Conventional and unconventional wars: The end of one and beginning of the other
by Rajan Philips
Sri Lanka’s supposedly most successful Army Commander has spoken. According to General Sarath Fonseka, the Tigers are finished as a conventional army, if not already, certainly by next year. He has also added the caveat that the LTTE will not be totally eliminated and that as an insurgent force it could go on forever, fuelled by Tamil nationalism and bankrolled by Tamil expatriates. As military declarations go, this one was rather cautious and guarded, quite unlike the “Mission Accomplished” bravado that President Bush mouthed off on the Iraq war and has been egg-faced ever since.
Even so, the cautious optimism of Sarath Fonseka is being questioned by objective observers – from the London Economist to Jane’s Defense Weekly (written by Iqbal Athas who appears to have been forced into mute mode in Colombo) among others. The difference between conventional and unconventional modes of war, according to Colonel Hariharan of Chennai, is that firepower is concentrated in the former while in the latter it is unleashed in “penny packets”. It should be obvious to any observer and all sufferers of Eelam wars over the last thirty years that the penny packets of violence have inflicted far greater havoc on our civilian populations and physical resources than the unleashing of concentrated firepower in territorial battlegrounds.
So there are question to be asked of those who make decisions to wage war and who support the war. What has been the net gain to the country in allegedly attenuating the LTTE as a conventional force while admitting that it will continue as unconventional insurgency forever? Are we marking the end of one mode of war while acknowledging the new beginning of an older mode? Are we resigned to being stuck in this vicious circle of wars, or are we mature enough as a people and a country to look for and find a political breakthrough?
[Colonel Hariharan, at a symposium in Colombo, Aug 2007]
Colonel Hariharan, a retired Indian officer who served in the IPKF and now writes highly credible military and political analysis of Sri Lankan affairs, has traced the sources of the LTTE’s conventional and unconventional warfare capabilities. The conventional capability is, says Hariharan, “an acquired skill egged on and abetted by skewed Sri Lankan political priorities and decisions.” The roots and sustenance of the unconventional warfare, on the other hand, are Tamil political grievances.
One dimensional presidency
It is fair to say that the LTTE’s conventional capability came about in spite of India and not because of India, the result of the most skewed of all Sri Lankan political decisions that got rid of the IPKF and frustrated the 13th Amendment. Although Hariharan avoids saying it, India certainly did have more than a hand in the development of the unconventional capability of not just the LTTE but every Tamil militant group that spawned during the 1980s. Arguably, India’s hand in that development was a botched forerunner to the currently controversial R2P paradigm.
Arguably as well, the LTTE’s conventional capability has been overplayed for opposite reasons both by LTTE supporters and their southern detractors. The former, the more loquacious of them, have apparently proclaimed that the matter of Eelam will be decided on the battlefield by the conventional armies of the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government. This assertion is now being used to justify the war efforts of Sri Lanka’s “militarily most successful President.” There could not be a more inadvertent indictment of President Rajapakse by one of his more glamorous beneficiaries – as a one dimensional President! The Economist has no need to be circumspect and has dubbed Rajapakse – ‘the war President.’
The notion of conventional force and possession of territory was used by the LTTE to pretend that it had arrived at the makings of a separate Tamil state and to insist on military parity with the Sri Lankan state. The army’s claim that the LTTE’s conventional capability has been destroyed will be used by the government to pretend that the unitary state has been protected and to insist that there will be no military parity with LTTE as a basis for future negotiations.
General Fonseka’s has gone a lot further and suggested that the LTTE’s conventional capability had to be defeated because the goal of the LTTE is not just to create Tamil Eelam in a part of Sri Lanka but to capture all of Sri Lanka. He apparently vowed: “we will not allow that at any cost, we will fight them.” The truth of the matter is that the LTTE has not been able to make sustainable gains through conventional battles to support anything more than a pretension of a separate sate. Even the occasionally dramatic LTTE battlefield victories have not been cumulatively consequential towards creating Tamil Eelam, let alone capturing the whole of Sri Lanka.
The General and the President appear to have a specific southern political reason to showcase their conventional warfare success. And that is to vindicate everything that they have done in the last three years to negate all the positive efforts of the last twenty (post-13th Amendment) years to address the Tamil and Muslim nationalist grievances. Just as President Premadasa tried to show that he had stood up to India unlike his more socially privileged predecessor (President Jayewardene), President Rajapakse appears to be showing that he is boldly calling the LTTE’s bluff while his Colombo-centric detractors (Kumaratunga and Wickremasinghe) were directly or indirectly appeasing the LTTE.
The upshots of the Premadasa / Rajapakse detours are also equally damning. President Premadasa’s actions contributed to LTTE graduating from an insurgent force to adopting the trappings of a conventional army. The war efforts of President Rajapakse may or may not have put the conventional genie of the LTTE in the bottle, but its unconventional genie, by General Fonseka’s own admission, will haunt Sri Lanka forever.
The only way out of this vicious circle is to stop pretending that Eelam is a serious option and that the unitary constitution is the only basis for a political solution. Equally, it is necessary to start realizing that the matter of Eelam will not be decided in the conventional battlefield or on the basis of military parity, but by enshrining political parity in a new constitutional arrangement and thereby rendering Eelam a redundant demand except for purposes of Tamil nationalist symbolism. This is the crux of our national problem.
[James Martin Pacelli McGuinness]
And it can be resolved, as Martin McGuinness, the former IRA man turned Northern Ireland politician, said recently, “only at the negotiating table”. He went on to say: "Both the government and the Tamil Tigers believe that they can have more victories over each other possibly in advance of peace negotiations. I have to say, I think both the government and the Tamil Tigers are foolish if they believe that."
Comments
Why is it that the enemies of Rajapakse are so busy trying to claim the war can never be won and the LTTE will go on eternally undermining the country's economy? What advantage do these people gain from such a defeatist attitude?
The answer is partly to do with the fears of Colombo's compradors who believe their pre-eminence in the country's political centre will be lost to the rural Buddhist middle classes. The presence of the LTTE has given them an opportunity to earn blood money from foreign governments and the INGOs busy-bodies who care little for the country's political and social realities. They have their own agenda in trying to break up the country. Their money buys the opinions of politicians, local political agencies and of course journalists.
The other reason is the victory of the Sri Lankan army over the terrorists will undermine their cosy efforts to hoodwink the public they were interested in solving the problem. What none of these people - including the writer of this article - will admit is the CFA was a failure. The LTTE brushed aside any pretext of wanting to become political movement long ago. The LTTE are losing the war because Tamils see they have no political agenda. They are mass murdering killers who simply have no other reason of existence other than killing.
The government of Rajapakse has a political agenda. They have given the democratic representatives of the Tamil people a chance to stand for election and to be made accountable to the populous for their actions (or non-actions). Democratic debate is the negotiating process in action. If the people of the East and (eventually) the North feel their voice and their needs are being addressed by their representatives at local and central government levels the insurgency will die. It won't die in a day but in a year or two after its military defeat it will be a forgotten and distant memory.
There is the president of Malaysia, where the Chinese minority community under the guise of the Malaysian Communist Party led an insurrection to overthrow the newly independent country's Malay dominant government. After their defeat who has ever heard of them again? The truth is even the support of the racist Tamil diaspora will wane and disappear in time.
This is not a religious hallucination but a very real eventuality because the LTTE never represented many Tamils in Sri Lanka - that was and is the true myth! - Sadhatissa
Very well said, "Enshrining political parity at the constitutional level". That is what is necessary and needed in Sri Lanka. Are they ready for it? Only time will decide. - Subramaniam Masilamany
Sadhatissa conveniently avoids the bsic issue, the political solution for the ethnic dissension.The conflict between Tamils and Sinhalese will continue as long as the Sinalese only policy,standardization,colonisation,job discrimation(only 1% of Tamils in the present goverment service)and other second class treatments are meted out to the Tamils. You may win the Tigers but the Tamils all over the world wil never lt you rest.- david
The unitary model is a solution that 'could have' worked, but no more, for all the bastardizing the majority Sinhalese governments did with this model since independence. The simple fact of the matter is Tamils do not trust their Sinhalese brothers as far as they can throw them to have their (minorities) interests in the hearts of the majority. Considering the rotten end of the stick Tamils received from the Sinhalese, they are perfectly justified in demanding a more viable system of governance that provides legal guarantees through constitutional reforms, preferably, a total constitutional make-over. [Similar to a post-nuptial agreement between two untrusting spouses, the idea is to "put it down in writing, babe, since I no longer trust ya"!]
A Sinhalese commentator has mentioned how the crushing of the Chinese uprising in Malaysia has led to Malaysia's present hegemony over its minorities - possibly in the hope that similar crushing of the LTTE will lead to preservation of the exclusive Sinhalese-Buddhist state and continued hegemony over the minorities. And the Tamil Diaspora’s support will simply wane over time, and the minorities will have little choice but to accept the prevailing conditions. The implication is to force the minorities to a formula that the majority has determined to be the 'optimum' for all its citizens, a repeating of the same mistake of those 'majoratarian' minded past Sinhalese leaders - the very thinking that got the nation in to this mess in the first place!
We need a paradigm shift in our thinking and ponder on the greater questions: irrespective of whether its Malaysia or Sri Lanka, is it to the best advantage of any nation to have a sizable segment of its population, the minorities, unhappy? What purposes would such a condition serve, especially, when it is possible to derive elegant political frameworks that can provide mutual satisfaction to all the diverse communities of the nation? Yes, esteem, security and equal opportunity for all.
Then, besides the two extremist forces, the Tamil separatists on the left and the Sinhalese-Buddhists supremists on the right, what is keeping those fair-minded Sinhalese moderates from making the bold moves towards what the author calls for, courageous constitutional changes? The answer lies in that dirty 4-letter f-word, "FEAR".
Though more tolerant and open-minded than their parent's generation, Sinhalese moderates remain dead scared that bold constitutional changes that provide irreversible devolution to the periphery, that may in turn translate to devolution to minorities in particular geographic areas (the Northeast) will eventually lead to the weakening of the majority's power and thus the eventual extiction of the Sinhalese race. Here lies the resistance of the non-prejudicial Sinhalese-Buddhists to devolving powers to the minority. Thus their hope that things would work-out through limited and controlled devolution of power through legislation such as the 13th Amendment - sort of a corrective measure for the mistakes of their parents. And Pilliyan, the newly elected Chief Mininster of the Eastern Province, a beacon of this hope. While it is highly unlikely that a genuine 'throw-the-crumbs' strategy will ever work with a minority that has lost all trust of the majority, even if this strategy works, what would be the price to pay for such a tedious approach? Especially in terms of elapsed time? 5 years? 10, 20 years? By that time how far behind will the nation lag in regional development? What will be the State's state be? With such a laggard and lopsided approach (acceptable mostly to the Sinhalese), will the multinationals flock in with FDI (foreign direct investments) essential to boost development? Will an unhappy Tamil Diaspora continue to support a rag-tag terrorist outfit who is bound to jeopardize national development? (At least this is so according to the Army Chief, Sarath Fonseka)?
If Sri Lanka seriously wishes to reverse its rapid trend towards becoming a truly failed state, its people and leaders have little choice but to become courageous - and adopt bold new measures that will guarantee dignity, security and self-sufficiency for all its individual citizens. The foundation to such transformation lies, as the author suggests, in the making of bold changes to the foundation itself, the Constitution. Not doing so, will only accelerate its degradation towads becoming yet another Somalia - lot faster than most would like to believe. - dias
I think it is precisely for this (political) reason that the commander has said this.
The military has its role to play in minimising the tiger millitery ability. Political and economic role is the key factor to the permenent solution to the conflict. The east is an example, Japan after WW2 is another.
It is a fact as Sadhatissa comments 'the LTTE is not representative of all Tamils in SriLanka'.I will also add that President Rajapakse,the Hela Urumaya or the JVP do not represent all Sinhalese in Sri Lanka.
To say that the Malaysian Communist Party represented the minority Chinese interests in Malaysia is an exercise that any consummate China baiter may indulge in as a pastime.
Whether the LTTE is vanquished or not or the Sri Lankan army wins the war or not. Sooner than later, a situation will have to develop in the country, when the majority of the silent amongst the Sinhalese /Tamils and Muslims, realise that enough is enough and come up with acceptable constitutional changes to ensure equality,dignity,self-sufficiency for all the inhabitants of the Island.
The leaders to give effect that realisation will then lead them.
That will be an inevitable process.There is no other way.
Because in order to lead normal harmonious lives, the Island's people irrespective whether they are Sinhalese,Tamil or Muslim will want to be 'FREE'. Free from the shackles of the check-points,identity cards emergencies, curfews, white vans,censorship,lies, khaki uniform hassles etc etc., to develop the economy of the country to ensure against hunger and disease.That is the ultimate truth. - R.S.Ganeshan
I was not born in tamil eelam, but i come from jaffna, yet it is everyday that i dream that we will one day be free.
Since 1948 we have seen reason after reason, event after event as to why the tamils have lost all trust in the state of sri lanka. This year, 60 years since independance, 50 years since the first anti-tmail riot and 25 years since the 83 riots is symbolic. i can only hope that the international community will open its eyes and allow us to have the same freedoms they enjoy everyday. - ajay
One could see the failure by the journalists to maintain the culture of tabloid justice in Sri Lanka. Many journalists in the South try to gloss over the truth and look ridiculous. The rise of punditry has blurred tabloid justice.
The Sinhala media have a secret agenda. They know the magnitude of the secret, which is no secret at all to others. Journalists offer opinonated or completely speculative comments to cater to their secret agenda. For this reason they are not interested in gathering factual information.
The state and the Sinhala media have vested interest in promoting and winning a war that is cruel, full of human rights violations and unwinnable in the North East (NE). They publish their version of truth that is no truth at all. Scholarly analysis is misleading from such untruthful or less reputable information.
Oppressors and the dicatators have their grip of the country through media. They have no respect for truth. Mahinda Rajapakse often calls the journalists to give a "pep talk" to them on what to write. What he says to them is abandon your free thought, analysis, opinion or judgement and comment to appease me and my attempt for Tamil genocide.
For this reason the tabloid newspapers are hesitant to reflect the mindset of citizens and journalists on the events that are of importance for peace and prosperity of the country.
Fortunately, a few journalists in the South have not lost their heads inspite of threats and intimidation by the state. Even the kidnap and murder of over 17 journalists have not altered their dutiful vision to bring the truth and fairness of journalism to the people and their country.
Yesterday, The International Criminal Court's top prosecutor called for the arrest of Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir. This is the first arrest warrant by the International Criminal Court against a sitting head of state.
The prosecutor said " what happened in Darfur is a consequence of Beshir's will". He also said "the crime of genocide is a crime of intention."
Mahinda Rajapakse may be the next sitting head of state to be issued an arrest warrent by the International Criminal Court. Rajapakse's will for murder, rights violations and destruction in the NE and his intention for the genocide of Tamils would qualify him for his arrest.Perhaps, then tabloid justice and journalistic standards could return to Sri Lanka.
Peace by the creation of two states, Tamil Eelam and Sri Lanka in the island ONLY will solve, even the social problems of both countries. - Sam Thambipillai