First, the market-oriented economic policies introduced in 1977 were put into practice with the notion that democratic engagement of trade unions had to be restricted and a semi-oppressive labour regime needed to be put in place.

The dominance of this view was expressed in explicit terms in a series of actions taken by the government in suppressing the general strike in July 1980. Army and police were used widely and trade union leaders were imprisoned and tortured. Government-backed subterranean groups were used to obstruct pickets and public meetings.

Secondly, the armed contestation of the Sri Lankan state by the secessionist LTTE and nationalist JVP had made it necessary to increase the strength and the fire power of the Sri Lankan security forces. This has, in turn, increased the powers of the military elite in the process of decision-making process through setting up of new mechanisms and institutions. As a result, at the time of the comprehensive military defeat of the LTTE, the security forces had emerged as a quasi-independent force with substantial support of the Sinhala segment of the population.

Thirdly, the introduction of executive presidential system without corrective checks and balances has also facilitated the process of militarisation of the Sri Lankan political landscape with government-backed subterranean groups operating side by side with the police and the security forces.

Although these factors operated in synergy, it may not be possible to give all these factors an equal weight and importance. There is no doubt that the prolonged armed conflict between the GoSL and LTTE was the key independent variable with higher parametric value in the equation.

The relationship between the process of militarisation of the political landscape and country’s deep-rooted democratic institutions and mechanisms is complex, tense and dialectical. On the one hand, the process of militarisation of the political landscape has resulted in weakening the democratic institutions, mechanisms and values as democratic institutions and mechanisms were constantly fashioned and refashioned according to the needs of the former. Hence, the qualitative nature of the Sri Lankan democracy has also changed significantly and the democratic values were redefined by the laws of the market and the powers of the state.

However, on the other hand, Sri Lankan democratic institutions have had substantial resilience so that they have resisted this militarisation tendency using their limited capacity, resources and power, especially at the time of short-lived peace in 1990, 1993-4, 2002-mid-2006. Although their definition of democracy is exceedingly limited and contracting, the civilian political leadership was always careful in ensuring that military did not pass beyond a certain threshold point. Thus, the architecture of the war machine has been designed carefully placing civilian leadership in between the civilian executive president and the upper echelon of the security forces.

The appointment of Lalith Athulathmudali as the first minister of National Security was not only to make the war effort more effective but also to strengthen civic monitoring over military affairs. The same role was subsequently played by Ranjan Wijeratne and Anurudhdha Ratwatte under President Ranasinghe Premadasa and Chandrika Bandaranaike respectively.

Ranil Wickramesinghe disrupted this equilibrium almost completely during the peace talks. When Mahinda Rajapakse decided to defeat the LTTE rather than pressuring it to come to a negotiated settlement using military methods, he had to redesign the military architecture not only to maintain civic-military balance but also to intensify military operations. Conducting a war does not follow democratic principles particularly in the context of internal armed conflicts. It was totally incorrect to interpret the appointment of Gotabhaya Rajapakse as the secretary to the Minister of Defence as an example of increasing nepotism. In the view of high level of intense military engagement, the architecture of the war machine had to be redesigned not to only to maintain civic-military balance but also to maintain the balance between three main forces led by very efficient leaders who were expected act in synergy but at the same time not making a space for them to gang up against the civilian leadership. Gotabhaya Rajapakse using his sophisticated military and technical skills has established himself as the central wheel of the war machine.

However, the way in which the government security forces achieved comprehensive military victory over the LTTE and the media coverage given to it in both print and electronic media made the security forces very popular particularly among the Sinhala segment of the population. An effective military action needs that day-to-day military operations should be freed from civilian political decisions particularly in a context in which civilian political leadership is subject to re-election. So, the intense military operation not only gave a relative independence to military hierarchy but also made it possible for them to influence decision-making even in activities that were not directly related to military operations in the war zone.

So the relative independence of the military elite, their ability to influence decision-making in general and its popularity among southern Sinhala population may have had an effect on the way in which military elites tend to think about the country’s future.

General Sarath Fonseka in his letter of resignation to the President Mahinda Rajapakse said that he had reason to believe that the upper echelon of the government had suspected that he would attempt a military coup to capture power. We have no evidence to substantiate his speculation that some people had suspected the possibility of a military coup led by General Sarath Fonseka. At the same time, no substantive evidence exists to support the view that General Sarath Fonseka himself was planning such a coup. However, given the circumstances described above, one may not, at least in abstract theoretical domain, deny the presence of some critical drivers leading towards a military coup.

When the war came to end with a comprehensive defeat of the LTTE, it was natural for civil leadership to avoid any kind of military takeover redefining the civil-military balance while addressing the issues of continuing security concerns. Changes introduced to the military hierarchy immediately after the war may signify a first step towards demilitarisation.

Demilitarisation operates at different levels. For both economic and political reasons reduction of the number armed forces is not possible. Sarath Fonseka at his new position as the chief of joint operation command sought not only the co-ordination of the activities of three forces and police but full control over them. It seems that this effort was thwarted by the Secretary to Ministry of Defence. So, Fonseka was dissatisfied as his plan of taking over the command structure of the security forces and police went awry. He had to find other means and found the leadership vacuum in the Opposition circle. That was the context in which General Sarath Fonseka decided to enter politics.

Although his support base was amorphous and internally contradictory, they all have had one objective in common, overthrowing Mahinda Rajapakse from power. The JVP has seen its support base getting increasingly weakened as the United People’s Freedom Alliance was able to gradually attract the youth in the periphery. Mangala Samaraweera was able to penetrate an already weakened UNP offering a shortcut to power that many UNPers were seeking for their own benefits.

During the last three years, the SLMC almost lost its support base in the Eastern Province. Western imperialist countries are also unhappy about Mahinda Rajapakse regime because of the change of orientation of its foreign policies. However, some rhetoric has to be articulated in bringing all the varying internal forces under one umbrella. Hence came the promise of the abolition of executive presidency that does not go beyond usual rhetoric.

Tissa Attanayaka has recently stated that a bill would be presented to the Parliament one month after the presidential election. There would not be a major change in Parliament even if the result of the presidential election were to be favourable to the UNP. So one may even wonder why UNP did not bring such a bill before the presidential election.

It is clear what General Sarath Fonseka seeks is what he was not able to achieve as the Chief of JOC. He has already said that he was unhappy because he was given not controlling power but only the power of co-ordination while three forces and police would operate under their own command structure.

From the point of civil rule, the existing structure is much more democratic and constitutes a barrier against a possible military coup.

The LTTE has been comprehensively defeated and the time has come for us to reverse the process that has developed for the last 25 to 30 years. The removal of the danger posed by General Sarath Fonseka would be a first step although the first step in itself would not be adequate in reversing a process that has been at work in the last three decades.