Tactical aspects of the Eelam War
Col R Hariharan
There is a lot of excitement as the Sri Lanka security forces are inching towards Kilinochchi from the southwest on multiple axes. The political tensions in Tamil Nadu over the plight of Tamil civilians in the war zone have added a bit of nervous expectation in Sri Lanka to the war scene. Broadly the security forces have enlarged the forward line roughly by eight km on the west of Kilinochi, isolating the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) stronghold of Nachikuda on the western coast. Task Force 1 which had bypassed Nachikuda, captured Manniyankulam and Vannrikulamon its advance along the A32 route to Pooneryn. Thus the LTTE access to sea routes to Tamil Nadu from the northern Mannar coast will probably come to an end shortly with these developments.
The57 Division, earlier locked in battle at the key road junction of Akkarayankulam (which leads to Kilinochchi in the north and the A9 highway in the east), has "pierced" its defences. According to the security forces this was the last of the LTTE strong points defending Kilinochchi. It has not been a cakewalk to the security forces as the LTTE had put up some resistance at selected places. The breakthrough in Akkarayankulam, in particular, has come after a lot of blood shedding. The defence spokesman has admitted losing '33 soldiers during the clashes in the weekending Sunday Oct 19th; 48 were injured and three were missing. This was perhaps one of the biggest losses suffered by the security forces. On the other hand the LTTE appear to have lost 12 cadres.
However, overall the LTTE had not been able to inflict such losses more often as the security forces advanced. While this could be for reasons of tactical withdrawal, it is clear that the LTTE efforts so far have lacked strength and firepower required to blunt the offensive. Though the fall of Kilinochchi looks imminent, in tactical terms its capture might not be essential. In any case, it would probably come within the security forces' heavy machine gun range in the coming week, making it untenable for the LTTE to hold. Capture of Kilinochchi, the LTTE's administrative capital till recently would certainly be a big loss of face to it. For President Rajapaksa it would add yet another feather in the cap after the 'victory' in the east. And that could make him politically stronger than ever before.
As the Task Force-1 advances to Pooneryn, it would be possible for the security forces to create an anvil extending from the western coast to Kilinochchi so that the hammer of 53 and 55 divisions operating along northern frontlines could be brought down upon the LTTE strong points in the crucial Elephant Pass/Nagarkovil bottleneck. The skirmishes reported in Muhamalai on Oct 16th were probably a probing attempt of the security forces for such an offensive. This option would also provide relief to 57 Division troops which had been on the offensive for three months now. A northern offensive could make the LTTE fight within a narrow strip with only one exit route open on the east to LTTE's Puthukkudiyiruppu defence complex.
If and when that happens, the LTTE domination of the A9 highway would probably end. It would also render both Nachikuda and Pooneryn defences meaningless unless the LTTE can quickly launch a counter stroke. But the moot point is does the LTTE want to launch such an offensive west of A9 highway at all? Their defensive pattern so far would indicate such an intention might not be there at all.
This is only one of the many ways in which this operation can be progressed. With the imminent fall of Kilinochchi, the Army Commander Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka has more options now than ever before. The monsoon is on and close air support could become tricky and mobility and visibility would also be affected. But weather gods are neutral and affect both sides. As the war in Wanni would involve jungle bashing, at best monsoon would slow down the operation on both sides and not stop it.
Understanding the LTTE strategy
So far in the areas west of A9 highway, the LTTE's conventional defence strategy appears to be based upon a series of strong points with bunds and ditches stretching for miles between them. The bunds along the expected axes of advance have been constructed to slow down the advancing troops and attack them at selected points when they try to break through the obstacle.
This is a strategy of the First World War vintage that became obsolete with the advent of increased battlefield mobility, greater depth and density of fire power, and enhanced battlefield reconnaissance capabilities. Unless the bund is protected by fire power and layers of obstacles, modern armies can reduce their effectiveness with no great difficulty.
In modern conventional warfare the technique has morphed into mobile defence based upon strong points that dominate the gaps between them with hard hitting armour based mobile teams. This technique is useful when a large area is to be defended by smaller number of troops as in the case of the LTTE. This strategy if successfully applied would lead to a lot of bloodletting and discourage advancing forces from launching the main offensive.
The LTTE had perhaps adopted defences based on strong points for this very reason. It was fighting against an opponent who outnumbered it by at least ten to one. On hindsight, last year the LTTE probably allowed a comparatively free run to the security forces to occupy areas south of road Vavuniya-Mannar along the Mannar coast so that the troops would be drawn into fighting the strong points further north. After that starting with Adampan in May 20008 there had been a series of LTTE strong points - big and small - forming layers of defences –Adampan-Nedunkandal-Andankulam, Madhu-Palamipiddi-Periyamadu, and so on.
But the LTTE had neither the required mobility nor fire power to dominate the gaps between the strong points to stop the security forces that had superior mobility, fire power and numbers. So probably it took recourse to constructing miles of bunds between strong points. And the security forces have been breaking the inadequately defended bunds regularly. Moreover, the LTTE strategy had seeds of failure as the axes of advance from south to north fanned out over increasingly larger gaps between strong points as the war progressed without a matching increase in troop strength. This is borne out by the LTTE inflicting heavier casualties on the security forces only when their axes converged on Kilinochchi.
The LTTE's performance so far has demonstrated the limitations of insurgency forces in carrying out conventional operations. Being light outfits with limited artillery support they were better suited to tackle company level tactical operations. In order to maximise the impact of conventional operations of insurgents, guerrillas have to be employed in tandem to hit rear areas and gun positions to destabilise the conventional opponent. The LTTE had not been able to carry out such commando strikes effectively so far in Eelam War-4.
During the war in Elephant Pass in 2000 the LTTE was able to overcome its weakness in conventional capability through superior battlefield leadership, high morale, and psychological advantage against the opponent who lacked them. The security forces then lacked the single mindedness of purpose they are showing now. In the Eelam War- 4, clear convergence of political and military focus on military objectives untroubled by other issues has resulted in the relentless pursuit of the LTTE.
The overconfident LTTE leadership is probably paying the price now for ignoring the two important developments in the security environment since the last Eelam War. These were the impact of Karuna's defection and the subsequent loss of east, and the qualitative and quantitative improvements in the Sri Lanka armed forces. This overconfidence of the LTTE gave the security forces a head start when they launched the offensive. The self defeating technique of suicide bombings has also deprived the LTTE of potential junior leaders, though they brought short lived glory.
Future portends
The tactical conjectures discussed so far might be of interest only to military minds. The question in everyone's mind is probably 'when' – in what time frame –Kilinochchi would fall and the A9 highway would open. It is not easy to answer this question. And there are always the imponderables of battlefield that affect the best laid plans.
The security forces had entered Kilinochchi district on July 31, 2008. They appear to be in no hurry to rush forward to overcome the LTTE strong points as they advance. Instead they have focused on inflicting maximum casualty on the LTTE. They have neutralised only those LTTE strong points that mattered on the way and by passed others. This perhaps tied down the LTTE to hold on to all its defences in anticipation.
But now as fall of Kilinochchi looks imminent, political and humanitarian crises are building up in the horizon. These could take the time plan for conduct of war out of the hands of the military. So far President Mahinda Rajapaksa appears to have given full freedom to Gen Fonseka to progress the operation in his own fashion. President Rajapaksa is coming under increasing pressure from India, where Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is facing flak from his Tamil Nadu coalition partners. So both the President and Gen Fonseka might decide to speed up the operations to get the A9 highway opened up and bottle up the LTTE within the Mullaitivu district. This could result in the security forces suffering more casualties than they had bargained for. On the other hand it would give a semblance of normalcy and relieve some of the pressures on the President. Of course it would reduce the plight of displaced civilians caught between the warring sides in the area.
The other question is how will the LTTE respond now as its domain is shrinking? In the past the LTTE had leveraged the criticalities of India-Sri Lanka relations to its advantage to survive and rise up once again to carry the battle another day. Can the LTTE, with its hands tainted with the blood of Rajiv Gandhi, go back to the same ploy? It is true there is loud public outcry in Tamil Nadu against the sufferings of Tamils in the war zones. But at the same time it is equally true that the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M Karunanidhi has made it clear that this sympathy should not be equated with sympathy for the LTTE.
Of course the easiest option for the LTTE is to inflict maximum possible casualties, cut loose, and pull back its assets deep into the Wanni jungles. Then lie low for a while, shed the conventional uniform and go back to the guerrilla mode. That would mean further suffering and agony for everyone with more suicide bombings, blasts and mayhem everywhere including areas outside the war zone. A more logical thing to achieve a win-win situation would be to sit with Tamil politicians, evolve a face saving political formula to find a democratic solution. But can Prabhakaran, whose strong point had never been logical reasoning, pull such a surprise? I doubt it. And I like millions of others would be happy if he proves me wrong.
17 Comments
There is justification when Col.Hari stated that a more logical thing to achieve a win-win situation would be to sit with Tamil politicians, evolve a face saving political formula to find a democratic solution.
But his account of Sri Lanka Military's fire power over the LTTE which in my view appears to be temporary. The heavy casualties incurred on the Sri Lanka Military was not disclosed. It is not the military's fire power that matters. Has the Sri Lankan Armed Forces ever won the hearts of the Tamils given the fact there were contradictory statements between the President and Gen.Sarath Fonseka.
Further, it appears the LTTE cadres are still unmoved despite the Military's advance towards Kilinochchi. On the other hand, the Sri Lankan soldiers are finding ways to escape or desert the Army which is seen when sections of battalions are regularly transferred from various points to various points. Though it appears to be their routine formalities, I have my reservation that the heads of the battalions may be the targets of their own soldiers which cannot be ruled out because this is a war between the visible and the invisible.
Though everyone of us is against terrorism for various reasons, it should not be forgotten that the LTTE terrorism is blended with freedom struggle or that freedom struggle is blended with terrorism. This is a complex matter. One has to distinguish between LTTE terrorism and the Tamil cause by way of humanitarian action in a meaningful manner through the International Agencies which the Government has failed miserably due to the conduct of the Army. Capturing Kilinochchi is a day's dream. Since the determination and will power is the strength of the LTTE one cannot easily mention that its domain is shrinking. Their activeness cannot be suspected. The LTTE has gone underground crouching comfortably and waiting for the opportunity to pounce on the army.
Gen.Sarath Fonseka and some military heads are only aware of the fire power of their arms and not the will power of the people. Reading the minds of the people is essential. Even Emperor Asoka failed to read the minds of the people during the Kalinga war. Mahinda is still not firm on a meaningful solution to the current ethnic problem. Not only Mahinda appears to be relying on Pakistan and China assuming that India abandon him due to pressures from Tamil Nadu, Indian leaders too appear to be bargaining for time for the formation of a stable government. This is where President Mahinda went wrong.
The much heralded victory over Kilinochchi will be temporary or just an imagination when poverty and misery takes over the people (when inflation is at an unprecedented level coupled with corruption), in addition to the sudden and unexpected attack of the LTTE on several points as what happened to the American Forces by the Vietnamese guerrillas. This being the situation I have my reservation that the plight of the displaced civilians will be reduced. This tense situation will come to a halt in June/July 2009 with some turn of events preferably with a somewhat favourable solution for the Tamils.
A.Rajasingam
:-)
This is what I think LTTE's plan:
Main point here is SL forces have never, ever captured an area with population. Every city, town and village they captured were empty of people.
Therefore, LTTE will allow SL forces capture Kilinochchi, Paranthan, Poneryan, ElephantPass etc..
Once A9 and West under their control, SL forces will take a break, so that IDP's can move out of Mullaitivu.
It is very likely only half the population will move. The rest numbering about 2,00,000 will stay with LTTE.
From this point onwards, SL forces have to kill at least 10 civilians to kill 1 LTTE fighter, and this will force either India or UN to intervene.
LTTE's ultimate goal is to bring UN forces to trigger a East-Trimor like solution.
:=)
The conclusion of Col Hariharan will not happen. This is mainly that Tamils political parties are for their personal benefits. For example, when the Rajapakse regime continues to commit war crimes against Tamils, Anandasangaree is with Rajapakse, not condemning the govt and failed to call for justice for Tamil victims.
LTTE was a product of Sinhala hooliganism and State Terrorism. Eelam Tamils were living peacefully until the Sinhala racists thrust violence upon the Tamils.
It is equally shame to India that allows War Crimes against Tamils in their backyard. Everyone except Human Rights Watch and few Human Rights organizations are writing about the LTTE but not writing about the sufferings and sacrifice of innocent Tamils as well as Tamil victims due to State Terrorism.
Your articles rely too heavily on propaganda from the Sri Lankan Defence ministry. Is this disingenuous?
I will ak a simple question to Col Harharan: Do you really think any negotiations with SL government means anythng?
How many negotiations and signed agreements have been torn up by respctive SL governments?
Have the two political parties EVER agreed on a solution? This is why, I suppose the LTTE, was discussing until the discussions reached succesful conclousion.
How many Tamils have lost all their houses and properties - repeatedly over the past 50 years?
For nearly twenty years - from 1950s, the Tamils have tried every peaceful means and discusions only to be beaten up by Sinhala thugs. None of the Political parties came to their rescue.
Is not this a Terrorit action by the respective Sinhala governments?
What do the Tamils do? You tell us.
Col. Hari
Being such a brilliant tactician and analyst, what went wrong during the IPKF era? There's one thing for certain! LTTE never underestimates it's enemy. They are down because of your country's tacit approval and collusion.
If the British can forgive the Germans for all the
atrocities of WW2, is Rajiv Gandhi a factor after
21 years of politics, to be a reckoned, for the
good of the millions?
The stupid mistake of the LTTE,assasinating Rajiv,
guided by contemporary thinking must change course
for the sake of the living.
The war can be over in 1 second with just 1 lucky deception strike by SLAF or DPU.You know what im talking about.
All the talk about capturing/not capturing/about to capture killinochchi, imaginary or somewhat realistic counter strikes ,turning tides is a merely a tactical concept.
Truth to be told Ealam dream was over in 1987 when LTTE rebeled against the Indian made 13th ammendment .Prabakaran not only killed the Ealam dream but killed the Tamil identity with it.The current states of the Tamil race in SL is worse than 1983 or ever worse than 1956.Tamil nationalists will beg to differ but thats the ground reality at present.War will be over with the demise of Prabakaran but it will take generations to rebuild Tamil livelyhoods,calture,traditions,reputation in the north and east back to its original states of a proud race.
Prabakaran made the Ealam dream reduntant single handadly.One man's destinity has made an entire community drop to its knees .Ealam war 4 buried ealam dream in the eyes of the world including USA/UK ect.There is no chance of a East temor or Kosovo doctrone ,that was killed by Prabakaran in 2004-2005 by walking out of the peace negociations.
Whether the SLA will capture killinochchi or Paranthan or Poonaryn or Mullatiuve OR wether LTTE can turn the tide is irrelevent.The sad reality is that GOSL or SLF cannot be beaten militaraly .If 30 years of war is not the proof then what else?.Is the tamil community (except the dispora) is at a better level now than in 1975? or even 1956?.Again Tamil nationalists will beg to differ but thats the ground reality.There is more chance of a Tamil ealam in central London than nothern SL
LTTE can kill Rajapaksha or Fonseka or Tom cruise ,but there will always someone else to replace,But LTTE will be good as gone once Prabakaran is no more.Again thats the reality
It is high time we look further than tactical aspects and see the strategic reality !
Dear Col. Hari,
Your recommendation to VP was tried and tested by moderate Tamil leaders since the independance in 1948. Had the Sinhalese polity
listened to them then, we wouldn't be facing this LTTE situation.
Please find a video presentation of the Sri-Lankan Air Force in action. I wish Manmohan Singh, Narayanan and the Indian Indra radar technicians stationed in the Wanni will get to see this.
http://www.tubetamil.com/view_video.php?viewkey=81761421d5e1e0c3de25
Cheers.
Col.Hariharan you often writes mixture of facts, and your wishes.
What many Indian pundits like you don’t understand is the psyche of Sinhalese.
Sinhala people ( or politician) will not agree to a meaningful devolution of power to the minorities. We, Tamils, had to learnt this fact in many occasions, and that is not going to change any time in the future. 'War on terror' is a ( scheme ) cover every successive Sinhala governments employed to suppress, and eventually subdue Tamil minority.
Indians are active partner in this crime against Tamils.
Don’t worry Mr Harry
Our military genius Thambi will teach another lesson for not only to you but also for Rasapaksas as well as for your Indian brothers.
Col Hari,
Good article, I appreciate your work. I am a regular reader of your and suddenly I see some changes in readers comments. Suddenly some LTTE sympathies appeared and banging on LTTE strengths. How much LTTE pays for your views. The knows LTTE is coping to end. I am a tamilean and 99% of my community hate LTTE. LTTE with mad Praba’s plans put tamils in to this struggle. We were living happily before this stupid come up with this stupid struggle.
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But can Prabhakaran, whose strong point had never been logical reasoning..
*/
The mind boggling question is how did he last this long if he was this dumb. I think its party his deceiving qualities which cannot be simply upbringing and genetic make up alone but also the environment he grew up in. The other of course, any fool can destroy things - especially in a third world countries.
Why Indians are always pointing out Rajiv Gandhi at the same time, failing to point out the atrocities committed by Indian forces against Tamils. I still miss Rajiv Gandhi, but at the same time why India does not realize its mistakes by making an accord to solve Tamil problems without consent of Tamil population. Anyone who think or tell that Sri Lankan government will solve the ethnic problem after crushing LTTE is trying to fool tamil people.
Arasan
Dear Canaga,
Col Hari is not there to answer your serious questions for free. He is only interested in Rajiv Ghandi's assassins. Unless you can help him on this he will not answer you.
Col Hari:
In response to my comments, you ask "what went wrong with IPKF era?"
Yes it is unfortunate. I was caught in that period due to my presence, from the day previous to the IPKF attack. You will be surprised to know how badly the IPKF behaved!
The aerial bombing and land bombing was very very bad- not targetted. They went into the best Jaffna hospital with their guns 'open' and killed untold number of patients, nurses and doctors.
When tiger boys arranged to go to India to collect their belongings, they informed the Indian army at a wedding function. The army in turn informed the SL army, who went and caught them on the sea beach. When the SL army was to send them to Colombo, the ten or twelve men killed themselves. This is what started the IPKF war - unfortunately.
The hospital took me around the properties to show me what was taken out of the neighbouring houses and sold in Madras!
I went for six days and ended up for six weeks - and my family did not know until four weeks later that I was still alive. No food, no electricity, mosquittoes plenty, and so on. What I heard on battery operated radio news is far far different to actual happenings.
I can go on and on, but I would not like to.
This is the unfortunate behaviour of armies around the world.
Indians will keep pointing out Rajiv and oppose LTTE in every forum despite TN uprising.Last 21 years we are witnessing this policy.LTTE and SL Tamils will keep pointing out IPKF atrocities for Rajiv murder .After justifying his assasination,SL Tamils beg for India 's intervention to save them.Infact,this begging approach of SL tamils/LTTE doesn't suit the martial race and the sacrifices of many young tamils.keep fighting or perish.they shouldnot cry for help.
Now since LTTE chief is surrounded ,it is imperative for tamils to muster India's support to save him.Blaming IPKF will not end your problems.Blame prabha's/SL tamil diaspora's ego which wiped out the race from the island.
As India points out there is no military solution.SL tamils should initiate political dialoque with SL govt for a dignified exit from this issue.or else willbe relegated to a position like chechniya