War after the fall of Vidattalthivu
By Col R Hariharan (Retd.)
Keeping up the momentum of their offensive, Sri Lanka army's 58 Division and Commando troops advanced another 10 km to the north to capture Illuppakkadavai on Sunday July 20, 2008 close on the heels of their success in capturing the Sea Tiger base of Vidattalthivu on the Mannar coast on July 16, 2008. According to Defence sources, the Commandos pursued and attacked the cadres of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) fleeing Iluppakkadavai, three km to the north on the A32 Mannar- Pooneryn road.
The rapid progress of the Mannar offensive and its quick successes send clear signals of the intention of Sri Lanka President Mahinda Rajapaksa to fight the LTTE unto finish despite his recent statement in India about his readiness to talk to the LTTE. At best the statement was a palliative to mollify ruffled sentiments in India where the LTTE enjoys a love-hate relationship in Tamil Nadu. (And the scale still appears to be weighted against 'love'.)
The military victories should enable the President, who had been beleaguered by issues of high inflation, food shortages and financial tight squeeze due to war expenditure, to more confidently host the forthcoming summit of South Asian nations at the 15th SAARC meet in Colombo. The demonstrated military strength of a leader always sends a stronger message than words. In his case it would show his determination to pursue military objective first, regardless of the subterranean rumblings about it among the international community.
The capture of Vidattalthivu and Iluppakadavai are hard earned victories that have come about not a day soon. Though Adampan was captured on May 8 after prolonged efforts to penetrate its satellite defences, obviously it was the breakthrough at Periyamadhu on the
eastern side that had enabled the security forces to speed up their offensive. The fact the offensive troops have kept up their momentum to secure Iluppakadavain, a well established LTTE location, in four days shows that the army is overcoming its past weakness of slowing down after every success.
Apparently the operational plans now had been reworked and better orchestrated than the half-hearted efforts that got bogged down for quite sometime around the Giant's Tank on the flank of Adampan last year.
Though 200 cadres of the LTTE managed to pull out of the Vidattalthivu base before the security forces took it over, the operation was a difficult one as it involved reducing well fortified defences built around the base with a network of defensive positions on three sides providing depth to it. This was the reason why its capture took so long as it involved reducing the satellite defensive positions on the south and east. No doubt the injection of additional troops of the newly raised 61 Division and the linking up of 57 and 58 Divisions had boosted the chances of success in the Vidattalthivu-Iluppakadavai offensive.
With these successes, not only the LTTE's clandestine logistic umbilical chord from Tamil Nadu coast is cut, but the manoeuvring space of the LTTE to switch troops from east to west and ability to coordinate operations on more than one front are also reduced. As against this, the security forces have now gained a decisive advantage with the linking up of forces operating on a wide front from the key road junction at Iluppakadavi to areas west of Mankulam on the A9 highway.
After the fall of Iluppakkadavai, the Nachchikuda LTTE base located 17 km further to the north becomes an important objective in the security forces offensive towards Pooneryn. Sea Tiger operations from Nachchikuda in tandem with Vidattalthivu had been a thorn in the flesh of Sri Lanka navy. The shallow waters of Vidattalthivu and the hundreds of Indian fishing boats in the vicinity had enabled the Sea Tiger boats to carry out sneak operations with little interference.
As the Sea Tigers would be handicapped after the fall of Vidattalthivu, the navy should be able to control if not totally curtail sea movement across Palk Bay and Nachikuda either towards island territories off Jaffna or to the Tamil Nadu coast. It would also help the navy in providing better support to its outposts and detachments operating along the coast from the Mannar salient to Delft island.
The land offensive building up against Nachchikuda might well turn out to be a combined army-navy operation. The offensive patrolling operations of coastal patrol vessels of the navy reported in the seas around Vidattalthivu and Nachchikuda on July 20 indicate the likelihood of greater naval involvement in operations against Nachchikuda and more importantly in Pooneryn later.
However, before Nachchikuda is taken the security forces will have to secure and consolidate their hold on line Vellankulam-Tunukkai-Malavi on the road branching off from A32 to Mankulam. (This would probably involve further advance on a broad front for about 4km.) In the present operational situation, the Mankulam-Vellankulam axis to the east of A32 provides perhaps the best opportunity for the LTTE to launch a counterattack to dislodge the security forces as they are stretched now with the rapid advance. So we can expect the 57 Division sector to the west of A9 road become active in the coming week.
The A32 provides an alternate route to Jaffna from Pooneryn across the Jaffna Bay. Pooneryn's location on the western flank of A9 road can bring the war closer to Kilinochchi. Even if Pooneryn is not captured, the successes of the security forces on A32 road have increased their options to further progress their offensive because they will be operating on a wide front with a choice of multiple thrust lines with the advantage of secure flanks.
In spite of the quick successes, Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka, the Army Commander is understandably cautious about the course of operations in the future. This is evident from the interview he had given to the Sunday Observer on July 20. His guarded approach had enabled him to carefully plan and conduct his operations probably at a time of his choosing. So he usually avoids coming up with rash promises on operations unlike some politicians. Perhaps he remembers that nearly a decade ago when the LTTE was not having so of much fire power, it had upstaged the Sri Lanka security forces in the same sector though they had scored initial successes. It is interesting to see despite the official claims of killing 9000 LTTE cadres in Eelam War-4 he still credits the LTTE with a strength of 5000, which appears to be a realistic assessment. This strength includes hardened elements as well as raw inexperienced and ill trained hands. How they fare against the armed forces will be seen in the coming weeks.
["Sri Lanka: War after the fall of Vidattalthivu– Part 2" to follow will include the LTTE's options and Indian reaction to the ongoing war.]
Comments
After fall of Vidathaltivu the Srilankan forces have advanced upto Illuppaikkadavai.So Thevanpiddy is within the reach of the Srilankan forces Artillary barrages.
The worry is what will happen to our lady of Madhu.
The terrain between Vellankulam and Illuppaikaddavai is not dence and consists only Shrubland to the East of Poonerin highway.So I think this is ideal for the Srilankan forces.
Whether there will be stiff resistence I do not know.
But the indication is our lady of Madhu will be further displaced along with the inhabitants to further interland.
- Sudalaimaadan.
Col. Hariharan, do you think your Indian regime will play double games again? If they see their hegemony and influence waning, will they arm, train, and refinance the tigers?
On another note, there is concern that Tigers will launch a suprise attack with large numbers of suicide cadres when the SLA gets closer to Kilinochchi or Mullaitivu with a thrust coming in Jaffna across the Muhamalai front. Also what if, the Tigers are on the other side?
Anyway, no thanks to Motherrrr india for their curse on Sri Lanka.. No doubt INdians specially your Southern Brahmin advisors to your regime, will mull this over to see how they can scuttle the Lankan Forces. We remember a lot.. That is why we don't trust Indians.
Just recently the army announced that the base may have not been a base used by the LTTE as a main base. It was just a plain feild. - sinhalamonk
Colonel, I can see your view as a soldier. But your views and thinking is so outdated like the wars you fought.
I am sure that you did not fight with weapons that are being fought now in the conflict in Sri Lanka!
Please give us more constructive and pragmatic views rather than writing as if you are hired by the government of Sri Lanka to write in the manner you write.
We know that you are an Indian. Is your writing a part of Indo-Lanka military co-operation? - Justin
The view of the writer is in terms of the successive victories of the Armed Forces. But will the consequence of the victories win the hearts of the Tamils given the fact that Mahinda has still not placed a meaningful solution to meet the aspirations of the Tamils. Time and again my view is that the LTTE is on the defensive for the time being and concentrating on the Wanni border forward line. In fact they are withdrawing tactfully and lying low.
The announcement of LTTE that the movement would observe unilateral ceasefire during the period of SAARC conference giving cooperation for the success of the conference needs examination at a time when the Sri Lanka Forces boasts of its quick successes as well as of the intention of President Mahinda Rajapaksa to fight the LTTE unto finish. One should remind what happened to Churchill’s Conservative Party after the 2nd World War. Here is a case where Sri Lanka is caught up within the tentacles of famine and poverty. In addition, there is mounting pressure on the Congress Government by other parties in India and Tamil Nadu is bent on applying pressure on the Central Government in retaking Kachchativu and the support of Tamil Nadu is vital to the Central Government. The alleged partners (AIDMK and BJP branch in Tamil Nadu) of the main BJP in defeating the present government might be a threat to Mahinda Rajapakse which can be an unexpected turn of event. Further the LTTE can play for time till the rainy seasons whereupon it can bounce back.
The allegation that the strength includes hardened elements as well as raw inexperienced and ill trained hands may be realistic. It is a fact that determination and dedication are the strength of the LTTE and the LTTE having proved that they are courageous fighters for their conviction like the Vietnamese, Lt.Gen.Sarath Fonseka may be hasty in his assessment of the LTTE. Under such circumstances it cannot be ruled out that some more heads will roll down in the coming months which will cause some upset on the government. At the same time it is too late for the LTTE to realize the grave blunder of assassinating Rajiv Gandhi and A.Amirthalingam.
A.Rajasingam
The equation has been balanced for the moment. At the core lies India's intention to "decapitate the LTTE", meaning a head for a head or revenge for the killing of Rajive Gandhi. This emotionally generated hard core that drives her response to the situation in Sri Lanka is balanced by India's need to cultivate levers by which it can maneuver the developmental process in Sri Lanka in the direction in which it wishes it to move and confine it to those it wishes it to stick to. The emotionally raw nature of this hard core has proved to be unpalatable to others and so it first re presented itself as a position demanding a change of LTTE leadership. With no credible alternative leadership anywhere in sight this core has been widened to the point where it encompasses the position that the LTTE must be weakened but its military assets preserved. Of course in the process its leadership may "unfortunately" be killed by the Sri Lankan army's policy of killing fighters rather than capturing assets or holding territory which fits in very nicely with this position of weakening the LTTE while preserving its military assets. With the international community readily agreeing to this strategy - especially given the LTTEs torture, murder and other criminal activities not only in Sri Lanka but also in foreign lands - India has pulled out all the stops and is going all the way in helping the Sri Lankan army commander plot his war against the LTTE.
Accordingly the LTTE - after initial attempts at resistance - has realized or has been told of - what is afoot and has begun to move its assets away from exposed positions and withdraw even from positions that would affect its logistical capacities. The leadership of the LTTE seems at long last to have realized that as far as its survival and future role is concerned it is India who will call the tune. What remains to be seen is whether the Sri Lankan government and polity and in particular the Sri Lankan armed forces realize that as far as a political solution to the crisis faced by the islands minorities, here too it is India who calls the tune. The LTTE knows that as long as the Sri Lankan government, polity and armed forces resist this fact, a lease on its life is secure. As elections have shown the acceptance of this fact is nowhere in sight amidst the islands majority community, their political representatives and their armed forces. A temptation to buy off their political representatives may arise. This will likely fail as can be seen from the presidents about turn on CEPA despite the assurances he had extended. A similar summersault in the midst of an attempt to buy off the army would be not just disastrous but disgusting as well. Nevertheless these are the kinds of manipulations that are likely and we watch with misgivings the blundering brutes who usually manage such operations going into action.
Sri Lanka however is not Kashmir and it is very unlikely that the rest of the world will stand by and watch regional powers use the island as a board for their proxy wars and shadow boxing. Sri Lanka is too valuable a location to be abandoned to the egotistical competitions of regional players. The global economy requires the realization of the potential that the island has. The propping up, consolidation and development of what is left of the democratic process and institutional framework within the island is likely to receive the support of the rest of the global community. Trincomalee has already been declared a city of peace. Whether the island remains united or a separate Tamil state is allowed to emerge makes little difference from a global perspective which is all about access to the island. Radovan Karadzic has been detained, showing that the UN tribunal has sharpened its teeth somewhat and Sri Lanka is now home to what must be the largest community of war criminals in the world. I would suggest that all players in the little game that is actually greater than the great one, take a look at the bigger picture, take on a bit of humility and work together in a way that ensures a win win situation for all.
- crazyoldmansl
excellant report look forward to the 2nd part
bye
s wickramarachi
Dear Col.Hariharan
Good!
One more article clearly expressing,
1.The wishfull thinking of Indian policy makers and intellegence team
2.The real motive of indian ruling class and media(except some single digit people)...
Pl. carry on your commentry on this war.Waiting very eagerly for Part 2 to know more things
Yours,
A Tamilaian with self respect and rational approach
S.K.Sundaram
Jaipur.
It is a common knowledge that India is running a proxy war in Sri lanka since 1987. In a way it is a shadow military operation and a military option aiming at dismembering the Tamil National question as well as controlling the entire island by India.
A typical demonstration is the way and timing of signing the Mannaar Basin oil agreement between an Indian corporate outfit and Sri Lanka, and the connotations behind it, while Eezham Tamils, the traditional shareholders of the sea space of the Mannaar Basin, facing genocide.‘Grab what is possible from a burning house’ (Eriki’ra veeddil pidungkinathu michcham) is a saying in Tamil, characterizing the attitude.
It is a common knowledge that India is running a proxy war in Sri lanka since 1987. In a way it is a shadow military operation and a military option aiming at dismembering the Tamil National question as well as controlling the entire island by India. A typical demonstration is the way and timing of signing the Mannaar Basin oil agreement between an Indian corporate outfit and Sri Lanka, and the connotations behind it, while Eezham Tamils, the traditional shareholders of the sea space of the Mannaar Basin, facing genocide.‘Grab what is possible from a burning house’ (Eriki’ra veeddil pidungkinathu michcham) is a saying in Tamil, characterizing the attitude.
Bureaucrats have been chosen and are assigned with a specific agenda .I suspect the Col R Hariharan (Retd) is one of them. Unfortunately, common people of Tamil Nadu are not concerned with the foreign policies of their governments. Illiteracy in the state and selfish polticians are the reasons. - Kumar
I loved to read your wishfull thinking Col.
Being a Sri Lankan Tamil and looking at LTTE's patience, I will consider the current situation as just as "Calm before the Storm".
Kumar
While the army is capturing new areas, it is interesting to read Puthinam.com, a Tamil website which is one of the good sources to learn about the events happening in the LTTE administered Wanni. There are enevts launching new magazines, events honouring artists from the general public as well as from the LTTE, there are events launching educational programs to school childern, opening up of saving schemes for school children by the Bank of Tamil Ealam, Cutural programs, etc.
These events there show us that the LTTE is not really showing any signs of desperation/fear about the fact that the area they control decreases as the SL Army keeps on capturing new areas.
As a Tamil who was born an brought up in the LTTE era, I and most of the Tamils know the history of the LTTE and the way they were keeping on growing since the 1970s.
Obviously the LTTE is short in man power and they very well know that. Therefore there tactics will be not to always resist fully the advancing army. The tactics are different and would keep on changing. The LTTE tactics are not simply militaryt tactics but they are more combined with economic and poilitacl tactics which, take into consideration local, regional as well as global political, economic as well as military scenareo. Therefore it is not prudent to dream of finishing off the LTTE.
If it is so easy to finish off the LTTE in a couple of years, then do we think that the SL army commanders and the army hierachy from the 1976 onwards were fools, that they couln't finish off the LTTE during the 32 years it was growing?
- Siva
Col. Hariharan,
Congratulations, a good article.
A good soldier is basically a good diplomat and good analyst.So is Ur great Army chief Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw.
By the way did U attend menakshaw's funeral?
- Arun Aravinthan
With the death of Jonas Savimbi, the leader of UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) in 2002, a watershed was reached in the course of the 28 year old civil war in Angola. Six weeks following Savimbi's death, a ceasefire between UNITA and the MPLA was signed, but Angola remains deeply divided politically between MPLA and UNITA supporters.
The course of the war and the end had many similarities to the conflict in Sri Lanka. UNITA had the support of the regional super-power then lost it, were extremely violent, was lead by a god-like charismatic leader, fueled and used ethnic hatred, splintered up under duress etc.
I think we have a lot to learn not only on how to end the war in Sri Lanka but also on what to do after. I think this would be a great discussion to start!
Dear Col. Hariharan,
The administrator of this website is publishing the comments (ofcourse in small numbers) from readers who are very rational and seeking the truth--putting your articles under the scrutiny of truth,ration and justice .
My kind request to you and administrator---Please forget about them,need not worry about them. As an extrame step you need not even give space for their's views.
Please go ahead with your articles.
regds
- S.K.Sundaram