights Commission, 15,425 people from 11 Grama Niladhari Divisions, who are presently in camps and with relatives will be affected, while most of the displaced still in Batticaloa (11,672 as of September) will also be losing their lands. NGOs working with displaced people in camps put a higher figure

* Most people had been sent back from IDP camps in Batticaloa with the promise of returning to Sampoor-they only realized when they arrived in camps that they will not be allowed to go home. At that point, they were told that they would be allowed to go home in a few days. But later on, they had heard from various sources that they will never be allowed to go back

* None of the affected people I met had been officially informed or consulted about this by any government officia
l
* Displaced people I spoke to, who now live in camps (Cultural hall, Inner Harbour Road , Trincomalee, Killiveddy and Paddiththidal), were clear they don’t want to go anywhere else except their homes in Sampoor. Several mentioned that the proposed place for relocation, Ralkuly, is not a suitable place for them to live. Many mentioned that they have means of livelihood such as paddy fields and cattle in their homes, and that they could even survive without assistance as long as they could go back home. One went as far as saying that he would commit suicide if forcibly relocated

* UN Agencies and HRC officials mentioned that government has plans to reduce the size of the high security zone, but no official announcement has been made to date

Appendix 1:

Map of Trincomalee, indicating area around Sampoor as an area without humanitarian access (C/o OCHA, 5th Oct. 2007)

ii. Proposed relocation site-Ralkuly

* Several affected people and officials I met mentioned that Ralkuly has been identified as the place where affected people will be relocated to, and hence, I also visited Ralkuly

* I learnt from a local government official and residents in Ralkuly that a jungle in Ralkuly is being cleared to build a housing scheme-that two houses had already been built and that the plan is to build 138 houses

* Ralkuly residents, who themselves had come back after being displaced mentioned they would welcome others to resettle if they like to come, but express doubt whether they want to come

* Ralkuly residents mentioned despite claims of “liberation”, they still live in fear that they would be affected if fighting broke out again

* A man had been killed by shelling, which according to local villages was by the government forces, on 24th September. A 63 year old woman told me how she had been injured in that incident, and took me to her kitchen to show a gaping hole made by the shelling. Villages told that the three children and wife of the man killed are finding it difficult to survive without any income. There has been no compensation of any sort, neither has there been any inquiry into this incident

* I also heard that people in Navallady, near Ralkuly, have not been allowed to resettle as that area too had been marked as a High Security Zone, but was not able to verify this

iii. Assistance and facilities in camps

* I visited two major transit camps in Killiveddy and Paddiththidal and also the camp in Cultural Hall in Inner Harbour road

* In both Killiveddy and Paddiththidal, I was told that the toilets are full and that they cannot be used anymore

* In the Cultural Hall, several people mentioned that they don’t receive any assistance from the government, and that the only assistance they get is half a loaf of bread (around 225 grams) per person per day for dinner, provided by a NGO

* They also mentioned difficulties in finding means of livelihood, such as daily jobs, and I also heard from several men who fear to go out of the camp due to apprehensions about being arrested on suspicion of having links to the LTTE

iv. Security in camps

* There was an alarming level of fear in the Paddiththidal camp due to harassment by the government forces

* Several displaced persons told me that whenever there is firing in the jungles behind the camp, the army would come to the camp, conduct search operations, round up young men for questioning and threaten people

* The military had threatened that if one soldier is killed in any incident, they will take revenge on the people in the camp, repeatedly referring to the massacre of more than 20 Tamil civilians in 1996 in nearby Kumarapuram

* In September, 26 people were beaten up by the military, including a pregnant woman. Another woman who had tried to intervene had also been beaten

* A petition signed by around 150 people in the camp had been handed over to the ICRC and the Human Rights Commission, but the intimidation continues

* I was also told that young men are scared to go out and do any casual job, as they might be arrested in round ups by the military

* In September, the Grama Sewaka in charge of the nearby Manalchchenai transit camp had been shot dead in the night. One person told me that it was likely because of his involvement in supporting the attempt to petition the Supreme Court on the loss of homes due to the Sampoor High Security Zone

* I camp leader reported that everyday, 2-3 families are moving out due to fear and already, about 15 families have left

v. Concerns about a separate “IDP” identity card

* Police had started to issue “IDP identity cards” to people living in camps-when I was in the Killiveddy transit camps, this was going on

* This ID is valid only for the Trincomalee district and includes the picture of the person, address, occupation, date of birth and also the race

* This had been issued to people who already have National Identity Cards (NIC) issued by the Central government, as well as people who didn’t have their NIC

* The general feeling was this IDP identity card was an attempt to mark them out as “IDPs” and “Tamils”

* Several people expressed fear that the identity card could be used for round up of people by Police and Security forces, and in particular to single out people who had lived in areas controlled by the LTTE. “The military always try to harass us, thinking we are LTTE supporters because we lived in areas that were controlled by the LTTE. This ID card will help them to single us out” said one man, whose 19 year old son had been taken in on suspicion.

* Many I spoke to questioned why the Police had to issue a separate ID card when the NIC issued by the central government was valid throughout the country. They also suggested that the effort and resources they are putting to make this ID cards could be directed towards issuing NICs for those who don’t have one at present

* Of particular concern was the fact that the ID particularly mentions “race”, and in most of the IDs I saw, “Tamil” was displayed prominently. This is something that is not disclosed in the NIC

vi. Fishing restrictions in and around Mutur

* Severe restrictions on fishing have been imposed by the military. One affected area that I visited was Thaqwa Nagar, a predominant Muslim fishing community, close to the jetty in Mutur. The restrictions imposed are causing untold hardships to the people there

* The day before I went there, Friday 2nd Nov., fishing had totally banned by the military, without any reason

* On days that fishing is allowed, its subject to a series of restrictions
+ Fishing is not allowed beyond 2kilometers from the shore
+ Engine boats are not allowed
+ Fishing can only be done with a permit issued by the Navy, valid for 3 months
+ The cost of photos has to be borne by Fishemen, and this is around Rs. 300, more than what most fishermen earn for a day under the existing restrictions
+ This permit has to be surrendered to a military checkpoint each time they go fishing, and has to be collected on return on the same day. The registering point opens only at 4am, so in effect, only very few fishermen can actually go out to sea by 4am
+ The form for obtaining the permit is only in Sinhalese and almost no one understands Sinhalese in this community

* One fisherman told me that he had not caught any fish that day. On other days, the income would be Rs. 200-300 (less than USD 2-3), much less than what they used to get before

* Most of the fish collecting centres had also been closed down

* Several fishermen also told me that fishing had been allowed when the area was under the control of the LTTE and that fishing is also allowed in and around Trincomalee

* Fishing has been the traditional means of livelihood for the Thaqwa Nagar community and fishermen mentioned that they are not able to engage in other forms of livelihood

* A soldier manning the registration point for fishermen admitted that fishermen are facing many difficulties due to these restriction and said that he didn’t know when the restrictions would be relaxed, such an order would have to come from higher authorities in Colombo

Appendix 2:

Fishing permit in Sinhalese (Names and other details have been blurred to protect identity of the holder)

vii. Paddy fields affected by a new road

* I saw a new road being built across the A15 road (Mutur-Eravur) bisecting the paddy fields. I learnt later that this new road was to link Kantalai to Sampoor, the high security zone area

* A farmer, who had been displaced and returned back, mentioned that he had lost large parts of his paddy field, and might lose as much as Rs. 75,000 (around USD 700) per harvest because of this

* He had not been informed or consulted on this by the military or any government official

* I heard from another farmer that about 50 farmers (Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim) will lose their paddy fields due to this project, and that to his knowledge, no one had been informed or consulted

* There has been no compensation offered or even discussed

* One of the farmers I spoke to expressed fear to complain about this matter and said it might be best to bear the loss silently. “We are Tamils, so we can’t complain. We live in fear, and if we try to complain, we might even be killed” he told me

viii. Restrictions on breaking stones

* Another group of displaced people, in Jinna Nagar, whose traditional means of livelihood had been breaking stones, are badly affected by recent restrictions on this

* According to affected people, a group of Buddhist monks had visited the area and asked them to stop breaking stones as there had been a Buddhist statue in the area before

* The monks had promised food rations and other support to the affected communities, but nothing had been received

* Subsequently, Mutur Police had threatened them with arrest if they continued breaking stones

* Authorities had ordered them to stop breaking stones for a month, but afterwards, they were allowed to resume this, but in only in a small area

* As these people do not have alternative means of livelihood, this had put them under a severe economic difficulties

* About 60 affected families had handed over an appeal to the Divisional Secretary and the Military Commander, but they had not received any response

Appendix 3

Petition submitted to authorities by the affected people in the Jinna Nagar Community

ix. Suppression of Hindu places of worship

* There has been a Hindu Kovil in Ilangeturai, but after the area had been taken over by the government forces, Hindus have been prevented from going there

* Several villagers in nearby Kallady and Muthichenai told me their fears that Hindu statues had been put aside and Buddhist statues put in its place by the military

* They also mentioned that although Tamil villagers are being prevented from visiting what had been a place of worship for them, visiting Sinhalese people are allowed to visit the site, apparently because they are Buddhists and they are also allowed to bathe in the nearby beach

x. Assistance to resettled IDPs

* Most people who had been displaced and come back to resettle, live in makeshift huts, near their homes

* The people I spoke to mentioned that there had been assistance provided to build temporary shelters

* Although many had returned to their places of origin, they have not received assistance to build permanent houses

* All the returnees I spoke to also mentioned problems about livelihood. For fisherfolk, the restrictions imposed on fishing by the military are having a crippling effect on their economy. Farmers expressed a need for seeds and equipment to restart farming, while several others said they would need assistance to develop the small income generating projects they had restarted, such as cycle repair shops and grocery stores

The humble dwelling and kitchen of a resettled family

xi. Property lost during displacement

* Many of the displaced had come back and found that their property was missing, even when ruins of their houses were still there

* Amongst the property that many had lost were motor bikes, tractors and electrical appliances such as TVs

* One family mentioned that they had lost their car, which they had seen in a nearby army camp. They claimed that despite repeated requests and production of relevant documents, the military refuses to hand back the car

4. Conclusion:

Despite claims of “liberation” and “reawakening” of the East, civilians in Trincomalee live in a highly militarized environment. Despite the heavy presence of security forces, disappearances and killings continue regularly.

Displaced people who still live in camps experience a number of problems. They live in fear of harassment and threats by the military, do not have enough assistance and facilities and people whose homes and lands had been taken over by the military for high security zones have serious concerns about forcible relocation. Government officials have not informed or consulted affected people on these matters.

People who were displaced and had returned to their places of origin also face problems of security as shown by the killings in Ralkuly and Karikamunai in the last two months. There are serious problems regarding livelihoods, such as the restrictions placed on fishing, the arbitrary taking over of paddy fields for a new highway and restrictions on breaking stones. Most people are also in need of assistance to build permanent shelters and begin livelihoods.

Key agencies, such as the Human Rights Commission and UN agencies are monitoring the situation and seemed aware of many of the problems and are making interventions with local government officials. ICRC and SLMM also continue to have a presence and accept complaints from civilians. But people I spoke to are yet to benefit from their interventions, particularly relating to protection and security. Humanitarian agencies assistance to thousands of people over an extended period and their task is made more difficult due to lack of information about government plans on resettlement.

LST calls on the government and all other concerned agencies to take immediate steps to address the concerns of displaced people in the Trincomalee district, including the eleven specific concerns highlighted in this report.

10 comments November 22nd, 2007

Arson Attack On “The Sunday Leader” Printing Press In Ratmalana

The Ratmalana printing press of the Leader Publications was attacked by arsonists early last morning, the second such attack in two years on the publishers of The Sunday Leader, Morning Leader and Irudina newspapers.

Sunday Leader Editor Lasantha Wickramatunga termed the latest attack as a ‘commando style’ operation which took place within a high security zone in close proximity to the Ratmalana military and domestic airport.

According to the Mt. Lavinia Police around 10 armed men had forced their way into the printing press threatened the employees and set fire to some of the equipment and also the newspapers which were set to hit the market yesterday. The Morning Leader is published on Wednesdays.

The ‘Sudar Oli’ of Uthayan newspapers is also printed at the same location and burnt copies of the Tamil newspaper were also seen on the floor hours after the blaze.

Mount Lavinia Division SSP Edision Gunathileke said two police teams have been deployed to probe the attack.

Meanwhile eye witnesses said that four men scaled the walls of the printing press and forced open the gates letting in around 15 other masked men to carry out the attack.

Some 25 employees of the press who were on duty were forced to kneel down while the attackers poured petrol on the machines and some newspapers before setting them on fire.

A petrol bomb was also believed to have been hurled at the machinery. Witnesses also claimed that a jeep and a double cab were seen parked nearby at the time of the attack.

The Dehiwala and Mount Lavinia Municipal Council fire brigade units took around one hour to douse the flames. The Government Analyst was due to visit the scene of the attack to investigate the incident and furnish a report later today.

In October 2005 an armed gang broke into the same press in Ratmalana and set bundles of newspapers on fire. The gang also assaulted the publication’s manager and demanded that printing of the newspaper be stopped.

In May of that year, the editor wrote to the country’s police chief claiming his life was under threat after a pro-government lawmaker accused him publicly of supporting the LTTE. Mr. Wickrematunga was also attacked once and his house shot at in 1998.

Editors’ Guild condemns

The Editors’ Guild of Sri Lanka yesterday condemned “in the strongest manner possible,” the arson attack on the printing press of Leader Publications Pvt. Ltd., early Wednesday morning.

The statement goes on to say:

The fact that the publications of that Newspaper House viz., Irudina, The Sunday Leader, and the Morning Leader have been severe critics of the incumbent Government places a heavy burden on the administration to have ensured its safety. The natural inference that could be drawn from this attack is to the detriment of the Government, which is already under the microscope locally and internationally for the abuse of Human Rights, individual liberties, democratic rights and media freedom.

While appreciating the difficulties faced by the Government in combating terrorism, the Guild is firmly of the view that when democratic freedoms of the citizens, cherished for so long, are trampled by the jackboots of anarchical forces in the manner it was done in this instance, it will negate the very purpose for which terrorism is being squashed, i.e. to permit democracy to flourish.

Investigations into countless incidents of a similar nature, throughout the country in recent times, including the murder of journalists, have not yielded results, with the Government being unable or unwilling to bring the culprits to book.

The Guild believes that this brazen attack will add to Sri Lanka’s plunging record on Media Freedom should the Government decide to treat the incident as just another statistic.

Ranil holds Government responsible

Opposition Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe yesterday charged that the attack on the Leader Publications press was a blow to media freedom and democracy in the country.

In a statement, the Opposition Leader said: “The junta ruling the country today has delivered another deadly blow to democracy. Early this morning an armed group stormed the Sunday Leader and Irudina Newspaper press, setting one building on fire and severely damaging a number of printing machines.

“This press is located in a High Security Zone. The Ratmalana Airport, the Air Force base, the Kotelawala Defence Academy and an Army camp are also located in this area.

“There are road blocks at every entry point to this zone. Nobody can gain easy access to this zone. It would be extremely difficult to enter this area at night.

“A number of aircraft belonging to the Air Force are hangared at the Ratmalana airbase and tight security measures have been put in place to ensure their safety. So it is surprising that an armed group could gain entry to such a heavily fortified area.

“If any group is to enter this area, they can only do so with the knowledge the Defence Ministry. No one can enter this area without the knowledge of the Ministry.

“Security arrangements in this area are being implemented thoroughly. Hence the armed group had been dispatched there with the knowledge of the Government and the Defence Ministry to destroy the press.

“That is why I brand this regime as a junta. The Cabinet is not aware of these things. This junta has control over the economy, business activities and defence. They have unleashed corruption and terror on the country.

“The Sunday Leader and the Irudina spoke out against these activities. We see this as an attempt to close down these newspapers as they pose a threat to the junta. On previous occasions, too, these newspapers have come under threat.

“Today the media is being suppressed by the banning of newspapers and electronic media and by setting fire to printing presses. Media men too have been intimidated and have to work in a climate of fear.

“The most number of journalists killed have been from Sri Lanka. Many international media organizations have protested against this dangerous trend in Sri Lanka.

“The United National Party vehemently condemns threats against media freedom. We will commit ourselves to upholding media freedom.”

Government Orders Probe

Expressing its regrets over the arson attack on the Leader Publications press early last morning, the government said yesterday that an investigation had already been ordered into the crime.

Addressing the media at the government’s press briefing at the Information Department, Media Minister Lakshman Yapa Abeywardana said the government did not approve of this kind of attack on the media, irrespective of the quarters they come from.

“On hearing of the attacks, President Rajapaksa instructed the police to conduct an impartial inquiry and to bring the perpetrators to book as early as possible — despite the differences the government had with this group of papers,” Mr. Abeywardana said.

Asked by a journalist as to how an arson attack could be carried out in a high security zone without the knowledge of the security forces personnel, he said attacks on media establishments within high security zones had been carried out in the past too. He cited the recent attack on Yugaya Publications, where the official publication of the UNP democratic group, ‘Sirilaka’ was printed, as an example.

Press Institute condemns

The Sri Lanka Press Institute (SLPI) ‘wholeheartedly’ condemns the destruction of the Printing Press of Leader Publications, publisher of the Sunday Leader, the Morning Leader and Irudina newspapers.

In a statement the SLPI said that “this is a dangerous situation where the government appears unable to enforce law and order. An attack on the free press is also an attack on the freedom of expression of the people of this country which is guaranteed by the constitution.” Demanding the government conduct a full and impartial inquiry into the incident and bring the perpetrators to justice, the SLPI called upon the government to ensure that incidents such as this and other attacks on journalists do not happen in the future.

According to available information an armed group entered the premises of the company and set fire to the press and some of the newspapers while the printing of the “Morning Leader” newspaper was in progress.

The SLPI sees this as a dastardly attack on an independent newspaper by armed groups and questions as to how such an attack could take place within a high security zone close to the capital of the country, it added.

Free Media Movement

The Free Media Movement which expressed outrage at the latest act against the freedom of the press in the island, said the authorities were responsible in that they were not able to protect the printing house of Leader Publications.

The Free Media Movement, while condemning the attack on the Leader Publications, said that today’s issue of Morning Leader print-run was on when the armed gang entered the premises.

The FMM, in a brief statement issued yesterday, referred to the dispute between Ms Sonali Samarasinghe, editor of The Morning Leader and the Asian Tribune website at the centre of a simmering controversy over its alleged relationship with the breakaway LTTE faction now headed by Pillayan.

“Recently, the Morning Leader editor had been very critical of Asia Tribune website, which according to the editor, was working hand in glove with the breakaway LTTE militant group now headed by Pillayan. She filed a civil defamation case against the website some weeks ago and in retaliation the website unleashed a series of articles attacking her,” the FMM said.

The Sunday leader printing press was set on fire on an earlier occasion on October 17, 2005 in the run up to the last presidential election.

The FMM said that Sunday Leader and its editor Lasantha Wickramatunga as well as Morning Leader Editor Sonali Samarasinghe have been harassed and threatened continuously during the last two years. All Leader publications are very critical of the government and are exponents of Opposition political views.”

The FMM blamed the government for not being able to protect the printing house. “The culture of impunity that prevails in this country has prevented any meaningful inquiry into all acts of violence against the media and journalists that has taken place under this government. The government has failed miserably to uphold and maintain the rule of law when the people’s democratic and human rights are violated. it said.”

Compiled from news reports filed by Sandun A Jayasekera,Senaka De Silva and Ananda Weerasuriya in the “Daily Mirror” and Norman Palihawadena in “The Island”.

12 comments November 21st, 2007

Thamilchelvan and Tamil Politics – I

by Rajan Philips

There are many pantheons in the small world of the formerly Ceylon, and now Sri Lankan, Tamils. There is more than one political pantheon and Thamilchelvan is the latest to enter the pantheon created and consecrated by the LTTE. His political life and dramatic death, a quick retaliation by the government to the LTTE’s Anuradhapura blitzkrieg a fortnight earlier, are symptomatic of many things that have gone wrong with Sri Lanka in general and among the Tamils in particular. Reactions and responses to his death have been mixed and divisive as indeed our politics are-outrage and mourning, revenge and celebrations, and middle-of-the-road concerns about the diminishing prospects for peace and political solution.

[S.P.Thamilchelvan attends a Reuters interview in Kilinochchi, May 7, 2005. Courtesy: Reuters/Anuruddha Lokuhapuarachchi - via Yahoo! News]

The public reactions to Thamilchelvan’s death are not the result of his military record but of his becoming the political face of the LTTE. He came into public view first in 1995-as the Leader of the Political Section and participating in the abortive peace talks between the LTTE and the Kumaratunga government. He was not much heard of before that, and there is not even an ‘honourable mention’ of Thamilchelvan in either of Narayan Swamy’s two books on the LTTE that are both recounts of violence rather than a study in politics. According to B. Raman, the Indian defence expert, Thamilchelvan is the only LTTE leader who may not have been involved in violence against non-combatants. Since 1995, Thamilchelvan has been LTTE’s smiling poster boy and the alter ego to Anton Balasingham. But unlike Balasingham, who was the retained theoretician almost from the inception of the LTTE, Thamilchelvan was groomed within the organization. He was the principal bearer of the political hat in an otherwise insurgent and military organization. He was the coordinator with expatriates who provided expert advice from the outside, and it was rumoured that Thamilchelvan was the main voice of moderation during the preparation of the ISGA document by the LTTE’s expatriate expert panel in Dublin in 2003. Thamilchelvan’s killing has produced a poetic irony: the government has exposed itself to criticism for targeted killing and for killing the prospect for peace in the short-term; on the other hand, given its own record as the past master of political killing the LTTE could hardly throw a moral stone at the government.

The reactions to Thamilchelvan’s death, even among the pundits, have been bordering on morbid curiosity rather than political reflection. There is no more talk in government circles about the APRC and its on-again, off-again deliberations. The buzz in Colombo is when, and not if, can the rest of the LTTE leadership be taken out? The government has mirror-imaged itself on the LTTE and is content with flexing its military muscle rather than rising above the LTTE and fulfilling the State’s political responsibilities. If the government or anyone else of political consequence in the South were to take these responsibilities seriously, they will pause to reflect on what have gone wrong in Sri Lanka and among the Tamils, and how to put them right.

First, anyone serious about Tamil politics should try to understand the trajectory of Tamil political leadership from the old elites, through a difficult transition, to the phenomenon that is the LTTE. Second, how and to what extent did the actions of the Sri Lankan State and governments contribute to the emergence of the LTTE claiming to be the sole representative of the Tamils? Third, what sense can we make of the LTTE phenomenon? Lastly, how can an exclusively military approach designed to overwhelm the LTTE be expected to lead to peace and reconciliation among the Sinhalese, the Tamils and the Muslims. Thamilchelvan’s political life and death provides the occasion and the backdrop to reflect on these questions.

[Ponnambalam Brothers - Arunachalam and Ramanathan]

The old pantheon

Forty years ago, about the time Thamilchelvan was born unknown and unsung in the obscure village of Mattuvil in the Jaffna Peninsula, the late A.J. Wilson, already the academic Brahmin of Peradeniya, presented a charmingly familial paper at the first International Association of Tamil Research (IATR) Conference in Kuala Lumpur. It was about the “Contribution of some leading Ceylon Tamils to the constitutional and political development of Ceylon during the 19th and 20th centuries”. The Tamil leaders featured were the elites of the elites among the Ceylon Tamils-members of the caste-ascribed and British-anointed Coomaraswamy family (to which the great Ananda Coomaraswamy belonged) of the 19th century; their nephews, the Ponnambalam (Ramanathan and Arunachalam) brothers who dominated the first three decades of the 20th century; the self-made and spectacular G.G. Ponnambalam who ended that dynasty; and the unspectacular but charismatic S.J.V. Chelvanayakam who was thrust into leadership after Sinhala Only. In the saga of Sri Lankan Tamil nationalism, they belong to a distant pantheon, some more revered than others.

[G.G. Ponnambalam & S.J.V. Chelvanayagam]

When Wilson, who was Chelvanayakam’s son-in-law, presented his paper in Kuala Lumpur, both Ponnambalam and Chelvanayakam were in Dudley Senanyake’s ‘National Government’ (1965-1970), and there was a sense of complacency among the Tamil middle classes that the worst of Sinhala Only was over. Worse, however, was yet to come in the decades that followed-constitutional upheavals, failed Sinhalese insurrections, the anti-Tamil riots of 1977, 1981 and 1983, the rise of Tamil separatism and the ongoing Eelam wars.

Tamilchelvan was 17 years old when he joined the LTTE, one of many boys who voluntarily joined the ‘boys’. They were embittered by the experience of 1983, disillusioned with the prospects of life in Jaffna seen as not only neglected but also oppressed by Colombo, and lured by the mirage of a new state. The LTTE and half a dozen other organizations were already in place for boys like Thamilchelvan to dedicate their lives to. The leadership and the frontline members of these organizations represented a sea change from the elite leaders whom Wilson had portrayed to his elite audience in Kuala Lumpur. Almost all of the young militants were from humble homes, had no impressive academic records, and were not set on any professional career path-attributes that set apart the old leaders from the young upstarts.

The change was not the result of any social reform or revolution as it did not presuppose or produce far reaching or fundamental changes in the organizing principles or the social and economic relations of the Tamils. It was a displacement of the old leadership by a new set of actors, not a democratic substitution but an enforced filtering-up process brought about by Sri Lanka’s political and constitutional crises, economic constraints, the State’s military intrusion into Tamil areas, ambivalence of the old Tamil leadership, and large scale emigration by the Tamils.

JR and Amirthalingam: The crisis of transition

The Supreme Court in its August 2005 ruling on the tenure of the Kumaratunga presidency made official what was already commonplace-that the passage of the Sixth Amendment in the dark days of 1983 was the single most act that packed off the TULF parliamentarians and paved the way for the LTTE to take a stranglehold on Tamil politics. The pathetic ambivalence of the TULF leadership is no less blameworthy, although it has to be recognized that the TULF leader at that time, the late Amirthalingam, faced a crisis that none of his predecessors, the elites of the elites, had had to face in their time.

Amirthalingam was the sacrificial medium of transition from the old elites to the new upstarts. He had paid his political dues over thirty years and after a long apprenticeship under Chelvanayaksm was fully entitled to succeed him as the Tamil leader. But Amirthalingam was not elite enough for some of the Colombo Tamil elites who usurped the role of being intermediaries between President Jayewardene and the TULF. He was also subjected to lateral sniping by others with leadership ambitions within the TULF, and was viciously attacked in the editorials of the Saturday Review, the short-lived Jaffna weekly that Amirthalingam tartly described in Tamil as the “Saturn View”.

But the biggest challenge for Amirthalingam and the TULF arose from their ill-advised but inexorable attempt to tie the horns of two dilemmas. First, they proclaimed the Eelam demand while really intending to settle for a “viable alternative” through talks with the Sri Lankan government. If Eelam came by the way, that would be lottery! Second, while professing non-violent politics the TULF was also nurturing the Tamil militants as storm troopers. The militants were the TULF’s ’subcontractors’ for the questionable Eelam contract; however, the subcontractors eventually threw out the main contractor, and one of them, the LTTE, virtually eliminated every other group to claim to be the sole-representative of the Tamils.

[A. Amirthalingam & S. Thondaman]

As was revealed after the 1983 riots (first by CWC leader Thondaman in Parliament and later in Wilson’s monographs), between the Vaddukoddai resolution and the 1977 election, the TULF leaders reached an understanding with J.R. Jayewardene that the new UNP government would take steps to provide a viable alternative so that the TULF could safely drop the Eelam demand. By all evidence, the TULF kept to its end of the bargain and went so far as to help President Jayewardene by not fielding a TULF candidate in the 1982 presidential election (to avoid a split in the Tamil vote) and by choosing to “sit on its hands” during the referendum that followed.

Mr. Jayewardene, however, chose to play too-clever-by-half politics rather than act like a genuine leader and statesman and deliver on his undertakings. He kept the TULF, the then official Opposition, isolated from the SLFP and the Left Parties by threatening to abandon negotiations if there was any contact between the TULF and other opposition parties. Ultimately he offered less than nothing, when even something less than the 13th Amendment that came five years later would have sufficed before 1983. JR’s betrayal caused Amirthalingam dearly, eventually his life. He and the TULF lost all credibility with the youth and with vast sections of the Tamil expatriates who were already swelling in numbers. It is no exaggeration to say that JR helped put the Tiger in the saddle and let it ride the Tamils. JR’s betrayal and his lopsided foreign policy at that time also opened the backdoor for India to get involved at the highest level and in the deepest way in what until then was considered Sri Lanka’s ‘internal matter.’ The rest is not just history, as the adage goes, but has been our living experience. The suffering continues.

Related:

Part II: The roots of LTTE’s Militarism and Political Culture

Part III: Kinship, caste and the Diaspora in Tamil nationalism

12 comments November 18th, 2007

Parliament Playing The Numbers Game While People Watch

by D.B.S. Jeyaraj

Mahinda Rajapakse celebrates his birthday today (nov 18th). Two years ago the people of this Country gave him a magnificient birthday present by making him victor in the Presidential poll of November 17th. This time Parliament is poised to present him another birthday gift by way of majority support when the vote is taken tomorrow (nov 19th).

[President Mahinda Rajapakse]

The past week has seen much excitement. The numbers game is being played by political parties of all hues. The target from the opposition leader’s point of view is to cobble together a majority that would vote against and defeat the Government in the budget voting. The goal from the head of the Government’s viewpoint is to prevent that situation by retaining the numerical majority and demonstrating that on the floor of the house.

The name of the game is numbers! While the great game to acquire the magic figure goes on a number of other little “games” are being played.. Some get sudden “conscience” attacks and want to cross over. Swift medical attention is shown by the powers that be. Portfolios, posts, perks and payments are pledged. This happens on either side of the political divide.

Hey! Presto!!. The conscience attacks are over and everything is hunky dory. Some remain where they were as their consciences are assuaged.

Others consciences however are not so easily satisfied. Perhaps the treatment was not enough or the expectations outweighed the promises. The grass is usuallu greener on the other side. The greenbacks too.

So some conscience afflicted persons do take that leap of faith. These conscience stricken people require different doctors to be cured.

A crisis they say brings out the best and worst in humanity.It is interesting and intriguing to see how a political crisis revolving around the numbers game brings out the bargaining power of certain respectable individuals.

The numbers crisis is the ideal opportunity to extract oodles and oodles of flesh plus bucketsful of blood. No Shylocks these! They get their flesh and blood too because they know when to demand successfully.

Its like a circus. Acrobats and trapeze artistes in clownish garb are flying from one side to another. One swings towards the opposition while another swishes on to the side of the treasury benches. Some are checked half – way and somersault back.

Some declare an intent to cross but do a topsy-turvy as profitable benefits are granted. Some protest-too loudly – that they have no intention to cross and everybody thinks they are going to do so. Such is the credibility of these honourable persons.

While these clownish games are on to make or unmake the Government in power, the people watch and speculate about the fluctuating fortunes of the respective parties and politicians. In a democracy the people are supposed to be supreme.

It is the people who elect the President and Parliament. Governments are formed in a manner reflecting the people’s will. Anyone elected by the people is duty bound to abide by the people’s will when deciding to change political colour.

But this does not happen here. The green elephants moved away from the UNP kraal in singles, doubles and in herds towards the Government. They wanted to reform the party by crossing over.

The Up Country politicians sank their differences to cross over to the Govt as they wanted to “serve” their people.

Rauf Hakeem was forced to jump because his colleagues would have done so without him. Hakeem was the SLMC leader so he followed.

Thus we saw the disgusting spectacle of persons elected on one ticket crossing over to the other side without trying to obtain the consent or approval of those who elected them.

On the other hand a couple of politicians who helped elect Mahinda as President crossed over to the opposition. Nowadays their primary occupation is to lure some more to the opposition.

The saffron brigade is seemingly divided with four persons ready to cross over because of their principles. The others are equally determined to restrain the jumpers on the basis of their principles. Wonder how many more Benz mobiles are needed to preserve ethno – fascist unity.

The Crimson comrades hold some powerful cards. They are trying to extract pledges of an extremist nature from a politically beleaguered President. But the national socialists are in trouble too.

They are in no mood to face an election alone if Parliament is dissolved. Chances are that the comrades could vote against in large numbers if they are sure the regime will not topple and could vote in small numbers otherwise.

Muslim and Up Country Tamil politicians desirous of crossing back to the opposition are also likely to make their moves only if sure that the Government is crumbling.

This goes for those green elephant crossers-over who want to return and also the SLFP malcontents flirting with the idea of jumping. It mainly depends on whether they are sure of the regime’s impending downfall.

The Tamil National alliance is also in a bind. Many of the MP’s are not in Colombo due to security reasons. More importantly it is not clear what their masters want them to do. Some political pundits in the Rajapakse camp accuse the tigers of backing UNP moves to defeat the government at the budget vote.

But there is another school of thought which believes that the tigers who brought Rajapakse to power will like to safeguard his position. Apparently the tigers fear Mr. Wickremasinghe’s crafty sophistication more than President Rajapakse’s crude show of force.

[Mr. Ranil Wickremasinghe at Gampola Rally, May 19, 2007 - Pic: UNP.lk]

It is against this backdrop that the current game of numbers is being played. The opposition leader in typical style is keeping his cards close to his chest.

While Mr. Wickremasinghe keeps a low profile moves are afoot to woo and entice so that the required magic number is reached.

President Rajapakse is characteristically ebullient and asserts boldly that “Ranil Wickremasinghe will not be able to defeat the budget in Parliament on Monday”.

His deputies like Messrs. Fernandopulle, Premjayanth , Alahapperuma and of course Brer.Basil are engaged in maintaining the status quo and also draw in a few more MP’s as a bonus.

So Parliament engages in the numbers game against the President while the people who elected them watch and wait as mere spectators.

Both sides are engaged in offensive and defensive tactics against one another. One manouevre is canvassing among MP’s of the other side and making them cross over. The other is convincing potential (double) crossers not to cross over to the other side.

The situation is fluid as loyalties are fickle. Trying to identify who is staying or going is an exercise in futility as nothing is firmly certain.

Even chameleons cannot match the elaborate and speedy colour changes going on. So we have to wait until tomorrow (Nov 19th) to know the final result and also who voted for and against.

DBS Jeyaraj can be contacted on: djeyaraj@federalidea.com

1 comment November 17th, 2007

President Strong Vis A Vis Parliament in Numbers Game

by D.B.S. Jeyaraj

An intense game political poker game is on!

The stakes are quite high!!

[President Mahinda Rajapakse]

The target from the opposition leader’s point of view is to cobble together a majority that would vote against and defeat the Government in the budget voting. The goal from the head of the Government’s viewpoint is to prevent that situation by retaining the numerical majority and demonstrating that on the floor of the house.

Whatever the cards possessed by Ranil Wickremasinghe now, he is at a distinct disadvantage in the beginning of the game itself. This is because the stack is loaded in favour of the President.

President Rajapakse’s ship of state is likely to be tossed atop political waves but is unlikely to capsize. The President will most probably weather this storm.

The Presidency is structurally and functionally in a position of strength vis a vis Parliament in matters like these. I think Ranil Wickremasinghe knows and comprehends this more than anyone else in the UNP.

Why is the current President in a position of strength despite the results of the Parliamentary numbers game?

In the first place President Rajapakse’s term of office is scheduled to end only in 2011. Even if he does not command a majority in Parliament he remains head of state and head of government.

If there is a majority against him in Parliament the President always has the option of forming a new government with a new Premier. The President can continue with a “minority” government if he so desires. He also has the option of dissolving Parliament and go in for fresh elections.

Even if the new election goes against him and he is faced with a hostile majority Rajapakse remains President still. He can form a new government reflecting the elecotarate’s mood or form his own minority government. He can dissolve Parliament again after a year of the new election.

If his political opposition wants to prevent this and also has a majority in Parliament then two choices are available to restrain or constrict the President.

One is to submit an impeachment motion against the President in Parliament. Meanwhile that could restrict him from dissolving Parliament.

The other is to vote against financial allocations to the President. Other bills including money bills too could be blocked.

This could in the long run prevent the President from functioning. It could also create a Constitutional crisis of grave magnitude. A beleaguered President could prorogue Parliament and rule through Presidential decree.

This would bring the Presidency and Parliament at loggerheads with each other. The Judiciary too may be contrained to play an active , interventionist role.

The separation of powers among the legislative, executive and judicial arms of government could turn into a confrontation of powers.

Given the fact that a flourishing separatist movement controlling territory exists within the Island such a Constitutional crisis could compel the armed forces to depart from tradition and take over the reins.

This would compound the complicated situation further. A major Constitutional crisis therefore is something that needs to be avoided by responsible political leaders.

Ranil Wickremasinghe is that kind of responsible politician. That is why he did not join the UNP rebels against Ranasinghe Premadasa in 1991 during the potential impeachment crisis.

Likewise he did not create a political stir when Chandrika Kumaratunga stripped him of key ministries in 2003.

Despite the hotheads in his party urging him to adopt a confrontational course Wickremasinghe refrained from doing so. He also did not encourage impeachment motions against the Chief Justice then.

A major reason for this non – confrontational attitude regarding the Presidency was due to Wickremasinghe’s deeper understanding of the Presidential system as introduced by his uncle Junius Richard Jayewardena.

Some Sri Lankan politicians and commentators labour under the erroneous impression that Parliament is supreme and that the head of state is dependent upon a Parliamentary majority. That is not so. The Presidential system was ushered in By JR Jayewardena to remedy the earlier state of affairs.

When JR was minister of state in the UNP government of Dudley Senanayake he made a path – breaking address at the Association for the Advancement of Science. JR Jayewardena in his keynote address of Dec 14th 1966 outlined his visions of a Presidency then.He argued in favour of a Presudential system based on the USA and French models.

“The executive is chosen directly by the people and is not dependent on the legislature during its period of existence , for a specified number of years. Such an executive is a stronh executive seated in power for a fixed number of years , not subject to the whims and fancies of an elected legislature; not afraid to take correct but unpopular decisions because of censure from its parliamentary party.” he said then.

The UNP manifesto of 1977 stated “Executive power will be vested in a President elected from time to time by the people. The Constitution will also preserve the Parliamentary system we are used to for the Prime Minister will be chosen by the President from the party that commands a majority in Parliament and the ministers of the cabinet will be also elected members of Parliament”.

After the Presidential system was installed Prof Alfred Jeyaratnam Wilson analysed it in his book “The Gaullist system in Asia:The Constitution of Sri Lanka”. In that he observed “What Jayewardena was after was a stable executive which would not be easily swayed by pressures from within or outside. The outcome in the end was a President who in many ways can in certain circumstances , be more powerful than the French President”.

Though he introduced a Presidential system Jayewardena did not provide for a cabinet appointed from outside Parliament.He was also averse to a powerful Presidential secretariat as a parallel centre of power to the cabinet.

In response to Prof. Wilson’s query on that issue , Jayewardena replied” I must say I am very reluctant to appoint advisers who will be around the President. The reason is that I wish the President to have only his Prime minister and the cabinet of ministers as advisers because they represent the people as members of Parliament”.

Jayewardena also outlined this position at the convocational address of the University of Sri Lanka on May 31st 1978. This is what he said

“I am the first elected Executive President, head of the stare, head of the government. It is an office of power and thus of responsibility. Since many others will succeed me I wish during my term of office to create precedents that are worthy of following.

First I will always act through the cabinet and Parliament, preserving the Parliamentary system as it existed without dimunition of their powers.

Second I will not create a group known as the President’s men and women who will influence him”.

This then was JR Jayewardena’s definiton of the Presidency he had set up. This practice of following the British cabinet model and confining such cabinet ministers to be members of Parliament has created an impression that the old system prevails in full force.

Notwithstanding Jayewardena’s claims to the contrary the reality was that governance had changed utterly in Sri Lanka.The executive President was above as well as independent of the “de- valued” legislature.

When JR Jayewardena ushered in the presidency he controlled Parliament with a five-sixth majority.Jayewardena however retained this hold on the legilature through several devices.

He froze the UNP’s Parliamentary strength of five-sixths and further extended it through the 1982 referendum; he prevented crossing over from government to opposition by Constitutional legilation; he promoted crossing over from opposition to government through the infamous “Rajadurai” amendment to the Constitution. he also got letters of resignation from all his MP’s other than S. Thondaman. Jayewardena in practice was a Constitutional “dictator”.

Premadasa tried to follow in his predecessor’s footsteps. The shabby treatment he meted out to Gamini Dissanayake and Lalith Athulathmudali his political rivals is well – known. When the Lalith-Gamini duo struck back by way of the impeachment motion conspiracy, Premadasa was shocked.

After coming out on top the Presidency asserted itself and the rebels were expelled. But the President learnt that he had to take his MP’s along with him and not dominate.

One way of satisfying MP’s was to create more and more portfolios. Kumaratunga too had to do this. Wickremasinghe was forced to expand his cabinet.

Now Rajapakse has taken this practice to ridiculous levels. But however one may criticise this practice, there is no denying that handing out ministries is a sure way of attracting more MPs and retaining those you have.

Jayewardena, Premadasa and Wijetunge presided over a UNP cabinet . The UNP had a viable majority in Parliament during their time.

But Kumaratunga and Rajapakse became Presidents when thir parties were a minority in Parliament. They forged majorities by using the powerful presidency to coax and coerce MP’s into joining the government.Both Kumaratunga and Rajapakse managed to govern regardless of their parties being a minority in Parliament.

The all-powerful presidency does not depend on Parliament. This provides stability in a fragmented Parliament.

The Presidency is the glue that binds diverse parties together in a coalition government,

It is also a fact that a dynamic personality as Prime minister conveys a false impression that the Premier is a powerful person. Premadasa projected such an image under Jayewardena but DB Wijetunge cut a sorry figure as Prime minister to Premadasa. Likewise Ratnasiri Wickremanayake is also perceived as powerless under Rajapakse as well as Kumaratunga earlier.

There have been two periods of “co-habitation” in Sri Lanka when the President and Prime minister were from different political parties. The first was in 1994 when Wijetunga was President and Kumaratunga Prime Minister. The second was in 2001 – 2004 when Kumaratunga was President and Wickremasinghe the Prime Minister.

DB Wijetunga accepted the fact that he was a “lame duck” President and abided by the wishes of the Prime Minister. In practice the President became a “Constitutional” figuregead and allowed Kumaratunga to be a de-facto executive Prime minister.

Later when Wickremasinghe was Premier, President Kumaratunga conducted herself like Wijetunga at the start. But once she had struck up an alliance with the JVP, Kumaratunga had her revenge and struck hard.

In decisive moves she demonstrated that the President was the paramount authority.Wickremasinghe protested but did not embark on a serious confrontational mode.

This is because he realised well that the President holds the whip hand in these matters and that challenging such authority was doomed to failure.

In such a context it does seem clear that Rajapakse is on a strong footing. He has already fragmented the UNP and enticed them into his cabinet. He has also brought in the Muslim and Up Country Tamil political parties and the Hela Urumaya.

Despite the criticism Rajapakse has been politically astute in expanding his cabinet and ministry portfolios. So the government majority MP’s have a stake in preserving the status quo. Also Rajapakse can woo others too from the opposition with these ministerial carrots if necessary.

He also has a stick. If Parliament turns hostile the President can dissolve it. Very few MP’s have a desire to face elections now. The JVP in particular would be most reluctant.

There is also the JVP’s fierce hatred of Wickremasinghe and all that he represents.In such a situation a major configuration of forces hostile to Rajapakse emerging in Parliament seems very unlikely.

The Achilles heel of a potential Parliamentary re-alignment against Rajapakse is that any such configuration cannot be stable. The UNP, JVP, TNA, SLFP dissidents , minority party malcontents etc may converge in voting against the Government for a single day.

That configuration however cannot last permanently. A fresh election will see this alignment collapsing. Thus there is no incentive for the non – UNP elements to aid Wickremainghe by voting against the regime.

Where Mahinda Rajapakse has deviated from the parameters set out by JR Jayewardena is by the setting up of a powerful cabal of advisers outside Parliament. This has caused much resentment in Govt ranks.

The situation has been further exacerbated by his blatant nepotism. Adding more fuel to the fire is the concentration of powers and funds in the hands of the Rajapakse’s themselves.

This state of affairs is increasing resentment and hostility within Government ranks.But it seems too early for this resentment to explode in open revolt or en masse defections.

There is also the corruption, rising inflation and cost of living etc. The people are suffering immensely. On the other hand the Government is perceived as winning the war against the LTTE. Both these factors are at play and there is an uneasy balance prevailing.

Further deterioration of the economy and unbearablly high cost of living on the one hand and realisation that the war is unwinnable on the other are required for the tide to swell against this regime.That moment has not come.

The UNP has been pathetically unable to foment and foster anti – govt feelings among the people on account of corruption, family bandyism, cost of living etc.

Stunts like attending “polas” have been fiascos. Inexplicably the UNP is becoming the first major political party to alienate the media while being in the opposition.

Wickremasinghe and his kitchen cabinet in waiting seem happier in promoting dissension in Government ranks through intrigue and plotting rather than building up a mass base among people through active politicking.

Playing the numbers game and engineering a Parliamentary defeat for the regime seems to be an easier short cut to power.

So Parliament engages in the numbers game against the President while the people who elected them watch and wait as mere spectators

But as stated earlier the opposition is at a disadvantage in this exercise vis a vis the Presidency. Whatever the result in Parliamentary numbers game regime change is no simple matter.

The executive President cannot be dislodged easily by a hostile Parliament.

This is not because of Rajapakse being the President but due to the inherent strrength of the Presidency as an institution.This is the legacy bestowed upon nephew Ranil by Uncle Dicky.

DBS Jeyaraj can be contacted on: djeyaraj@federalidea.com

5 comments November 17th, 2007

Decline and Fall of “Col” Karuna in East

by Shanthi Sachithanandam

Vakarai division, largely jungle tracts crisscrossed with 14 or so villages and little hamlets, situated along the northern border of Batticaloa District. The people of Vakarai are engaged in subsistence farming and fishing, with a small element of those who are traditionally hunter-gatherers.

It was somewhere in December 1995; I was in the middle of conducting a meeting at a village called Paalchenai, in Vakarai, when suddenly a visibly distraught man from the same area burst into our meeting with a tiny transistor in his hand. “Amma, the army has entered Jaffna town,” he blurted out.

All of us, the Paalchenai villagers and I, exclaimed in horror. We quickly gathered round him to listen to the news of the conclusion of the first leg of the Riviresa operations that captured Jaffna town.

[In 2004]

Whenever I recollect this incident, I cannot help but marvel at the power of the idea of nationalism that is able to mobilise such a diverse group of communities. There are no perceptible common links between the people of Jaffna and Vakarai in terms of class, caste, kinship, education, traditions or any of the generally referred to classifications based on primarily economic and cultural interests.

Both people would most probably have never visited each others’ localities. Yet, there in Vakarai, we saw them join on the basis of a nationality that was under threat of extinction.
But then, mobilising as a nation does not preclude the function of other smaller contradictions within. Take village-based loyalties for instance. This is extremely strong in Batticaloa District, so much so that they invariably change in to hostilities between contending villages.

The continuing animosities between the adjacent villages of Vantharumoolai and Sittandy, Santhiveli and Kiran, and, Karuwakkerni and Sungankerni, Kinnaiyadi are cases in point.
Conflicts often erupt during temple festivals between inhabitants of the two villages in question over issues of protocols provided for the various clans and other matters. This polarisation is apparent even within organisations and armed groups such as the LTTE. These parochial differences are emphasised and dug up when needed to mobilise support for one-self, win positions of power or compete for resources.

Similarly, regional sentiments against Jaffna were triggered amongst the Batticaloa middle class, which was reacting to the preponderance of Jaffna Tamils in government positions and also within the bigger trading establishments in the district.

It was ironic that almost everyone who led the anti-Jaffna agitation at that time was from the second generation of Jaffna Tamils settled in Batticaloa. Whatever the social forces at play at its origins, today this situation has been equalised to a great extent.

Almost all the government officers in the district are locals, and the Jaffna trading establishments have dwindled to only a handful. However, the Jaffna bogey is resuscitated every time the need arises for restricting competition, such as filling vacancies within the Eastern University or gaining recognition as community leaders.

In these situations the antecedents of possible competitors are aired, debated and used effectively to cancel them out in the first round itself.

That is what Karuna did when he felt the need to consolidate unbridled power for himself within the LTTE. He wanted all supervision and control from the north off his back, for which purpose he conveniently used the Jaffna bogey. His claim was that Batticaloa cadres were sacrificing their lives to protect Jaffna.

It is not my intention here to undermine in any way the contribution of Batticaloa cadres within the LTTE. But if at all a study could be conducted to ascertain the percentage of cadres within the LTTE in proportion to the populations of Jaffna, Batticaloa and the Wanni, other interesting facts may emerge.

One guess is that the plantation community that settled in the Wanni during the late 1970s and early 1980s in the aftermath of the communal violence in the South might easily score highest.

Be that as it may, Karuna’s emotive claim prompted the hierarchy to dispatch him as supreme commander of the Batticaloa-Ampara region with autonomous political, military and financial powers, back in 1999.

The principle underlying this strategy was that Jaffna and Batticaloa each would manage and advance its own army in its own area. Perhaps this move may be termed as the beginning of the end of Karuna, for it was to lead to his ruin.

He amassed huge personal fortune through indiscriminate taxation on farmers, fishermen, traders and liquor dealers; and ensured a percentage cut off every village infrastructure development project in the district.

While the northern command was still engaged in merely exhorting potential recruits and trying to impose regulations for their compulsory services to the LTTE, he introduced the method of blatantly forced abductions.

Mysterious deaths occurred of a few of his insiders who had been identified by the people as being fair minded. Tactics of public relations changed whereby the people were intimidated and suffered extreme humiliation at the hands of his boys. They were so cocky in their boast that there was no appeal beyond Karuna Amman.

Although he styled himself as the undisputed leader of the Batticaloa Tamils, it looked like he was concerned only about his own village, Kiran. As they say in Tamil, “A full sized donkey wasting down to become a tiny red ant.”

Any government or NGO programme had to benefit Kiran first, no questions asked. A 100 housing project approved for a village called Settiyaar Kudiyiruppu was ordered by Karuna to be transferred to beneficiaries in Kiran.

The education community from Santhiveli had lobbied hard to obtain a much-needed additional building for their school. Karuna arbitrarily decided that this had to be built for Kiran School instead, despite the lack of a real need.

In addition to all this, a ‘modernising’ Kiran project was also underway. He wanted to bring down houses and temples in an attempt to re-route the Batticaloa Colombo main road through Kiran.

It is said that when a president of the board of trustees of one of the temples objected to this plan citing that he as the head of the temple had a responsibility to protect it, Karuna had curtly replied through the mobile phone of one of his assistants, “He may be head of the temple but I am the head of Tamil Eelam.” He was so drunk with power.

Due to lack of contacts with rural Batticaloa, the professionals and intellectuals living within Batticaloa town were to a large extent ignorant of the highhanded approaches employed by Karuna, and the gradual ‘Kiranification’ of his original Batticaloa vision.

Therefore, when he declared his independence from the mainstream LTTE in March 2004, there was an initial jubilation amongst them, which began to taper only when the reality of his necessary collaboration with the army sank in.

Naturally, Batticaloa is not a terrain which can be held on its own. The battle for real estate was in the north, and it transpired that even to secure Batticaloa District, the cadres of Batticaloa had to fight in the north after all.

If we say that the Military Intelligence tripped a falling Karuna into a coffin, the Sri Lanka Army drove the final nail. As soon as areas of east were captured, they mowed down hundreds of tombs of LTTE cadres both in Vakarai and in Tharavai. These graves were of the sons and daughters of Batticaloa who had fought along with Karuna, for the liberation of their people.
Even as he was instrumental in helping the army to capture the district, Karuna appeared powerless to prevent this desecration. All his tough talk (remember his Derana interview?) and his boast of being able to bring development to Batticaloa ended right there. He was finished. Karuna sang his own requiem.

Therefore, the purported expelling of Karuna from his party, Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Puligal (TMVP) in early October is a mere ritual of a fact that had concluded some time ago.

Pillaiyan, his deputy who has replaced him, is now busy calling traders, NGOs and others in the districts of Batticaloa and Trincomalee for meetings to explain the present status quo.

“Karuna embezzled money within TMVP. That is the reason for which Thalaivar (Leader) also had to sack him before,” he is reported to have said.

Thalaivar? But is that not the term LTTE cadres and other supporters use for Prabhakaran? On being asked for clarifications, he is supposed to have stated, “Then and now and always he is the only Leader (Ore Thalaivar).”

I have always marvelled at the power of the idea of nationalism. [Courtesy: Montage]

18 comments November 16th, 2007

LTTE Must Reconcile with India for the sake of SL.Tamils

RECONCILIATION WITH INDIA