Archive for May, 2008
by Commodore RS Vasan IN (Retd)
Reports indicate that a SLN logistic support ship was sunk at about 0223 hrs on Saturday 09 May 2008. The ship was next to Ashroff Jetty at Trincomalee and was being loaded with explosives to be carried to KKS. This ship itself came in to the possession of the SL Navy by a court order way back in 2003 when it was apprehended transporting illegal migrants in Southern Sri Lanka. The ship was more than 38 years old and was regularly used for logistic support for the Sri Lankan armed forces. Ironically the earlier name of the ship ?Invincible? did nothing to prevent the ship from meekly submitting to the designs of the black tigers.
Before coming to a conclusion on what would have caused the sinking it would be in order to examine the methods/options, which could be adopted for launching of such attacks. There are many options as far as underwater attacks are concerned.
The First is an attack by a suicide diver strapped with explosives who could approach the target underwater with out being detected, cling on to any vulnerable portion of the ship and detonate the explosives .The results of an underwater explosion on the hull are always a devastating one and invariably results in breaking up of the ship and subsequent sinking. In this case some reports have indicated that the ship sank with in 13 minutes of the attack. Apparently there was no loss of lives.
The Second method is to attach a limpet mine to the underwater hull of the ship and this could be set to explode either with a timing device or with a fuzing device that could activate with sound or pressure or movement in its vicinity. In such cases the diver could get away from the scene of action. However during the process of his retreat from the ship if he is detected, the success of the operation would be compromised and would lead to bottom searches of the target ship and neutralization of the limpet mine. The black tigers would not have liked any compromise and thus would have preferred the suicide option.
Related aspects of carrying out such attacks have been discussed in an analysis of the sinking of a Fast Attack Craft on 22nd March 2008 vide.
The depths off Trinco and even alongside berths are very much favourable for such attacks. I can vouch for this fact from my first hand experience in the harbour from where I operated for some time during the early 90s.The fact that the ship was stationery and the crew perhaps busy with the loading operations may have contributed to not detecting the diver and the resultant success of this operation by the Commandos of the LTTE.
The Third option is for the human torpedoes to be used against the target. The SL Navy officials have apparently has ruled this out. From the point of view of the Sea Tigers, the suicide attack would indeed have been the choice of execution against heavily defended targets.
The pattern of operations suggests that the tactic adopted is similar to the one that was followed during the sinking of a fast attack aircraft on 22nd Mar 2008 except that in the former case, the FAC was moving at sea and in the latter case the target was stationery in a protected harbour.
Having examined all the three options, based on the facts and reports available so far, it can be inferred that the underwater defence systems in place were breached by a suicide diver who succeeded in detonating explosives next to the old underwater hull of the ship MV A 520 resulting in the sinking of the logistic support vessel
Comments on the preparedness of SL Navy
It appears that the established precautions for thwarting an underwater attack were either not in place or failed to prevent the impending attack. The standard practice for preventing underwater attacks by divers is to have boat patrols and drop random scare charges to deter the divers. Divers also search the bottom of the ships at regular intervals to spot any explosive that may have been attached. The shipside is rigged with lights for ready use and upper deck sentries are posted to spot any activity that may raise suspicion of the presence of saboteurs.
Most Navies adopt a calibrated degree of preparedness to ensure that the threat is tackled in a timely and efficient manner by denying the use of the waters to saboteurs in a protected harbour. Many navies also use their sonars to cause damage to the eardrums, impair hearing and deter the diver by use of high underwater sound power. Such measures depend on the threat perception and the degree of alertness assumed in a particular location. In addition it is also a practice to have grapnels towed behind the patrolling boat (similar to trawling operations) to cause injury to the saboteurs. Whether all these measures were in place is not known.
Sri Lankan Navy has been credited with the sinking of more than a dozen logistic ships of the LTTE, which were employed for carrying the essentials from many parts of the Indian Ocean for sustaining the war effort. The ship that was sunk was apparently also used in the operations against three logistic ships of the Sea Tigers off Coco Island in 2007.
This is the second such sinking in the last two months. While the names of the three suicide attackers were given out soon after the attack on the Fast Attack Craft two months ago, all that has been mentioned in this case by the Tamil net is that the Commandos from Kangkai Amaran unit of the Sea tigers executed the attack. This unit apparently was named after a Senior Commander of the Sea Tigers who was killed in Mannar District in an attack by the Deep Penetration Unit of the Sri Lankan Navy in Jun 2001.
In conclusion, it is clear that that the Sea tigers still have the capability to surprise the SL Navy and would like to regain the control of the seas which is so essential for the tigers to replenish from many parts of the world including southern India.
The use of underwater divers for attack while not being novel has the potential to cause serious damages, loss of morale amongst the forces and disrupt planned activities at sea. The success of such operations would have deleterious impact on the ongoing operations of Sri Lankan forces, which are trying to move supplies and military hardware through the eastern sea routes to KKS. One can safely assume that more such attacks and all the options discussed above would be exercised by the Sea Tigers to wrest the initiative from the Sri Lankan Navy, which has enjoyed some successes in the recent months. [southasiaanalysisgroup]
(The author with distinguished naval and coast guard service for over 34 years is presently with Observer Research Foundation and is steering the Maritime Security Programme under the aegis of International Security Studies (ISS), headed by General VP Malik former Army Chief The views expressed are his own)
May 13th, 2008
A. INTRODUCTION
At the invitation of the Reconciliation and Peace Desk, Colombo Diocese of the Anglican Church, a team of religious leaders visited Mannar from 15th-18th April 2008. The team included a senior Buddhist Monk, several Anglican priests, a Methodist priest, a Catholic Priest, a Catholic nun and two lay Christians.
The visit was intended as a solidarity visit to the people and religious leaders in Mannar and to better understand the present situation in Mannar.
The team met with displaced people from Mussali (Arippu, Silabathura areas) and Manthai West (Vanni), residents of Mannar, representatives of the Fisherfolk groups, traders groups, Citizens Committee and local and international NGOs. The team also met the Government Agent of Mannar and held several meetings with clergy of the Catholic diocese of Mannar. We visited the Buddhist Temple but were unable to meet its incumbent who was out of Mannar. We also sought an appointment with the Area Commander of the Security Forces to which there was no favorable response, but had the opportunity to interact with several soldiers and officers manning checkpoints.
In addition to Mannar town, the team visited Nanattan, Pesalai, Kalimoddai, including several camps hosting displaced people. We also had the opportunity to join a fast-prayer service calling for the protection of the Madhu shrine from political and military activities, which was organized by the Mannar Catholic Diocesan Inter-Religious Council.
Please note that the contents of the report, observations, conclusions and recommendations are limited to the areas we visited and information received during the visit, although in some cases, relevant background information is cited.
B. OUR EXPERIENCES, OBSERVATIONS AND KEY ISSUES IDENTIFIED
1. Militarization and checkpoints
Mannar town and all outlying areas are heavily militarized. All passengers entering and exiting Mannar through the A30 Vavuniya-Mannar road, or through the A14 road from Medawachiya (by train or by road) are subjected to intense checking and registration. Security forces personnel were present on the road leading to Mannar and several times, the vehicle we were traveling stopped and pulled aside to let military convoys pass through. Between Medawachiya and Mannar, our vehicle was stopped and registered 6 times. Our group was not subjected to intensive checking, but we noticed that at each checkpoint, passengers traveling by bus had to get down, carry their baggage and walk a distance that would range from few meters to half kilometer, as part of the “checking” procedure. There was also heavy presence of security forces in Mannar town and outlying areas we visited.
2. Restrictions of road access to Medawachiya
Since early this year vehicles going from Colombo to Mannar are not allowed proceed beyond Medawachiya, and vehicles leaving Mannar are also not allowed to proceed beyond Medawachiya. This is applicable to buses as well as private vehicles. Thus, we were compelled to take a train and request friends in Mannar to arrange transport between Medawachiya and Mannar. This is causing severe inconveniencies to civilians, particularly elderly, handicapped, those with infants etc.
This is also hampering the work of relief agencies that provide assistance to displaced people, as supplies have to be unloaded and reloaded again. This also increases the price of relief supplies,
There is no clearly spelt out procedure on criteria and procedure to apply for exemptions, when a need arises. We learnt that the current practice adopted for such exemptions is approval by military, including by the Defense Secretary.
While the primary restriction is on vehicles, we also heard that the security forces have been arbitrarily deciding not allow some people to pass through Medawachiya. We were told by one humanitarian organization that two of their staff, who were going form Mannar to Anuradhapura in the 1st week of April were not allowed to proceed beyond the Medawachiya checkpoint by security forces.
More disturbingly, we also heard of stories of blatant discrimination of Tamil community, as some had been told that Tamil people could only travel from Medawachiya by train and not by road, beyond Medawachiya.
3. Preventing non Mannar residents entering Mannar
On the 15th April, on the way to Mannar, we met a staff of a humanitarian agency, resident in Chettikulam but working in Mannar, who had been not allowed to go to work on 14th April, after being stopped at Kattaiadampan by security forces. There has no notice or information given on this.
After proceeding towards Mannar, we ourselves were stopped at Kattaiadampan checkpoint and told that people outside Mannar (meaning people whose National Identity Card didn’t have a Mannar address). We had to wait for almost 2 hours, in the hot sun, with no shelter or shade, while making frantic phone calls to the Bishops House in Mannar, who in turn had contacted the security forces, who had finally given us the green light to proceed, just after we had turned back the vehicle to proceed towards Medawachiya again.
We met one woman whose was being stopped, and who told us that she is not able to reach her husband who was in Mannar. Several others were coming back to Mannar after New Year celebrations elsewhere. Some were going to work, Mannar island being the central point of the district. While we were waiting, some relatives from Mannar came to meet some people held up, but we saw one group turning back and going without having being able to convince the security forces to let their relatives come to Mannar. We saw some who had been waiting from morning, turn back towards Medawachiya-Vavuniya, hitching a rides in a lorry.
The officers manning the checkpoint were almost apologetic to us, saying they can’t take any decision to allow us through to Mannar, until orders from superiors were received. One said he didn’t know the reason for the order, while another said it maybe because some Sinhalese visitors from the south had been abducted by the LTTE. However, during our stay in Mannar, we never heard about such an incident, even from other security forces personnel we interacted with.
Subsequently, we came to know from eye witnesses, that the security forces had continued to stop people from entering Mannar at Kattaiadampan, although the Area Commander as well as Military Spokesperson had denied such restrictions were in place when questioned by media.[1]
4. SPECIFIC CONCERNS OF DIFFERENT COMMUNITIES IN MANNAR:
4.1 People displaced from Vannai
Amongst the places we visited was a camp in Kalimoddai. Many people living in the LTTE controlled Vanni areas have started to come by boat to Mannar. Initially, they had been questioned on arrival by security forces and then left alone. Few young men had been detained for further questioning.
But since March, the security forces have decided to hold all these people in a camp in Kalimoddai. Thus, although many of them that we met mentioned that they prefer to stay with friends and relatives elsewhere, they are not allowed to do so.
We heard from the people as well as the security forces in charge of the camp that the camp is snake infested. We saw a snake that was killed when we were in the camp, and were told that snakes are killed there daily. We also heard that UN agencies and NGOs provide assistance for shelter, food etc. But many complained that these were far short of what they needed.
We came to know of a pregnant women, who is expected to give birth in two weeks time form the date we visited, i.e., around 30th April. She urgently needs medical attention. She has relatives in Mannar who are ready to host and take care of her until and after delivery. We also met a distraught women whose husband and children are in the Vanni, and she is unable to join them, after she had accompanied some children of a relative. Another boy we met is ready to go abroad and his father is waiting in Colombo . But he is unable to join his father in Colombo and neither is his father able to visit him, due to prevailing restrictions on travel imposed by security forces.
There were young children, advanced level students and also university students who are unable to continue their education. There was also a girl whose wedding arrangements have been finalized and but she herself, the bride, is unable to go.
Teachers and government servant have not received salaries and others such as fisherfolk and farmers also have no income, as they remain confined to the camp.
We also heard that some people had been allowed outside for few hours, but this had stopped after one boy who had been allowed for few hours, could not come back due to non availability of public transportation from Mannar. The boy told us that this was inspite of the fact that he had informed security forces in Mannar about this situation and returned to the came by 10am next day.
Several people expressed frustration that they are being held back by the government, after promises of being looked after if they ran away from the Vanni to government controlled areas. They all had come with hopes of better lives in government controlled areas. But their hopes are dashed, and many told us that they would not have come if they knew the government was going to confine them to a camp.
The main aspiration of these people was very simple, that is to be allowed to be free and live with friends and relatives without being confined to a camp. This may indicate the reaction of some of those who told us that they don’t want the dry rations being offered by various aid agencies, but just want to be free.
We would like to place on record that the security forces at the camp welcomed us politely, even offered us few chairs they could find and facilitated our visit and interactions with people by not following us around. They requested that we not carry our cameras and phones and not to take photos or video, which we followed.
4.2 People displaced from Musali division
We also visited some displaced people living in camps in Nanattan. However, unlike in Kalimoddai, it was difficult to interact with people, as security forces followed us when we tried to talk with the people. Our team as well as people was not keen to talk with us in the presence of security forces. Though we were escorted to one camp situated within a church compound by the priest in charge, security forces insisted that we get their permission to visit the site and take photographs.
The people we visited were amongst the more than four thousand that had been displaced by security forces operations in the Musali division, in early September. During this operation by the security forces, there had been no reported casualties to the security forces or LTTE cadres, but 12 civilians were killed in an explosion. We also heard reports of two others who had been killed.
At the time they had been asked to leave, they were told by the security forces that they would be allowed back home within 2-3 days. Subsequently, they had heard through media, security forces announcements that they could go back to their homes in January. However, when we visited, more than 7 months after being displaced, they are still not allowed to go back.
The facilities in the camps we visited were basic and the conditions in Nanatan Rice Mill in particular looked terrible. We were told that NGOs and UN agencies were assisting with food and shelter. While were we were at the rice mill, ICRC was distributing cadjan for temporary shelter. The camp in the Church compound in Nanattan had its own temporary school, made out of cadjan, wood and bamboo. We were told that classes are conducted upto advanced level, and that the teachers who had been displaced are teaching there. It was brought to our notice also that there is a lack of furniture in the school.
4.3 Fisherfolk
Fishing is a popular occupation in Mannar. We met fisherfolk and representatives of fisherfolk groups in Mannar as well as in Pesalai. They face a number of difficulties in fishing, such as the restrictions on night fishing, which is most productive time for fishing and also restrictions on “dragnet” fishing. There have also been recent regulations asking fisherfolk to deposit their engines to the security forces by 6pm and collect them following morning. Though fisherfolk had offered to keep the boats instead of engines, this request had not been granted by the Navy. Furthermore, only 10 & 15 horse power engines allowed to now. Restrictions on fuel also affect the livelihood of fisherfolk.
We heard that number of fisherfolk get beaten by the security forces for even slight delays in obeying these regulations. We also heard that Navy personnel take some of the best fish for themselves without any payment for personal use when going home for holidays and also for regular use in their camps.
Another key concern raised was the tolerance of illegal fishing by Indian trawlers, even in night when fishing is prohibited. When local fisherfolk go in the morning, as per Navy rules, available fish is already less.
Fisherfolk also face difficulties in transporting fish, due to restrictions imposed, particularly at the checkpoint at Medawachiya as well as several other checkpoints. We heard stories of how the fish had been spoilt and there had been no income from lorry loads of fish, due to delays, and being checked several times. We also came to know that it was difficult to obtain sufficient amounts of ice, which is essential to transport fish.
4.4 Traders
Transport restrictions are also adversely affected due to restrictions on travels. Goods have to be unloaded and reloaded twice, at the Medawachiya checkpoint, as well as Uilankulan checkpoint closer to Mannar. At Medawachiya, the vehicle also has to be changed. This means extra labour and transportation costs as well as possible damages. One trader told us that a lorry load of tiles that used to be Rs. 15,000 now cost about Rs. 50,000. Another trader told us that hardware stores are facing severe problems due to restrictions such as on iron rods.
4.5 Farmers
Along with fishing, agriculture is also a popular occupation. The unexpected rains had negatively affected the harvest, but we came to know that this was being made worse by arbitrary opening of the water of the Giants Tank. Although the opening and closing the water is a prerogative of the civil administration, we learnt that this decision had been made by the security forces. The regulation asking labourers from outside Mannar, such as those from Batticaloa to leave is also affecting the farmers, and in addition to this, many labourers who come to Mannar to assist with agriculture are not able to come, due to restrictions imposed at Kattaiadampan.
5. Progress on investigations on Pesalai Church incident[2]
On 17th June 2006, when thousands of people had been taking refuge in St. Mary’s Church, Pesalai, men on motor bicycles had come and fired at the church and also thrown grandees. One woman was killed and 47 reported as being injured. Five fishermen were also killed by the Navy on the same morning in a related incident. There is no doubt in the minds of the local people who were eyewitnesses and church leaders that it was the Navy that was responsible for this. Marks left by the grenade and bullet holes are still visible in the church. Many people in Pesalai had subsequently fled to India in fear as refugees after this incident, as they realized the place they considered their last place of refuge, the Church, is not immune to attacks by security forces.
Although this received wide publicity, and was also in Nov. 2006 included amongst 15 high profile cases to be inquired into by a Presidential Commission of Inquiry, we are extremely concerned to note that to the best of our knowledge, no progress had been made and no one has been prosecuted or even subjected to disciplinary inquiries.
6. Concerns regarding Madhu shrine
Madhu Shrine has been a sacred place of worship for Catholics, as well as Non-Catholics, all over Sri Lanka , representing all communities. In the last three decades, the Madhu Shrine had offered refuge to thousands of displaced people irrespective of their religious affiliations and came to be recognized locally and internationally as a “safe haven” for the displaced.
The Catholic Diocese of Mannar which administers the shrine had attempted to keep it strictly away from any military or political activities and purely as a place of religious worship and humanitarian refuge for displaced people.[3]
Despite this, in several instances, the Shrine has come under attack, resulting in death of several people, including some incidents few months ago. Almost all people in the Shrine area had fled in fear as Sri Lankan Armed forces intensified operations around the Madhu area. On 31st March 2008 and the days following, shells had again fallen in the Shrine area, and forced the priests and others who had remained in the church with the sacred statue of Our Lady of Madhu, to hide in bunkers. On 3rd April, priests and others had also fled the Madhu Shrine for safety, taking the sacred statue with them.
They relocated to Thevanpiddy with the statue, the only functioning Catholic Church in the Mannar diocese in the Vanni area. It is als the northern most Church in the Mannar diocese and borders the Jaffna diocese. We met priests who had been involved in this process, as well as those who had visited Thevanpiddy while we were in Mannar. Their common reflection was that Our Lady of Madhu statue was displaced for the first time in history, ironically, after offering refuge to thousands of people over three decades of war. But without doubt, the arrival of the much revered Our Lady of Madhu statue to Thevanpiddy, would be welcomed by the displaced people from the surrounding areas who had gathered there. In effect, Our Lady of Madhu statue had followed the displaced in their new place of relocation.
The Bishop of Mannar, the priests and people of Mannar, as well as the Catholic Bishops Conference of Sri Lanka had been calling on the government and the LTTE not to use the Madhu Shrine for military and political purposes, not to enter the shrine area and to leave it in the sole and complete control of the Church and to declare it a zone of peace. Church leaders have made clear that their intention is to return the statue to Madhu shrine when those conditions are ensured.
We also had the opportunity to join and express our solidarity towards this cause by joining a peaceful prayer-fast, on 18th April in the Mannar town. Several other services were also being held in churches around Mannar towards this, and we also learnt that about 4000 people had taken part in a public prayer service and peaceful March 1st April. The leadership of the Catholic Bishop and clergy and the commitment of the people of Mannar was inspiring to all of us.
7. Thalladi Church incident [4]
St. Anthony’s Church falls under the St. Sebastian’s Parish (Cathedral) and has been a popular place of devotion. In the months preceding the incident, the church had been a church only in name, as security forces had taken control of it and not allowed priests and devotees to conduct or join religious services and infact had used it as a military facility, thereby exposing it as a target.
When six soldiers in the church premises were killed by LTTE shelling on 12th February 2008, the military made false accusations that the priests has asked soldiers to clean the church. The priests concerned brought to our notice that the truth of the matter was that they had only asked for the church be made available for religious services. As we passed by several times in front of the church, we were able to witness for ourselves that the Church was indeed occupied by the military. From the main road, military vehicles and personnel were clearly visible inside the church premises.
We also noted with regret that the explanation of the priests involved was ignored by a widely publicized public statement by the Catholic Bishops Conference of Sri Lanka, which is only based on the versions given by the military and state media.
C. SITUATION AND RESPONSE OF THE RELIGIOUS LEADERS
We observed that the Church leaders (clergy and religious) play a proactive role in assisting and protecting people affected by violence and subjected to human rights violations. The predominat Catholic Church’s work in this regard is visible and praiseworthy. Its leader, Bishop Rayappu Joseph regularly speaks out about the plight of civilians, abuses by security forces and has been calling on all parties to end violence and revert to negotiations. Priests and religious play a less publicly visible, but equally important role. Priests and religious proved to be a valuable source of reliable information about local realities to our team.
However, we regret to note that Church itself has been under attack. A priest of the diocese, who was involved in assisting the displaced people, was killed in Sept. 2007, while delivering assistance. A Catholic priest had also been killed in 1985 and a Methodist priest in 1984. Several churches had been attacked, including the ones mentioned above. No progress had been made with regard to investigations and prosecutions into any of these incidents. Many priests we met reported harassments and threats at the hands of security forces in and around Mannar. And we also learnt that priests serving in areas controlled by the LTTE also face challenges in the face of abuses by the LTTE. We came to admire the commitment of the Bishop and priests, as they continued to travel dangerous ground by bus, motorcycle and serve their people with the minimum facilities at their disposal.
We were saddened that the Bishop and priests are often labeled as “LTTE supporters”, despite their tireless work for the people of Mannar, in the face of dangerous and difficult conditions.
We also heard that the Churches in Mannar, particularly the Catholic Church, appreciated the assistance and concern of different church based groups and civil society groups, several of whom had been visiting Mannar and working with the Bishop and clergy.
However, the need for continuing and even intensified support from civil society and religious leaders was stressed by several priests in our formal and informal meetings. The need for greater understanding and involvement of the Churches in other parts of the country, especially in the south was also clearly visible to us.
D. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
During our visit, we realized that people in Mannar, the residents as well as the displaced, live in fear and with a feeling of hopelessness. Catholic clergy and religious we met on the eve of our departure re-affirmed this, acknowledging that in the context of Mannar, a priority in their ministry is to give people hope, and they seek to do this by various interventions that give witness to the truth regarding the plight of the people and coming forward to assisting and protecting victims, survivors and family members of human rights violations, often at great risk to themselves.
Clearly, there is a total lack of confidence of ordinary people, church leaders and civil society and even senior government civil officials about possible redress mechanisms available to the public.
We also saw clearly that the civil administration in Mannar exits only in paper and name, and that key decision that affect civilian life is taken by the security forces, side lining and not even consulting the civil administration, leave alone civil society and ordinary people. It appeared that Mannar is a defacto military junta. The considerations for decisions that affect civilian life are based on military and political priorities, with minimal or no consideration of humanitarian needs. Sri Lanka’s international human rights commitments and even the fundamental rights guaranteed to citizens also clearly have no place in Mannar.
We regretted that there was no favorable response to our request for a meeting with the Area Commander of the Security Forces, which would have given us an opportunity to engage in a dialogue with him about our observations and include the security forces perspectives in our report.
According to government statistics, about one fourth of the Mannar district’s population is displaced. They live in conditions that are inhumane and lack essential facilities such as food, shelter, healthcare and education.
However, the constant and loudest cry we heard from people in Mannar was a cry to be able to live in dignity, to be respected as human beings, to be treated as equal citizens. A cry for freedom, to be free form fear, want, live in their own homes or with their relatives and friends, to be able to engage in their normal occupations.
As religious leaders, we do not agree with the militaristic approach and violent tactics adopted by the Government of Sri Lanka, the LTTE and other armed groups, however legitimate their causes maybe, and believe that the ONLY way forward towards resolving the ethnic conflict is through negotiations.
At the same time, we recognize that the Government of Sri Lanka has the legal authority to engage in military operations and to derogate some international human rights commitments and fundamental rights guaranteed in the Sri Lankan constititution, in certain situations, at its own discretion. But it is paramount that even these restrictions must be in line with procedures laid down, particularly international standards and norms and that international humanitarian law (rules of war) is respected in military operations. What we have seem in Mannar, as pointed out above with actual cases, are frequent violations of international humanitarian law as well as international and even local standards and norms regarding derogation of human and fundamental rights and non-derogable rights.
We are also convinced that “national security” of all people in this country is best achieved by respecting and fulfilling human rights, in the short term as well as long term and respecting all Sri Lankans as equal citizens and dignity.
It is based on these reflections that we make the following commitments and recommendations:
We commit ourselves to:
i. Share what we have seen and heard in Mannar, as well as our perspectives on these in the light of our religious teachings, through collective action and individually
ii. Take up with relevant authorities and other people who could assist, various issues that we have highlighted in this report
iii. Be in regular touch with our fellow religious leaders and civil society groups in Mannar
iv. To support the efforts of religious leaders and civil society groups in Mannar in their efforts to assist and protect victims of human rights violations and general violence prevailing in and around Mannar
We call on the:
The Government of Sri Lanka to
i. Immediately halt the blanket restriction imposed on people entering Mannar
ii. Gradually ease the restrictions on vehicular traffic through the Medawachiya checkpoint, and immediately make known procedures to be followed in obtaining exceptions to the existing restrictions
iii. Facilitate the freedom of movement of people confined to the Kalimoddai camp and address urgent humanitarian issues faced by people in the camp, including those highlighted in this report
iv. Facilitate the return of people displaced from the Musali division in September 2007
v. Ease the restrictions imposed on fishing, including some of those highlighted in this report
vi. Ensure proper and speedy investigations, prosecutions and convictions in relation to the attack on Pesalai church in June 2006 and make progress known publicly
vii. Ensure that security forces do not attack nor enter the Madhu Shrine and for the President to declare it a “Zone of Peace” to be administered by the Catholic Church in Mannar
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam to:
i. Ensure that its cadres do not enter the Madhu Shrine area and do not use it as a shield in confrontations with government security forces
ii. Ease the restrictions imposed on civilians living in the LTTE controlled areas in coming to government controlled areas
Civil society including churches and other religious groups (in Sri Lanka and outside):
i. Constantly monitor the human rights and humanitarian situation in Mannar, disseminate this information to the general public and relevant authorities
ii. Undertake regular solidarity and fact finding missions to Mannar
iii. Assist religious leaders and civil society groups in their humanitarian and human rights work
___________________________________
[1] Refer Lanka Enews news report dated 16th April available at http://www.lankaenews.com/English/news.php?id=5707
[2] For background and more details of the incident, refer to the report by the Catholic Bishop of Mannar dated 18th June 2006 and report dated 28th June by the Centre for Policy Alternatives and INFORM
[3] See appeals by the Bishop of Mannar dated 1st April and 7th April 2008, statements by the Catholic Bishops Conference of Sri Lanka dated 10th April 2008 and an appeal by the Inter-Religious Council of the Mannar Catholic Church on 18th April 2008.
[4] For further details, refer to the statement by the priests concerned endorsed by the Catholic Bishop of Mannar on 14th February 2008
May 8th, 2008
by Haroon Siddiqui
Returning to Colombo after several years, one is struck by the military checkpoints at key crossings where visitors are waved on but young Tamil males are not.
The fortified capital is pasted with war posters-a map of Sri Lanka, with an eye in the middle and a caption: “Are you alert? If you are, your village and your country are safe.”
The media are uniformly bellicose: “Military makes advances.” “There’s no unwinnable war: Only a mission to crush terrorism.” “The LTTE must be defeated at all costs.”
The army is on the march, again, against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, which has been seeking independence for the northern part of the island nation.
But the latest round of the 25-year-old conflict between the majority Sinhalese and the minority Tamils-it has already claimed 70,000 lives and sent hundreds of thousands of Tamils into exile, including Canada-is being billed as part of the worldwide war on terror.
It is not successful here either.
There are other parallels between President Mahindra Rajapaksa’s war on terror and that of George W. Bush.
“You are with us or against us” has become the operating principle in Colombo as well. The patriotism of critics is constantly questioned. Caskets coming from the front are not allowed to be filmed. Journalists and other observers are barred from the front lines. Human rights violations are brushed aside, perpetrators never prosecuted.
The United Nations says the number of “the disappeared” last year, running into hundreds, was higher than in any other country.
Human Rights Watch and other groups accuse the government and allied militias of extrajudicial killings, and of using abductions as a tool of intimidation and ransom.
Others blame security forces of raiding Tamil neighbourhoods, detaining people and subjecting them to frightening interrogations.
Yet the world doesn’t quite care.
Strategically, Sri Lanka isn’t all that important. It is not, say, Iran or Syria, routinely demonized by the U.S. and the media obedient to it. But the horror unfolding in the Sri Lankan civil war, and its broader implications for the world, including Canada, are infinitely worse.
Part of the reason for the international indifference is the LTTE.
Declared a terrorist outfit by the U.S., Canada and Europe, it was the leader in suicide bombings until the tactic was used in Israel and post-invasion Iraq and Afghanistan. In recent weeks, Tamil suicide bombers have killed scores of civilians. The Tigers also stand accused of running extortion rackets among Tamil diasporas in Toronto and elsewhere to raise funds.
It is the ordinary Tamils who are paying the price, especially those in areas not controlled by the Tigers.
“Nowhere in Sri Lanka are the Tamils safe,” a Western diplomat told me in Colombo. “What’s happening here is de facto ethnic cleansing,” as Tamils flee for India or the Middle East and beyond. “The government doesn’t seem to care if they all leave.”
Mano Ganesan, a Tamil MP who heads a civil monitoring group on disappearances, recently told Canadian High Commissioner Angela Bogdan: “The government arrests Tamils for being Tamil and they ask questions later. I hate terrorism. I don’t want bombs to go off. But that doesn’t mean the government should conduct mass arrests without even giving proof or updates to the families.”
Meanwhile, there’s no prospect of a revival of the 2002 ceasefire and the subsequent peace process led by Norway and backed by Canada.
The government wants to crush the Tigers. This has been tried before with no success. But this government is determined and deploying more resources.
The army did win back territory in the east, where local elections were held last month and provincial elections are planned for Saturday. But the troops have not made much headway in the north, which is where the Tigers have been entrenched for years.
For all the official bravado, the front line hasn’t moved for months.
In this war without an end in sight, says the Brussels-based International Crisis Group, “the humanitarian crisis is deepening, abuses of human rights by both sides are increasing and those calling for peace are being silenced.” [courtesy: The Toronto Star]
Haroon Siddiqui is Toronto Star’s editorial page editor emeritus, Email: hsiddiq@thestar.ca
May 8th, 2008
By M.S.M. Ayub
The United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) led electoral front does not seem to be united in the issue as to who should be the Chief Minister, a Tamil or a Muslim in the event it wins the Eastern Provincial Council election scheduled for Saturday. This is a major issue discussed in the Tamil media in view of the composition of population in the province.
MLAM Hisbullah, the former deputy minister, who defected in the wake of the nominations for this election from the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) to the ruling UPFA, said soon after nominations were tendered that President Mahinda Rajapaksa was firm to have a Muslim as the Chief Minister. Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan alias Pillayan, the leader of the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Puligal (TMVP), or Pilliyan Group, however stated at an election rally in Batticaloa on May Day that President Rajapaksa wants a Tamil Chief Minister for the Eastern Province.
At another rally on Monday he said that basically Provincial Councils are meant for Tamils, but some people unnecessarily raise the question as to who should be the Chief Minister, a Tamil or a Muslim. This reminds us of a news item published weeks ago in a website often critical of the Government saying that Senior Presidential Advisor Basil Rajapaksa has promised the Chief Minister post to both Pillayan and Hisbullah.
United National Party (UNP) led coalition has successfully averted such a difference of opinion on the Chief Minister post by an electoral pact between the UNP and the SLMC which stipulates that the candidate who will obtain most number of preferential votes will be appointed Chief Minister.
Since the agreement did not specify a member of any community for the post, and the coalition has three prominent SLMC leaders, Leader Rauff Hakeem, Chairman Basheer Segudawood and General Secretary Hassan Ali, in the fray, after resigning their parliamentary seats, it is widely rumoured that one of them would be appointed CM in the event the UNP would win. Despite the fact that the Eastern Province is the only province that has the potential to produce a Muslim Chief Minister it is clear that Muslim leaders in the province are not united as to whom among them should be the Chief Minister.
Apart from the CM issue LTTE’s possible resurfacing is another issue taken up in this election campaign, but understandably only by the UPFA-TMVP alliance. Government leaders discussed this matter at election rallies with the intention of translating the credit of liberating the Eastern Province from the grip of the LTTE into votes.
In fact the very campaign theme of the Government seems to be pointing to the LTTE “Goni Bila” and UPFA leaders attempt to identify the UNP led coalition with the LTTE. President Mahinda Rajapaksa said at the May Day rally held this time in Dehiattakandiya, the farthest place in the North and East from the conflict area, that the LTTE might raise its head again in the east in the event UNP wins this election. Given the UNP’s relative soft attitude towards the LTTE and its criticism of the recent war effort of the Government, President Rajapaksa’s remarks might have some bearing on the Sinhalese villages in the East who were invariably harassed by the LTTE atrocities.This might be one of very few messages that are likely to be fruitful in influencing voters though the political hype or the “Rella” has a bigger say in addressing the voters.
Some ministers argue as another campaign issue that the party in power in the centre must take control of the provincial councils as it was the central government that allocates funds to the provincial councils for their various development projects. By the very argument those ministers admit that their administration in the centre is far from good governance and they convey a message to the world by implication that if a party other than theirs comes to power in the province their administration in the centre will discriminate against it.
This is not a new ploy by a ruling party. It was one of the main trump cards played by the ruling UNP led by Late President JR Jayewardene during the District Development Councils (DDC) elections in 1981. Then the JVP leaders who contested the DDC election retorted that if that was the case UNP must be defeated for the very reason and for the sake of a just society- Dharmishta Samajaya, JR Jayewardene’s motto- not only at the district level but also at the national level.
UNP’s main campaign theme has been the accusation against the Government and the Pillayan group for harassing other parties during the campaign. As most observers anticipated the Provincial Council election in the East is far different compared to the Batticaloa Local Government election where complaints on violence and malpractices were minimal. Already election monitors have expressed fear that violence may erupt on the election day.
However election monitoring has been seemingly politicized and divided this time and two monitoring bodies seem to represent the two main parties. There had been more than one monitoring body sometime back too, but they did not seem divided on political lines, but cooperated with each other instead as in the case with PAFFREL and CMEV.
The recent division among the monitoring bodies came to the surface following the Local Government election in Batticaloa district on March 10.Most people, particularly people representing the opposition parties argued that Pillayan group would use their weapons and anticipated a situation similar to that of North Western (Wayamba) Provincial Council election in January, 1999 when the supporters of the opposition were brutally harassed.
Contrary to their prophesies only some thirty odd election related complaints had been lodged in police stations during the LG polls in Batticaloa and it was seen as relatively a violence free election. When the main local monitoring organization issued the report on the election the main opposition, the UNP criticized it claiming that it sided with the Government and soon emerged another organization consisting mainly Government critics on its hierarchy. Thus we are sometimes going to have two conflicting reports after the election.
Almost all except a few allegations on harassment during this election campaign have been levelled against the Pillayan group. It is going to adversely reflect on their future. For the Pillayan Group this is not merely an election, but a process that would take them far beyond the election. Pillayan at a meeting held in Batticaloa on May Day amidst the election campaign, made a request, which was very vital in respect of democracy, although most champions of democracy ignored it or did not take it into consideration. He wanted all political parties to help his organization to transform itself into a democratic movement.
In spite of the question as to how much this plea was genuine it reminds the political parties that claim that they are keen to solve the ethnic problem one of their paramount duties. However most so-called anti- war activists are unfortunately not on good terms with Karuna- Pillayan group ironically for they have stopped the war with the Government forces. Also they are not as sympathetic towards the TMVP as they are towards the LTTE which is not prepared to accept anything short of Tamil Eelam.
If the Pillayan group can win at least the majority of the Tamil votes in the East this time, it will boost the confidence in their cadres in the democratic process. On the other hand the sense of indignation in their cadres, in case they could not win the majority of the Tamil votes, will sometimes turn them again towards the AK 47 and T56. Also it will further mount their confidence in weapons if they win some seats using them or capitalizing fear of other parties in their weapons. Therefore the Pillayan group’s transformation is not purely on others hands; they too must have a genuine desire to be transformed.
Pillayan’s request cannot be considered to be genuine in the light of some reports from Batticaloa which points to the terrific behavior of his group. They had assaulted a group of JVPers who had been engaged in putting up posters in Akkaraipattu area days ago and it has been complained that they had used the much talked about weapons to intimidate them.
Apart from transforming Pillayan group into a democratic movement the Eastern Provincial Council election is one step forward in Government’s effort to politically banish secessionism from the country. It further politically distances the eastern Province people from their Northern brethren and would be become a wedge in Tamil Homeland concept which includes Northern and Eastern provinces. If Eastern people are prepared to tell the northern hegemonic politicians to mind their own business by way of establishing a separate provincial administration and run their affairs independently no politicians have the right to call for merger of those two provinces any further. And a sizable credit must go in that event to the JVP and the JHU which were instrumental in legally de-merging the two provinces. [dailymirror.lk]
May 7th, 2008
by D.B.S. Jeyaraj
Thirty-two years ago, on May 5th 1976 , around 40 – 50 Tamils met clandestinely at a secret location in the Jaffna peninsula and formed themselves into an organization called the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
Umamaheswaran became its leader. Prabakharan was made military commander.A five member committee was appointed to control and co-ordinate the new movement. Both Umamaheswaran and Prabakharan were members of this committee.
Their objective was unambiguously clear. The LTTE goal was to establish an independent state called Tamil Eelam in the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka.
A revolutionary armed struggle relying on guerrilla warfare was to be waged against the Sinhala dominated Sri Lankan state.
Nine days later on May 14th the newly formed Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) passed a resolution at Vaddukkoddai demanding Tamil Eelam-a separate state for the Tamils of Sri Lanka.
In July 1977 the TULF contested the Parliamentary elections on a secessionist platform. The TULF said in its manifesto that the elections was a referendum and that votes for the party meant a mandate for Tamil Eelam.
The TULF swept the polls in the Tamil majority electorates of the North-East winning 18 seats.TULF Secretary-General Appapillai Amirthalingam became leader of the opposition.
The goals of the TULF and LTTE were the same on paper. In practice the relatively moderate TULF was prepared to compromise and eventually agreed to the District Development Councils as an alternative to Tamil Eelam.
The militant youths referred to as “Boys” did not agree with this and continued to pursue their goal of Tamil Eelam through violent methods.
The anti-Tamil pogrom of July 1983 was a watershed that brought moderate and militant Tamils together temporarily.
Meanwhile the LTTE split in two. A large number of members broke away under the leadership of Umamaheswaran and formed the Peoples Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE). Some like Nagarajah, Aiyer etc went their own way.
Only a handful of the original LTTE members remained loyal to Prabakharan. A frustrated Prabakharan went away to India and stayed there for a while.
In his absence a triad comprising Seelan, Mahathaya and Ragu ” managed” the LTTE in Sri Lanka.
At one point the LTTE with its depleted ranks began working together with the Tamil Eelam Liberation organization (TELO) led by Thangathurai and Kuttimani.
There was a time when Prabakharan wanted to merge the LTTE remnants under him with the TELO and form a new organization.This however did not happen.
The arrests of TELO leaders Thangathurai , Kuttimani and Jegan by the Navy in 1981 brought an end to the TELO-LTTE cooperation.
The LTTE began functioning independently under Prabakharan who was both its leader and military commander.Later Charles Anthony alias Seelan became military chief.
By July 1983 the LTTE cadre numbered thirty. There were twenty-three full-time members and seven part-timers.
There were also many “helpers” of all ages in different walks of life.
The LTTE killed 13 soldiers through a landmine at Thirunelvely on July 23rd 1983.
This resulted in the 1983 anti-Tamil violence. There was a spontaneous “rush” by Tamil youths to join the militant movements and fight for Tamil Eelam. India began training and arming the movements
The struggle for Tamil Eelam itself underwent many bizarre twists and peculiar turns. There was internecine warfare among the movements. The LTTE became the dominant Tamil group.
The Indo-Lanka agreement of July 29th 1987 caused a sea change in Tamil politics.
Except for the LTTE all other Tamil parties and organizations accepted it and opted to give up the Tamil Eelam struggle and accept devolution provided under the 13th amendment to the Constitution.
The LTTE also agreed initially, surrendered some arms and even accepted a monthly payment of money from New Delhi as an “incentive” in the early stages. The tigers however changed track soon and resumed hostilities, daring to take on the Indian army.
The past years have seen many rounds of peace talks between the LTTE and different governments in Colombo. None of them succeeded and the Coutry suffers endless war interspersed with temporary spells of no-war.
In the meantime the LTTE has achieved tremendous “growth” in certain aspects. The double digit membership of 1983 is in five digits today.The LTTE is a transnational entity today with front organizations among the wide-spread Tamil Diaspora.
From 1990 the LTTE has succeeded in keeping under its control sizeable parts of the North-East. The areaof this “de-facto” state has fluctuated periodically.
Tiger territory has increased and decreased according to the fortunes of war.Yet there has always been a sphere of LTTE control.
Within this LTTE area the tigers have set up structures like Police stations, Courts, inland revenue offices,TV, Radio, film unit, newspapers ,banks,immigration and emigration offices, business ventures, farms, etc. The tigers have even drafted their own laws.
Militarily the LTTE has grown. They have infantry brigades, womens brigades, commando units and specialised divisions for laying mines, sniping, firing mortars and artillery, resisting tanks and armoured cars etc.
The tigers also have a naval wing known as sea tigers and a fledgling air wing called Air tigers. The LTTE has many marine vessels and a limited number of small aircraft.
The LTTE also has an elaborate overseas network with the Tamil Diaspora as its base. There are multimple media organs engaging in propaganda and myriad activists raising funds.
The tigers have the capacity to organize mass demonstrations at short notice in many western cities.
The LTTE also runs many commercial enterprises in several countries both west and east.They also have a fleet of ships transporting arms acquired overseas to North Sri Lanka.
In short the LTTE growth in the past 25 years has been phenomenal. It is perhaps the only enterprise run” for, of and by” the Tamil people in Sri Lanka that has registered “success” of this magnitude after July 1983.
This successful growth has come at immense cost to the Tamil people of Sri Lanka.
Vertically the LTTE may have gone up but horizontally the Sri Lankan Tamils have gone down.
This is the unpleasant and inconvenient truth that the LTTE and acolytes often deny and do not like to hear.
The first world war was only four years long from 1914 to 1918.The second world war was six years from 1939 to 1945.
This war for Tamil Eelam has gone on for decades and decades with an intensity and ferocity that has debilitated the Tamil people immensely.
The Tamil areas have undergone a staggered “scorched earth policy” cunningly implemented in phases by different regimes. Death, injury, destruction, displacement etc are part of daily life.
Fishing has dwindled. Agriculture has diminished. Industry is virtually non – existent. The economy has decayed and unemployment is rampant. Single parent families, widows, orphans etc are widely prevalent.
Education the mainstay of Tamils has suffered considerably. Many schools do not function. Hospitals are run down. People are displaced from their homes under the pretext of setting up security zones.
The quality of life has gone down. Infant mortality rates, malnutrition, stunted growth etc are areas where Tamils in the North-east are affected more.
The social fabric of Tamil society is torn badly, cultural life shrinks, Values are brutalised. Ethical codes crumble.These are the effects of long term war on a small, powerless people.
The worst impact has been on demography. Tamils have left the Country in very large numbers. Equally large numbers have moved to areas outside the North and East. Only 42 % of Sri Lankan Tamils are said to be living in the North-East now.
Some years ago at a seminar in Colombo retired Indian Judge V. Krishna Iyer stated that Tamils be given full autonomy. Former Central Bank governor N.U.Jayewardena wrote to the newspapers in response.
NU made three observations. Firstly he said the Sri Lankan population would stabilise to zero growth in 2025. Secondly he said that the high rates of Tamils leaving the Country indicated that the Tamils would only be 1.9 % in 2025. Thirdly NU said that 1. 9 % was a “manageable minority that need not be given autonomy”.
Thanks to comparatively higher educational standards and social problems like dowry, late marriages, aversion to female children etc the Tamil birth rate has been on the decline even before 1983.
The census figures of 1963, 1971 and 1981 show gradual decrease percentage wise. If a proper census is taken now the Tamil population percentage would be much less. It may not be 1. 9 % as NU said but it could certainly be less than 5%.
The Tamils may have proved a point by taking up arms against the state dominated by the numerically larger Sinhala people. But ultimately demomgraphy would defeat the Tamils.
The LTTE and its supporters often assert that a guerilla movement fighting for the goal of national liberation cannot be defeated militarily. This may or may not be true but the point to be taken note of is something else.
If the prolonged armed struggle for Tamil Eelam is leading to a gradual decline of the Tamil population in Sri Lanka then the ultimate losers will be the Tamils themselves.
A minority would be made a microscopic minority and therefore made easily manageable by the numerical majority.
It does not matter then whether the LTTE is defeated or not because the Tamils will be weakened quantitatively and qualitatively.
To put it bluntly the so called “Sinhala state” need not win this war. All it has to do is prolong the war and sustain the pressure. The Tamils would be drastically reduced in numbers . This is already happening in the Island.
It is against this backdrop that the LTTE turned 32 on May 5th.
Through the sacrifices and dedication of its cadre on the one hand and the ruthless violence and authoritative intolerance on the other hand the LTTE has become the dominant politico-military force of the Sri Lankan Tamils today.
The tigers have become the self-appointed sole representatives of the Tamil people.
This columnist does not accept the LTTE as the sole representatives of the Tamils.
Not merely the LTTE but no entity on earth can claim to be the sole representatives of a nation or people.
The reality however is that the LTTE remains today the dominant entity among Sri Lankan Tamils. It is the single-most powerful non-state actor among Tamils.
Along with such power should come a sense of responsibility. As former British premier Stanley Baldwin once observed “power without responsibility has been the prerogative of the harlot throughout the ages”.
The LTTE has been the determining force in Sri Lankan politics for many years. Tragically the tigers have been the sole arbiters of Tamil destiny in Sri Lanka.
The LTTE asserts that creating Tamil Eelam is the only solution and that Tamils must suffer and sacrifice in order to achieve it.
According to tiger acolytes Velupillai Prabakharan is the only Tamil leader steadfastly advocating the cause of Tamil Eelam. All others have abandoned it and are therefore traitors.
But the multi-crore question is at what cost?
The Bible queries whether it is worth gaining the whole world and yet lose one’s soul.
There is a Tamil provern “Suvar irunthaal thaan Sithiram varaiyalaam”. (One can draw a fresco only if a wall exists). Can Tamil Eelam be established in the Island while the Tamil people get reduced in numbers?
There is also the question of whether the LTTE can achieve Tamil Eelam? The real estate it controlled once has shrunk in size. Can it recapture these areas militarily?
The tigers have alienated the Muslims living in the North and East and also the Sinhalese. In recent times due to the Karuna revolt a large number of Eastern Tamils have spurned the quest for Tamil Eelam.
There is also the case of Tamils living outside the North-East. Unless there is violence like in India during the time of partition most of them would not like to return to Tamil Eelam.
The expatriate Tamils of an older generation may say emotionally that they would return but very few would actually do so.
As for the second generation they are-as Prabakharan himself once commented-a “lost generation” (tholainthu pona santhathi). At best they may come for extended vacations.
Apart from the desirability and attainability of Tamil Eelam there is also the question of viability and the situation within Tamil Eelam if it materialises.
Given the tenacity of the Sri Lankan state in resisting separation there is little chance of Colombo accepting Tamil Eelam.
Assuming that Tamil Eelam comprises the present Northern and eastern provinces the land and sea borders would be very long and large. There would be constant friction and strife.
Even if the Sinhala people accept Tamil Eelam India would not. Thus India would move in quckly and crush it.
Given the current geo-strategic configuration there is no chance that New Delhi would ever countenance an Independent Tamil state in the Indian ocean unless the Sinhala government does something incredibly stupid.
Even if that happens (highly unlikely) the Tamil areas of Sri Lanka may be attached to India as a union territory or protectorate. There would be no independent Tamil Eelam.
If and when Tamil Eelam evolves notwithstanding these factors the resources of the nascent state would be devoted mainly for military purposes. In a climate of war very little foreign investment could be expected. The Tamil Eelam state will be an economic basket case.
The focus on national security will result in a negation of democracy, pluralism and human rights. All these would be denied under the pretext that an external enemy is at the gates.
The despotic rule of the LTTE in the regions under its control would be replicated on a much larger and institutionalised scale.
Even though the LTTE boasts about its parallel state administration the reality is that food and fuel have to come from outside. Besides the salaries and expenses of Government employees, school teachers, medical staff etc are all being currently paid by Colombo.
The LTTE may have made a name for itself through its armed struggle. But its strength is basically its destructive capacity and not constructive capability.
In recent times the LTTE has acquired a negative image internationally. The conscription of child soldiers, suicide killer attacks and the adoption of terrorist modes at times has given it a terrible reputation.
Despite its impressive feats on the battlefront the LTTE is isolated internationally. Some of the most powerful nations of the world including the USA, India, Britain, Canada and the EU countries have proscribed it as a terrorist organization.
Significantly the LTTE does not enjoy support on a large scale even among the Tamils of India. There is sympathy for the Tamil plight but very little regard for the LTTE. The support of tiger sympathisers like Nedumaran, Vaiko etc is negligible.
It is in such a situation that the LTTE reaches 32 years in age. After decades of fighting that has debilitated and diminished the Tamil people what are the concrete gains made by the LTTE in winning back the lost rights of the Tamil people?
[In pictures: Women in Sri Lanka conflict]
Death , displacement and destruction have enveloped the Tamil areas for many years. Despite all this suffering and sorrow undergone by the Tamil people what has the LTTE achieved in its perennial quest for Tamil Eelam?
There redressing of valid Tamil grievances and the accommodation of legitimate Tamil aspirations is possible in two ways. One is through the arduous route of secession and the other is through equitable power sharing arrangements within a united but not necessarily unitary Sri Lanka..
The LTTE while paying lip service to the concept of a political solution has sabotaged any worthwhile effort aimed at meaningful negotiations. It would have the Tamils believe that only Tamil Eelam can achieve results and that only the tigers can quench this thirst for Tamil Eelam.
The truth however is that the LTTE has many , many miles to go before it can ever hope to attain Tamil Eelam. Even then the quest is elusive as the odds are stacked effectively against it.
It is like the search of a blind man for a black cat in a dark room. Only in this case the cat is not there. Also the Tamil people are made to pay a heavy price.
Like a compulsive gambler Prabakharan has risked the entire existence of the Tamil people as a vibrant ethnicity in Sri Lanka for the elusive goal of Tamil Eelam. It is an all or nothing gamble for him.
He is like an invading military general who burns his boats so that his soldiers have no choice other than to fight on for victory or face death. There is no turning back.
If the soldiers win the war the general will be praised for his steely determination. If they lose there wont be anyone left to tell the tale.
Ultimately the success or failure of the LTTE cannot be gauged by the size of its military assets or the destruction and losses inflicted upon the enemy.
The proper criteria is to see how far the LTTE has progressed on its journey towards Tamil Eelam?
In terms of a cost benefit ratio assessment is the progress (if any) achieved commensurate to the heavy price being paid by the Tamil people?
The ultimate political destination of the Tamil people can only be the full restoration of lost rights. The important question is whether the LTTE is on the right track?
How long will the LTTE persist with its unrealistic quest for Tamil Eelam? How long must the powerless Tamil people suffer due to this protracted war?
It is time for the 32 year old LTTE to do some soul-searching!
Readers who have serious and sincere responses, about the views expressed in this article may send them to djeyaraj2005@yahoo.com
May 6th, 2008
by Arvalan
“Ten people who speak make more noise than ten thousand who are silent.” Napoleon Bonaparte
The terms Tamil Diaspora, expatriates and lobby are being used by the analysts and media frequently. This creates a perception that these terms are similar and is a matter of semantics. A lobby is “a group of persons who attempt to influence legislators or other public officials on behalf of some particular cause or interest” and lobbying means “to influence (legislators), or urge or procure the passage of” (Reference Macquarie dictionary.) The keyword in defining lobbyists and lobbying is influence”, which is defined as “power of producing effects by invisible or insensible means”.
One would ask the question whether the efforts of the Tamil diaspora are really lobbying as it lacks effective influencing. The concept of lobbying is paramount to the Tamil nation and the Tamil Diasporas at this critical juncture in our path to liberation. The fact that we are criticizing the International Community (IC) for inaction, inertia and impartialness towards the Sri Lankan government’s atrocities is testimony for lack of (if any) lobbying in the international arena. Here are some examples of the Tamil nation pleading with the IC in the recent past.
*”Propping up genocidal Sinhala State counterproductive, International Community should change approach”- The leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), V Pirapaharan, in his 2007 annual Heroes’ Day statement
* “The Indian State must take the responsibility for the ethnic genocide of the Tamils that will be carried out by the Sinhala military, re-invigorated by such moves of the Indian State,” Liberation Tigers of Tamileelam (LTTE) statement dated 10th March 2008.
* “LTTE urges Norway to take steps to end military assault on Madu shrine. Liberation Tigers”- Political Head B. Nadesan’s letter to the Norwegian government dated 7th of April 2008.
These pleas are the outcome of the failures in our lobbying effort and certainly these statements themselves do not constitute as a form of “effective lobbying”. “The right to be heard does not automatically include the right to be taken seriously.” said Hubert Humphrey former US Vice President. I believe at present this evidently portrays our efforts in the international political arena.
Our concerns and grievances have been heard by the IC. They understand our plight, sufferings and sacrifices. Why then does the IC do not act to support our justifiable cause? Or at least reprimand the Sri Lankan government for its atrocities?
The answer to this question partly lies in our inability to “influence” the decision makers in the IC, in other words our inability to lobby effectively. The efforts of the Diasporas in soliciting support from the IC cannot be classified as lobbying; it is classic propaganda. When you propagate you secure the right to be heard. That does not mean you have been taken seriously or that you have positively influenced the decision maker (which is what lobbying means).
Our propaganda efforts have so far secured speakers (Members of Parliament, Clergy, Human rights activists and Academics) for our gatherings to mark an assassination, massacre or even the remembrance day (marveerar narl). Does that mean we have lobbied effectively in the international arena?
I believe the Tamil nation should launch an effective lobbying strategy in the international community. As a first step towards this we should establish a Tamil nationalistic think tank, which should be the front that interacts with the academics, thinks tanks, non government agencies and governments in the IC. The think tank is non political and does not represent the Tamil nation in any negotiations. LTTE should remain as the sole political representatives of the Tamil nation in any political negotiations. This effort is not about isolating LTTE. This effort is about enhancing the efforts of the LTTE in the IC
It is essential that the think tank should not be affiliated to the LTTE. This will be an acid test for the LTTE and Tamil nationalists as in the history of our struggle there has never been a genuine voice representing the interests of the Tamils other than the LTTE. This has avoided infiltration of intelligence agencies in our struggle. However at the same time we have lost opportunities to lobby in the IC.
Due to the absence of Tamil nationalistic moderate voice the Tamil nation has been deprived of opportunities to lobby the decision makers in the IC. This vacuum is being filled by Douglas Devananda and Anandasangaree at present. In the case of the Sinhala nation, JVP is classified as extremists, which renders the SLFP or UNP governments moderates in the eyes of the IC. In the case of the Tamil nation the sole representatives LTTE are classified as extremists, which the IC is reluctant to engage with.
The Tamil National Alliance (TNA), British Tamil Association (BTA) or Australian Federation of Tamil Association (AFTA) are not considered as moderate voices as they are considered as LTTE’s front organizations. Therefore we need to establish a think tank of academics, professionals and ordinary Tamil nationalists, who are not perceived as affiliates of the LTTE to communicate with the decision makers in the IC. The think tank should not be restricted to professionals and academics and should include ordinary Tamil nationalists as well, as the ability to think and think effectively is not restricted to the “educated”.
The think tank will develop effective lobbying strategies to influence the decision makers, not just soliciting speakers for our forums. This will include discussions with the exemplary lobby groups from the Jewish, East Timorese, Kosovo and other communities to learn from their experience. The think tank will also open the door for the Tamil nation to engage with the decision makers in the IC and provide an opportunity to positively influence.
Secondly the Tamil community should integrate with the IC. For example the New Zealand Tamil Community’s participation the recent ANZAC day celebration is a forward step in terms of our lobbying efforts in that country. We need to integrate before expecting to influence. Electoral lobbying efforts of the Sydney Tamils in the recent federal elections in Australia, is another example of integration. Integration is the key to execute influence in the IC as evidenced by the role played by the American Jewish community.
Thirdly the Tamil community should “wine and dine” with the decision makers. It is a harsh fact that the Sinhalese community has mastered the art of wining and dining with the local decision makers. The Sinhala community organizes many socializing effects where the local politicians are invited to wine, dine and integrate with the Sinhalese community. These events include the dinner dances, Old school association gatherings, community award nights and to coincide with the cricket tours. The Tamil community should organize events such as the above to meet and greet with the decision makers as a first step for effective lobbying. The relationship that is built at these functions will form the basis for subsequent influencing efforts.
The purpose of this article is to throw in a different perspective and to be a thought starter. I understand that various expatriate groups are working with the same agenda and it is time that we pool our efforts together for the common well and lobby effectively.
Let me conclude with a quote from President Franklin D. Roosevelt “Okay, you’ve convinced me. Now go out there and bring pressure on me” and Sun Tzu, The Art of War “Those who do not know the plans of competitors cannot prepare alliances. Those who do not know the lay of the land cannot maneuver their forces. Those who do not use local guides cannot take advantage of the ground”
May 3rd, 2008
by D.B.S. Jeyaraj
The Chimera in Greek mythology was a fire – breathing monster with a lion’s head,goat’s body and a serpent’s tail. According to the mythical tale, the hero Bellerophon killed it with the help of the winged horse Pegasus.
Nowadays the word chimera is used at times when referring to a thing of hybrid character.Chimerical is the adjective derived from the noun chimera.
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) organization is ostensibly fighting for the goal of national liberation. The LTTE wants to set up an independent state called Tamil Eelam comprising the Tamil dominated Northern and Tamil majority Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka.
The tigers are often chimerical in the methods used to pursue their goal. Their mode of armed struggle has trilateral aspects.
The LTTE adopts positional warfare like a conventional army or militia when it is trying to capture or defend territory. It engages in guerilla attacks when it targets the armed forces or Police. The tigers indulge in terrorism when innocent civilians are killed in bomb attacks or while assassinating democratic leaders and officials.
The tigers have in the past used all three modes. This mixed methodology makes it difficult to “label” the tigers effectively. Friend and foe would selectively pick what they want and brand the LTTE accordingly.
Some treat each act of the LTTE on an individual basis. In what seems to be a very simplistic approach ,each instance is treated on a case by case basis and categorised accordingly .
Events of the past weeks have demonstrated the LTTE’s trifold dimensions effectively.
In the North, the LTTE is engaging in positional warfare to defend the territory it holds. The tigers have been fighting the armed forces on multiple fronts in Mannar, Muhamaalai and Manal Aaru.
The high watermark in this was the manner in which a military push by elements of the 53 and 55 divisions were beaten back on the Muhamaalai front.
As for guerilla attacks there was the landmine attack in Thutuwewa killing 2 Special task Force personnel and the pressure mine explosion at Kalmadhu in which Capt. Bandara, Lt. Ratnayake, Cpl.Wickramaratne and Pvt. Padmasiri of the 6 Vijaya regiment travelling in a tractor were killed.
[VaanPuligal-pic:Eelavision]
The more spectacular attack was done by air when the LTTE’s fledgling air wing known as “Vaanpuligal” dropped three bombs in the Manal aaru / Weli Oya region.Once again tiger aircraft were able to drop explosives and get away safely despite the reportedly set up air defence systems.
The LTTE received much kudos for its fighting prowess in Muhamaalai and its Air tiger exploit in Weli – Oya/Manal Aaru. Both demonstrated that the LTTE was a fierce fighting force and could not be written off lightlly.
Yet, whatever its gains in the positional warfare and guerilla attack spheres , the LTTE lost it all by exploding a bomb in a bus at the Piliyandala bus station. The gruesome incident – in which 26 innocent civilians were killed and 38 injured – was a blatant act of terrorism.
Acts of terrorism in which innocent civilians are victimised must be condemned. This goes for acts of state terrorism also.
If the tigers had hoped to prove a point or two by the tenacious militaristic display at Muhamaalai , their brutal act of terrorism at Piliyandala turned the tables on them.
The LTTE strategy may have been to show that they were capable of inflicting a military defeat in the frontlines as well as infiltrate a Colombo suburb and plant a bomb but the end result was counter – productive.
[Buddhist monks stand at attention during the funeral of monk Vepathaira Chanananda at the cemetery in Piliyandala, a suburb of Colombo, April 29, 2008. Chanananda and another 25 people were killed in the suspected Tamil Tiger bomb explosion on a packed community bus-pic via Yahoo! News by Anuruddha Lokuhapuarachchi]
Both the national and international media publicised the pathetic plight of the civilian victims locally and abroad. Given the overwhelming international and national mood against terrorism the bus incident got more coverage than the battlefront debacle.
Had the LTTE refrained from the terrorist action of killing and injuring innocent civilians in a bus, the case of those arguing against the march of folly towards a military solution, could have gained more strength.
Once the LTTE exploded a bomb with terrible consequences the proponents of a political solution were effectively silenced.One cannot advocate political dialogue over military confrontation in the aftermath of a brutal terrorist attack.
A Colombo based diplomat told this columnist immediately after Muhamaalai about a tentative plan to meet President Rajapakse and emphasise the need to suspend war and promote peace talks. The move was aborted after the Piliyandala bomb.
” Our position on the need to suspend war and engage in talks still remains the same. The fighting in the north and the explosion in the south strengthen our stance that the solution can only be politically evolved and not militarily imposed. But timing is important in matters like these. Friday’s Piliyandala bombing has screwed up matters”, the diplomat said.
Despite the Muhamaalai debacle the Rajapakse regime’s hand has been strengthened further. There is very little pressure on the Government to call off the war.
To the contrary the hawkish sections in the corridors of power who had been dumbstruck after the Muhamaalai debacle have begun re-asserting themselves. More war seems to be on the agenda.
Each time the LTTE engages in an act of terrorism the hard-liners get re-invigorated.The underlying justice of the Tamil cause gets undermined.The terrible situation of the Tamil people is overlooked. The Tamil problem is easiliy distorted into a terrorist problem.
The LTTE plays into Colombo’s hands by such acts. The Government’s so called war against terrorism gains wider accptance. The peace doves are weakened. The battle hawks are strengthened.
Meanwhile Police sleuths investigating the April 25th bombing of the bus at Piliyandala claimed to have made a distinct breakthrough when they arrested three persons in connection with the incident. Two relatives of an arrested suspect are also being questioned.
According to informed sources two of those arrested were Tamils and the third a Sinhalese. One of those arrested is suspected of being a seasoned tiger operative. The Identity card in his possession says that his name is Lawrence David Raju. It is doubted whether that is really his name.
This man had allegedly placed the deadly bomb in the bus at Piliyandala bus station. He is known by the name “Appan” and has also used the names Prakash and Vasanthan.
The Sinhala accomplice who allegedly took “Appan” to the bus station is a 21 year old youth called Ranasinghe Aarachilage Buddhika.He is being interrogated intensively.
The third person arrested is also a Tamil who was residing at 210/2, Horana road, Piliyandala. The man named Devendran Siinnaiah has a brother Vijayendran Sinnaiah in Kilinochchi.
Vijayendran is a hard – core tiger and has been involved along with his brother Devendran in transporting LTTE cadre to Colombo and suburbs.Another brother Rajendran Sinnaiah is being held at the Negombo jail for a weapon related offence.
A fourth brother is a Police sergeant attached to the traffic division at Kollupitiya Police station. His wife is a woman Police inspector. Both are being questioned now.
Though investigations are still incomplete this columnist was informed by knowledgeable sources that two lines of inquiry are being pursued.
One is that of a “London link”. Apparently the attack was conceived of and co-ordinated by tiger bigwigs in Britain. The LTTE cell operating in Piliyandala was being handled via London it is suspected.
The modus operandi seems to have been that of “communication” between the Kilinochchi command and the Piliyandala cell being conducted by telephone via London.
It was only a few days ago that three persons aged 46, 39 and 33 were arrested in London by the British authorities for suspected LTTE links.
A high level Police delegation may leave for London shortly to pursue investigations regarding both the London link in the Piliyandala explosion as well as the tiger involvement of the trio recently arrested by the British police.
The second line of inquiry being pursued is whether the Piliyandala cell had originally intended to target in the Galkissa-Dehiwela area , a businessman named Kumar Rajapakse allegedly involved in the arms and armament dealings.
It is suspected that there was a sudden change of plan after the killing of the Catholic Priest cum human rights activist, Fr. Mariampillai Xavier Karunaratnam on April 20th in the LTTE controlled Wanni region.
Fr. Karunaratnam was targeted-at Ambaikulam between Vavunikulam and Vannivilankulam-through a claymore device in what was a deliberate killing perpetrated by a special assassination squad run by military intelligence.
While fighting continued between the security forces and LTTE along many fronts in the Mannar – Vavuniya area the spotlight has been shifting gradually to the Manal aaru-Weli-Oya region.
The Manal Aaru region comprises areas from the Mullaitheevu, Vavuniya, Anuradhapura and Trincomalee districts. Tamil inhabitants from 28 villages and 40 hamlets. farm settlements were driven out in the eighties of the last century in a flagrant exercise of ethnic cleansing by the United National Party regime under Junius Richard Jayewardena.
The region was then settled by Sinhala agriculturists and fisherfolk brought from different parts of the Country. A network of military camps was established to “protect” the new settlers many of whom were trained as home guards.
The area has been rapidly Sinhalaised with the ancient Tamil names being changed to Sinhala. Names like Mankindimalai, Kurunthumalai, Thannimurippu etc have gone out of use. There are new militarised settlements like Janakapura, Kalyanipura, Parakramapura etc.
Even streams and rivers known by their old Tamil names have been translated into Sinhala. Thus “Paalamai Odai” has become Kiri Iibban wewa. “Aanai Vizhulunthaan Aaru” is now called Ali wetuna wewa.
The process began in the eighties itself when Manal Aaru became Weli – Oya just as Kudumbimalai is now becoming Thoppigala.
The sad irony in this that both the Tamil and Sinhala names have the same meaning in many instances except where new militarized settlements have sprung up.
“Aanai vizhunthaan Aaru” and “ali wetuna wewa” for example mean in English “the river that the elephant fell in”. So too is Weli – Oya and Manal aaru meaning sandy river or stream.
The creation of Weli – Oya in the Manal Aaru region is a politico – military project. The ethnic cleansing of Tamil inhabitants along with the militarised Sinhalaisation of the region was a calculated scheme to interdict territorial contiguity between the Tamil dominated Northern province and Tamil majority Eastern province.
The Weli oya – Manal aaru region has seen an escalation of military activity in recent times. The 59 division under the command of Brig. Nandana Udawatte is stationed there.
The LTTE cadre drawn mainly from the Imran – Pandiyan infantry division and Sothiya womens brigade are stationed at the “Manal aaru kalamunai” (Weli oya battlefront) under the command of “Col” Balraj.
Balraj a former member of the Peoples Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) hails from Puthukudiyiruppu and is an original son of the Wani soil. He was at one time a protegee of ex – LTTE deputy leader Gopalswamy Mahendrarajah alias Mahattaya.
Balraj rose rapidly in the ranks and was responsible for early victories of the LTTE in Kokavil and Mankulam. He was made deputy military commander of the LTTE and played a crucial role in the war for Elephant pass in 2000.
“Col” Balraj led a sea – borne invasion that landed at Kudaarappu that made its way clandestinely to the A – 9 highway and interdicted supplies at Inthaavil between Elephant pass – Iyakkachchi and Eluthumadduvaal. This was the turning point which paved the way for the ultimate defeat.
Balraj who underwent severe injuries to his leg walks with a slight limp at times. He also underwent an operation in Colombo during the ceasefire.
In recent times two senior LTTE leaders “Col” Sornam and “Col” Bhanu have been sent to the Manal aaru/ Weli – Oya region to assist and supplement the efforts of “Col” Balraj.
The frontlines are about 12 km in length extending from Aanaivizhunthaan aaru in the interior to Kokuthoduvaai along the coast. An elaborate complex of military installations and forward defence lines have been set up along this 12 km line of control.
There have been many skirmishes and ” limited ” offensives by the armed forces in recent times. There has also been intermittent exchanges of artillery fire.
The army has also infiltrated into tiger territory in small groups and engaged the LTTE. The army has succeeded in injuring some tigers through landmines including a senior tiger leader.
Basically the 59 – 3 brigade has been active along the Kokuthoduvaai – Alambil front; the 59 – 2 has been active in the Naayaaru – Kumulamunai front; the 59 – 1 is concentrated along the Janakapura centered FDL’s.
Though not spectacular some significant advances have been made by the 59 into tiger territory. An area of about 4 1/2 to 5 km has been seized from the LTTE although the overall strategy at this juncture is not to acquire real estate.
The 59 division has been actively engaged in combat from January 1st this year. According to military reports the 59 division claims to have killed 537 LTTE cadre in the period between January 1st and April 30th.
It is also claimed that 653 tigers were injured during this period. The bodies of 47 LTTE cadre were recovered by the soldiers in these 4 months.
The LTTE however refutes the casualty figures claimed by the Army.
It is apparent that the strategic importance of this front is likely to cause increased military activity in the near future. The fact that LTTE supremo Velupillai Prabakharan has “transferred” two senior leaders Sornam and Bhanu from Mannar to Mullaitheevu denotes this fact.
“Col” Bhanu is in overall charge of the Kittu artillery corps as well as the “kutty Sri mortar unit. Both Kittu and Kutty Sri took their lives and sank with the LTTE ship “Ahad” on Jan 16th 1993 when surrounded by the Indian navy in international waters .
There has been a departure in the pattern of artillery-mortar fire after Bhanu moved in. Instead of targeting FDL positions alone as in the past the LTTE is now targeting the army’s area headquarter positions and field command posts also.
The tiger artillery shells have also fallen into civilian settlements like Parakramapura and Sinhapura. This has resulted in a minor exodus.
There has been a marked increase both quantitative and qualitative after “col” Bhanu entered the scene. On April 26th for instance a total of 37 shells were fired within a relatively short period. Six soldiers were killed and 13 injured.
The army gauged that the shells were being fired from a point in the Nedunkerny area. The army retaliated by using multi – barrel rocket launchers(MBRL).
It is not known whether the tiger artillery was hit but the Tamilnet claimed that two civilians, an elderly man and woman were injured in Nedunkerny.
The army however states that intercepts of radio messages reveal that 29 tigers were killed and 53 injured in the firing.
Military circles have noted with concern that there has been a conspicuous increase in artillery and mortar firing by the LTTE in the recent past.
At one point the LTTE was using its artillery and mortar very economically due to the difficulties it was facing in procuring regular supplies via sea. The Navy and Air Force had succeeded in circumscribing marine supply routes it was said.
However in recent times the LTTE has been very “liberal” in using mortars and artillery. Apart from using its home made “Ragavan” artillery shells and the mortar shells named Paseelan and Kumarappa the tigers have also been using “imported” stuff.
This is visible in multiple fronts in Mannar , Mullaitheevu and the Muhamaalai region.
Apparently the tigers have succeeded not only in getting a fresh supply of artillery and mortar shells but also have procured adequate “raw material” to manufacture their own varieties.
The induction of fresh supply of shells was confirmed in two recent intelligence reports.
The State Intelligence service in a report submitted to the Joint Operations Command stated that two LTTE ships had unloaded arms and other military related supplies on February 16th and 17th this year.
The vessels were stationed deep sea and the unloaded stuff was fetched to different points along the Vettrilaikerny-Challai coast by trawlers.A first hand account has been obtained from ” persons” who had purportedly been involved in carrying boxes.
In another report presented by the military intelligence division to the national security council it was said that another LTTE ship on March 28th had brought war materials, fuel , medicine etc from the Indian coast to Naachikuda along the Mannar coast.
The fact that three LTTE ships have reportedly broken through the naval cordon was not a pleasant fact to digest. There is also the possibility that more ships may have transported additional armaments and war material.
While the Navy is going on with its sea patrols focusing mainly on the Trincomalee – Mullaitheevu coast there has been visible lethargy in taking pro-active initiatives.
Some defence circles believe that the December 2007 incident of a Navy Fast – attack craft (FAC) being destroyed by the LTTE in the Neduntheevu seas, the February 2008 “seizure” of a naval water jet in the Thalaimannar seas and the recent demolition of another FAC through a submersible device in the Nayaaru seas have altogether had a cumulative effect on the Navy.
There is also the additional deterrent of explosive laden boats manned by “black sea tiger” suicide cadre accompanying LTTE flotilla. All this has led to a slackening of pro-active naval activity and has led to breaches in maritime naval cordons , it is felt.
There is also suspicion that the “international” support provided in curtailing LTTE maritime movement is not readily forthcoming as in the past. If correct, this may be related to growing international displeasure over the Gung Ho policies of the Rajapakse regime.
The LTTE also “scored ” politically when it re-activated its hibernating air wing described as the “Tamil Eelam Air Force”. Two small Ziln planes carrying three bombs each flew up from a clandestine airstrip along the Mullaitheevu coast.
They were targeting an MBRL artillery pad and a military headquarters complex in the Weli-oya /Manal Aaru region. Five of the six bombs exploded but failed to inflict large scale destruction.
Several buildings and six vehicles were damaged.
The important point however was the fact that the tiger planes were able to come from nowhere, drop bombs and return safely without any problem in spite of the elaborate air defence systems said to be in place.
It is said that a tiger helicopter was also scouring the skies simultaneously in what may have been either a diversionary tactic or aerial surveillance mission.
There have been a number of reports in the media about the air force having destroyed several LTTE airstrips and related installations. The latest attack shows that the tiger air wing is not merely alive and kicking but flying and dropping.
In a separate development the LTTE sustained a “cultural” loss when Subramaniam Kannan alias Major Silambarasan a.k.a. “Kuttikkannan” was killed in the fighting. Kuttikannan hailing from the Trincomalee district was a well – known singer of Tamil nationalist songs.
His most famous number was “Aandaandu Kaalamathaai” (for many, many years of our time) He was called Kuttikannan to differentiate between the senior musician Kannan and him. LTTE political commissar Balasingham Nadesan presided over the special funeral ceremony.
These then are the fluctuating fortunes of war. The bloodshed and mayhem goes on relentlessly . Even as the armed opponents pursue the illusion of a military solution the helpless civilians continue to bear the brunt.
DBS Jeyaraj can be reached on djeyaraj2005@yahoo.com
May 3rd, 2008
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