Southern hawks think a Sinhala solution can be imposed on the Tamils
by Dayan Jayatileka
"You never see it comin’ till it’s gone" – Falling & Flyin, Jeff Bridges in Crazy Heart"
Seeing it comin’:
Will the Tamils silently celebrate and the Sinhalese secretly curse the day that Prabhakaran died? With his secessionist fundamentalism and ghastly terrorism, he was the biggest obstacle to achievable autonomy for Tamils and the best excuse for the Sinhala establishment’s tardiness to devolve power to the Tamil speaking periphery. Now the North is no longer hostage to secessionism and the South is bereft of a human shield against democratic demands for devolution.
There was an old Cold War joke about the thief who broke into the Kremlin and stole, among other things, the complete results of the next election.
Well, one of the most important results of Sri Lanka’s upcoming parliamentary election is already in or rather, is predictable: the predominance of the TNA in the Tamil majority areas of the North and East and the resultant political polarization between North and South.
While Ranil Wickremesinghe arguably has the cosmopolitanism necessary to reintegrate the Tamils into the Sri Lankan polity, that very cosmopolitanism (and his track record of appeasement of the Tigers) mean that he cannot carry the Sinhalese with him on this issue even if he becomes President someday.
By contrast President Rajapakse is indispensable because he can carry the majority of the (Sinhalese) majority with him into a settlement with the Tamils, but does the consciousness of his close allies permit him to do so, on a basis other than that of unilateral imposition and total Tamil capitulation?
The SLFP has reformist nationalists, and UNP, nationalist liberals, who could forge an overarching consensus, but these factions are marginalized to the point that they cannot be factored into any serious current discussion of future prospects.
The incumbent administration seems to think that all problems can be solved through political uni-polarity of a sort that would come with a two thirds majority at or after the parliamentary election (through defections). Serial victories — in the war, in a single diplomatic arena and at the Presidential election—have given rise to a mood and mindset, ideology and project, that we have witnessed before in other more important parts of the world on a much larger scale.
We have seen politically uni-polar moments, with their attendant delusions and tragic denouements. When the USSR lost the Cold War, the US won the first Gulf war and Kosovo conflict, and went onto overthrow the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the Bush administration and more precisely its two most influential components, the religious fundamentalists and the neoconservatives, were convinced the moment had come for the USA to re-mould the world unopposed and as it saw fit. Parallels were made with the Roman Empire at its height. A favorite dream theme was that of a New Middle East.
It is hardly possible to recall those absurd illusions today, buried up-ended as they have been. Domestically too we have experienced the equivalent of such hubristic delusions: in late 1982, at the moment of JRJ’s triumphant re-election, with a booming economy and a prostrate Opposition.
Today we are experiencing yet another such moment; one in which the Southern hawks, the Sri Lankan equivalent of the neoconservative populists, think that a Sinhala solution can be imposed upon the Tamils; a Southern solution on the North and East; a solution which entails the rollback of the Indo-Lanka accord and the 13th amendment and its substitution by something else amounting to something less.
The argument seems to be that having won the war which was itself an outgrowth and logical culmination of Tamil nationalism, that nationalism can be totally rolled back and we can (re)write our own Sri Lanka as if it were a tabula rasa. For these ideologues, ‘Sri Lanka’ and ‘Sri Lankan’ are, (as it perhaps was in the spirit animating the 1972 Constitution), but a synonym and mask for ‘Sinhala Buddhist’—and not a negotiated or evolved synthesis of the identities of all the island’s citizenry, albeit with a natural ‘core’ status and function for the Sinhala Buddhist civilization.
One may observe parenthetically that the conversion from ‘Ceylon’ to ‘Sri Lanka’ and ‘Ceylonese’ to ‘Sri Lankan’ didn’t stop at ‘Lanka’ and ‘Lankan’, as in the Lanka Sama Samaja Party or the Lanka Guardian.
Thus the political deadlock in the North-South relationship continues while the war, the armed conflict, has been won. The April 2010 parliamentary election takes place in a context that is postwar, post-victory and post-presidential election, but not post-crisis. If one defines the conflict not as a military one but as a political conflict, then we may be living in a moment that is not yet ‘post-conflict’ and is even describable as ‘pre-conflict’. The upcoming election must be viewed as embedded within this situation. Its real consequences go beyond the arithmetical outcome and reside in how the electoral outcome impacts upon the larger context of the long-running crisis.
The commencement of the crisis of Sri Lanka’s political identity was obviously not 1983.The Vadukkodai resolution calling for the establishment of an independent sovereign secular socialist state of Tamil Eelam was in 1976, while JR’s UNP manifesto of 1977 said that "the Tamil people have been driven even to seek a separate state" — and the TULF swept the North on this single issue at the watershed elections of that year.
The TNA has undergone a partial yet welcome reconfiguration; partial because it entails personalities rather than political line and policy platform. Welcome, because the most pro-Tiger elements have been shed and the party looks more like the old TULF, TUF, or Federal party. It is not that the TNA has no radicals or militants in its ranks. Suresh Premachandran is one, but though he was pro-Tiger, he was never a Tiger and is originally from the EPRLF stream of Tamil militancy. The reconfigured TNA is rather like the UPFA would have been without the JHU, but only the NFF.
Premachandran is probably best seen as the TNA’s counterpart of the UPFA’s Ranawake or Weerawansa. Gajan Ponnambalam’s breakaway grouping which seems to have the support of the hard-line elements of the Tamil Diaspora and organs such as the TamilNet, are the JHU equivalent, and they are no longer part of the TNA.
Still, there is a major problem which will contribute to the exacerbation of the situation. One part of the problem is that the TNA has not yet officially and formally abandoned the secessionist Vadukkodai resolution. That platform may have had some historical validity or comprehensibility at that time, and after July 1983, but it has been unjustified and obsolescent since Indian mediation commenced, serious negotiations started and the Indo-Lanka Accord produced a reasonable reform as alternative. It would be a wise and legitimate stance were the TNA were to unilaterally renounce secessionism, formally return to a federalist platform, while settling for autonomy within the unitary state of Sri Lanka.
The other part and no less troubling aspect of the problem is that the Southern establishment is not staunch in its commitment to authentic provincial autonomy within a unitary state; not even the autonomy contained in the country’s Constitution and derivative of a bilateral agreement with our most indispensable international ally.
After the election, the TNA will put forward demands that dominant Sinhala opinion may think excessive but world opinion and many Governments find unexceptionable. If President Rajapakse contents himself simply with not giving in, rather than keeping the TNA engaged but off balance with a counterproposal at least the rest of Asia will think reasonable, the TNA will go the Chelvanayagam route of peaceful agitation. This will be stimulated by competition from Gajan Ponnamabalam’s grouping and pressure from Suresh and such others within the party.
It is unlikely that there will be a Southern consensus, given the basic two party split in Sinhala society. The Rajapakse administration’s response will also be tangentially affected by the Sarath Fonseka factor: a caged, wounded lion in the basement or dungeon does not make for sociopolitical stability and a generous, consensual response to minority issues.
If the state cracks down on, or elements in the South react violently and with impunity to, peaceful and democratic non-secessionist Tamil demands, the global diplomatic reaction in this YouTube age will not be the same as in 1956, 1983 or 2009. The TNA will be armed with democratic legitimacy in the eyes of the world, from West to East.
The Tamil Diaspora and its ex-colonial Western patrons will exploit the gap between MR’s nativist ideological constituency and the globalised world. That’s when the Tamil Diaspora’s serial referenda campaign will have set the stage, and the British connection (not just Labour’s Blair-Brown but the Conservatives’ William Hague) which is a bridge to ‘human rights crusaders’ in Washington DC will kick in.
We won the diplomatic battle in Geneva not only because of our friends but also the nature of our enemy: the Tigers and the Tiger-flag bearing Tamil Diaspora demonstrations. The same strategy and tactics will not work against a democratically elected TNA option, unless the latter remains formally and demonstrably secessionist while we for our part have implemented the 13th Amendment.
Our Eastern friends helped us against armed Tamil separatism but they regard the Tamil community as a respected, productive component of Asia’s citizenry and will not back us in a confrontation with the democratically elected representatives of the Sri Lankan Tamils of the North and East.
India remains our key ‘buffer state’ internationally, and if we think we can unilaterally rollback the accord and 13A without something more extensive in place; i.e. go below the 13A and continue to have Delhi in our corner, we are deluding ourselves. We don’t have to implement the provision to devolve police powers right now.
However, the carefully negotiated arrangements on land cannot be deleted or diluted. The problem arises when our leadership refers to "village level devolution" on an occasion as portentous as the first peacetime Independence Day in decades. It is as if we have learned nothing.
If Mr. Sampanthan is not successfully co-opted with adequate power sharing, Gajan Ponnambalam’s splinter group will grow, ironically as Chelvanayagam’s breakaway Federal party did when Colombo undermined Gajan’s grandfather’s political credibility with the citizenship move on the hill country Tamils.
The issue of Sri Lanka’s collective identities is hardly likely to be resolved by integration through economic development. If economic development alone would do the trick, the UPFA would not have lost the East so badly at the Presidential elections. Indeed this formula puts the cart before the horse.
A viable option for Sri Lanka would be the Asian model of globalization, but the dominant ideology, mindset and policy framework of the incumbent administration is far from the paradigm of the New Asian modernity. The experience of Asia reveals broadly five formulae or models for handling diversity, though one could also envisage a suitable combination of aspects of these models:
1) Meritocratic multiculturalism; a level playing field and a managed market economy (the Singapore model)
2) Secular state, constitutional guarantees of equality, and quasi-federalism (the Indian model; the secularity of the state/central govt. is not contradicted by sporadic outbreaks of ethnic or religious violence at the sub-national, local or civic level).
3) A secular, unitary/non-federal state with suitable regional/provincial autonomy arrangements (China, Indonesia, Philippines)
4) Non secular, federal state (Pakistan)
5) Secular unitary state ( Bangladesh)
The relevance of secularism is that it is symbolic of the state’s/central government’s neutrality or non-alignment in relation to the constituent communities/collectivities of that society, irrespective of the sizes of those communities and ratios between them. Thus the state stands above the communities, able to reconcile them.
The Soulbury Constitution would have put us closest to model 1. If the existing Sri Lankan Constitution inclusive of the results of the Indo-Lanka accord, i.e. 13th amendment were fully implemented, the Sri Lankan state would arguably be a variant of model 3: non-secular, not a level playing field, but with an offsetting provincial autonomy.
However, the 1972 Constitution, the 1978 Constitution without the 1988 amendment, and the ideas of counter-reformation proposed by the ideologues of Sinhala dominance all posit a model which does not fit with any Asian framework. It is/would be the model of a non-secular, linguistically unequal, non-federal polity devoid of even provincial level devolution/autonomy.
In a homogenous society, devolution is not an imperative. In a heterogeneous society, strong centralism devoid of devolution is fine if accompanied by meritocratic multiculturalism and secularism, i.e. a neutral state.
Conversely, a secular meritocracy – a neutral state — is not necessary, and the dice can be loaded in favor of the majority perceived as historically underprivileged, provided there is a compensatory counterweight at the periphery in the form of federalism or regional/provincial autonomy (Malaysia). Sri Lanka does not have a homogenous society. Its minorities are mixed in with the majority in some areas and preponderate in another.
Yet Sri Lanka today neither has a neutral state (secular or meritocratic multiculturalism) nor a federal system nor active devolution within a unitary framework. Thus it does not have the necessary framework for successful globalization along Asian lines and full participation in the Asian economic miracle.
This threefold asymmetry between (A) Southern and Northern political choices; (B) social reality and political structure; and (C) the dominant paradigm and reform imperatives for fulfillment of the country’s potential, constitute the core of the Sri Lankan crisis and the fault-lines which will be exploited by those who do not wish the country well.
Meanwhile, we may well reflect with Jeff Bridges playing ‘Bad Blake’ as he sings:
"Funny how fallin’ feels like flyin’/ For a little while".
19 Comments
It sure looks like DJ has had a chameleon-like change of heart and mind since getting kicked out of his UN post. Well, that is good, keep it up Dyan and maybe a few more might join you.
Mr. Jayatileka presents a very interesting thesis.
The tragedy, however, of the Sinhala extremists in Canada (derisively referred to as SLUNATICS) who have hijacked the voice of the people of Sinhala heritage in this northern clime (just as the LTTE hijacked the voice of Canadian Tamils the vast majority of whom despised the LTTE) is their inability to understand the importance of the types of reasoned ideas posited by persons such as Mr. Jayatileka who by tomorrow morning will (again) be branded as a traitor!
Viresh Fernando, Toronto, Canada
From what I have heard meritocratic multiculturalism of Singapore listed as number one fails to live up to that status. Can you elaborate on the government explanations regarding whipping exercised by the state to enforce dins scipline among tenagers, the extra inducements offered to young girls of academic attainment to marry and reproduce, and the negative inducements for those with lower IQ not to reproduce, dominance of one family holding the top post over many decades. For me ot as well versed in these matters as the respected writer these instances do give reason to cry foul.
If anyone thinks that the UPFA seeking a two third majority to solve the ethnic problem by imposition, it is a fallacy. Given the past record of the MR regime and the type of candidates being fielded only indicates that neither the peaceful settlement, imposed or otherwise or the general welfare of the lankan population does not seem to be in their minds. It is more than predictable the sole purpose is to strengthen the dynasty and nothing else!
So be it, let them get away with it. May be the people of Sri Lanka would bear up thus far and what may ensue might take another century to rehabilitate the country if people rise up whatever parallel examples, speculations and theories are offered.
“All sin tends to be addictive, and the terminal point of addiction is what is called damnation!”
Dr DJ has put forward the options facing us very clearly. What will it be, or a 'home grown solution', known only to MR at this moment? The efforts being put by the Sihala Nationlist Block to canvas and obtain a 2/3 majority may be a hint of what this home grown solution will entail. The Minorities should harbour no illusions and vote accordingly.
The article appears to portray the current government as hawkish and imply that Ranil and Sampathan are the leaders who can look after the Tamil people.As usual the writer uses his high octane language to color his statements.
Dr Jayathilleka presented the 13th amendment as the solution at world forums whilst the government was still engaged in the humanitarian operation to rescue the hostages from the LTTE.
The defeat of Terrorism and the subsequent overwhelming endorsement of the President at the election is an indication that the majority Srilankan's priority is a peaceful and prosperous country.
30 years of the 62 years of the independence was consumed by terrorism.The demography has changed significantly in this period. Tamil population has dwindled by more than a third. The population of Tamils in Colombo far exceeds the total in the North and East combined.
Any agreements or resolutions which were planned and drawn then need to be revised and restructured to reflect these developments.
The North and the East which are the least populated areas need to be kept open to accommodate the increasing demand for the growing population.In addition strong on going Military presence is required in the North and the East.These needs have to be incorporated in to any new plans for devolution.
The solution to the Tamil greivances surely need to be a new home grown arrangement. Even to adopt a modified Singapore model the country has to be on a strong economic footing first.Srilanka certainly will be a better place for the Tamils than Singapore if that model is adopted.
Mr Leon Emmanuel certainly hasn't read my writings on this subject WHILE I was ambassador to the UN Geneva, on this and other websites and papers. Indeed Dr Gunadasa Amarasekara speaking at a press conference hosted by Mr weerawansa's NFF almost the day after our victory at Geneva, attacked me for the reference to the 13th amendment in our 'match winning' resolution, and followed this up with a mid page article in the Sunday Divaina. Of course the refernce was taken from the joint Indo-Lanka communique of May 21 issued after a top level delegation visited from Delhi.
Sadly, I agree with the comments of Viresh Fernando. In my several visits to Toronto and being with Sinhala and Tamil groups - socially and otherwise - I notice even those of both communities from Colombo and Kandy emotionally feel separated. Some who have assumed leadership positions in the Sinhala community find it in their parochial interest to maintain this posture of the "we" and "they" syndrome.
Tamils from the interland of the NEP, understandably, have little inclination to unity because most of them are born post-1983. The scars of war on them and their immeidate families are still raw. A medical man and his Tamil friends (in their 50s) recently returned from Sri Lanka after calling on the President. They had plans to invest in Jaffna - initially. However, they are now termed "traitors" Their critics say it is too early for unity and want GoSL to show their good intentions. The more initiated and professional Tamils still maintain their social links with their Lankan friends from other communities - but
somewhat lukewarm.
There is, therefore, a need for Lankans in Canada to join hands acroos the racial divide at least gradually and show people back home unity is possible.
Congratulations to the author.
This is one of those rare situations where somebody presents a balanced view about the actual reality there in the Island.
Alot of the post war LTTE bashing is not going to fool alot of us. We were not born yesterday. This is not a romantic dragon slayer story. There are only shades of gray.
We the tamil community overall are very strong willed and have our priorities in sight. Trying to force unity on us is just plain stupid. Most tamils will continue working and developing in and out of Sri lanka. But that does not mean we are going to allow sinhala chauvinists to make long term decisions for our community. This does not mean we are all supporting the LTTE and Eelam. The author pointed this out. Many of us are quite willing to live in a Sri Lanka, but not one where the extremist Buddhist elements are completely controlling us.
The average village idiot in lanka might think that is how things should work, but sure as hell it wont.
Sri Lanka is not North Korea. Foreign opinion means EVERYTHING to the success of this island in a global economy.
The world was willing to keep a backseat so the the war in the island can finish. And now they are looking into war crimes. This is certainly not the time for any further provocation of the tamil community because i guarantee it will cause problems for everyone and the country will find itself in further trouble
Kalu Albert
30 years of the 62 years of the independence was consumed by terrorism
------------------
Its this type of idiotic talk that further prevents any real understanding amongst everyone. 30 years of terrorism eh? You must be referring to the LTTEs arrival in the 1970s.
And since the Sinhalese were going on racial riots for at least 20 years (which led to the LTTE being formed), let me revise your statement so it sounds more realistic:
'62 years of independance, initial 20 years of which were consumed by state terrorism, which was then joined by rebel terrorism and both state and rebels added to the mess for 30 years after'
The fundamental cause of the failure of the State of SriLanka is the mindset of the Sinhala people . They consider that they are the source of the legal rights of the Tamil speaking people. They completely refuse to recognise that the Tamils lost their sovereignty to the Portuguese and their territory was unified with the Sinhala territory. As the result of this improper act of the colonial masters,Sinhalese enriched at the cost of the Tamils.
Anyway their government is not in a position to decide where to keep the army. Because these have to be decided by China and India. UN has to decide on the war cime and crime against the Tamils over the last 60 years.The question is whether SriLanka is China's court or Indian province.
amil -Sinhala conflict is not sulu janatha karatharai.
It is question of a nation which lost its sovereignty to colonial rulers and failed to restore due to imprper decolonisation. Therefore this matter has be adjudicated in an appropriate international legal forum. Due to this the Secretary General has requested the government of SriLanka to allow the UN to conduct referendum in the Northern and Eastern provinces . It has to be extended to other countries where the Tamils live on exile.
"Southern hawks think a Sinhala solution can be imposed on the Tamils" – this is only partially true as it is not just what the Sinhalese think at present, but what they had thought all along since national independence.
This is a refreshing article by Dr. Jayatilleke but one that perhaps eludes comprehension by Sinhalese bigots. The days of using Tiger terrorism as an excuse for not articulating a solution to the ethnic challenge are long over, and the Rajapaksa administration, in its 2nd term, will be held accountable. The 32-grin smiles, the charades and time-buying tactics will also no longer work, and unless there is measurable progress, the Western international community will only reciprocate with further tightening of the screws, an example of which is the withholding of the GSP+.
... ... the Southern establishment is not staunch in its commitment to authentic provincial autonomy within a unitary state.
... ...JR’s UNP manifesto of 1977 said that "the Tamil people have been driven even to seek a separate state".
DJ finds it relevant to remind us of this historic turning point, in our history.
The rationale that it was Sinhala nationalism that drove the Tamils to favour separatism does signal an opportunity to build a consensus towards an irreversible process of reconciliation.
But there could be hiccups. For instance, that 'we don’t have to implement the provision to devolve police powers right now' may be reasonable thinking but cannot a logical position.
Why does one have to envisage a 'you' and a 'we' in a homogeneous polity ... ... ?
... ... The issue of Sri Lanka’s collective identities is hardly likely to be resolved by integration through economic development.
This assertion is worth its weight in gold!
Haha, DJ what a great article!
It sure beats your days when you were working for the government. I guess you had to tow the line back then. Funny how misfortune can lead to glory. Your article is terrific.
Yes, you are right in characterizing the Tamils as very angry with the political situation. And it sure looks like Sinhala hawks are going to shove Sinhalization down Tamil throats. To Eelam Tamils this is nothing other than colonialism and destruction of a unique culture.
In my opinion, you have a very pissed off Tamil polity. Especially, Tamils abroad are very angry. This is really dangerous for the Sri Lankan state. Tamils have basically been crushed by international super powers and they are loathe to fight again under such tremendous pressure from foreign powers.
This brings us to an interesting situation in which you have a population that is ready to fight, but does not want to do an irrational political decision of fighting a war that it can not win.
So how could it become feasible for Tamils to wage war successfully? This is if the geo-political environment morphs into one where an opportunistic superpower or regional power sees it in their self-interest to provide Tamils with support in waging war.
In Eelam War IV, India and the US alliance thought it was in there self-interest to support the Sri Lankan state. And China more or less sold ammunitions to SL, but the Tigers also managed to get a hold of chinese weapons. (from some country other than China? the Tigers were survivors)
The key in Eelam War IV was that the geo-political environment decided that it was time for Tamil Eelam to die, and Tamils were crushed under this enormous pressure.
Actually it can be argued that the US alliance or Western powers basically gave the Tigers the option of give up your arms and agree to a power sharing solution, OR be destroyed if you choose to renew warfare for a sepearate state. And the Tigers chose war instead of a halfway devolution alongside surrendering arms.
Now you have a situation similar to the 1983 where Tamils are super pissed off and ready to fight but it would be irrational to fight.
That is where India stepped in to provide Tamils with the wherewithal to fight a war of independence.
So you are in the same situation, today, but China (which I guess is becoming a player), the US, and India all are supporting the Sri Lankan state.
With Rajapaksa firmly holding onto power, India and China are vying to support the state and maintain influence. Of course the US is still a worldwide power and still has tremendous influence over Sri Lanka, but it is mulling things over a bit after the election.
So in conclusion, I don't think the Tamils can be appeased overnight. They are generally going to be pissed off as we have seen in the Vaddukoddai re-affirmation and maybe also in the Northeastern vote for Fonseka (depending on how you read into it).
In order to defeat the Tamils, and thereby maintain the peace, Rajapaksa has to make sure that none of the players, (mainly we are talking the US and India) have an about-face and start making use of Tamil anger to achieve their own ends.
So Rajapaksa has to maintain an environment where both India and the US are satisfied with his regime. That is the key to defeating the Tamils. Ensuring that they never have foreign support for their insurgency.
Because Tamils are simply not going to fight war again in an environment where it is irrational to launch war. It is irrational for Tamils to launch a new war as long as they have no support whatsoever from India and the US.
Tamil's diplomatic war will never really amount to much, because you can't fight Sinhala forts with resolutions. But the diplomatic war shows that Tamils are nursing pure anger, and this pure anger can be hijacked by the US-alliance at any time they see fit.
I doubt the US, British etc. would ever do such a thing, because the US has basing rights in Sri Lanka and all. And they gave SL so much support during Ranil's time.
But the way to defeat the Tamils is to just maintain a geo-political environment in which all three powers are content with Rajapaksa and vying to gain influence over SL through Rajapaksa.
In this regard China and India are more or less vying for influence by giving aid to Rajapaksa. The US is probably just pretending to be pure-hearted with its human rights stuff, but in the end it will play the same game as China and India. I bet they would have preferred Ranil and Fonny though.
Siding too much with China will anger India.
Siding too much with the US like JRJ did, in the past angered India.
And I think the US and China will never really be too angry with SL as long as Rajapaksa can balance their strategic interests with keeping India happy.
And India seems pleased with how things are going, but it is a delicate balance between the regional power and global powers.
Winning the hearts and minds of the Tamils will take time. And after 10-15 years, especially with Colonization i bet they will be defeated. But in the 10-15 year period you have to make sure to keep all the global powers happy and thereby deny the Tamils the oxygen and material support they need to regroup.
And for Sinhalese, don't give Mahinda his 2/3 majority. That guy is so full of @#$%T. He is just going to give himself so much power once he controls parliament in addition to the executive presidency and defence ministry. That guy cares for Sinhala nation, but at the same time he has wantonly used power and has built his family's wealth during his tenure.
There should at least be some symbolic checks on his power.
Keeping Fonseka locked in jail might have the ironic result of adding to Fonny's credibility if he launches a future candidacy as the beacon of democracy. Or as a restoration of democracy. Another way Sri Lanka can be divided- watch out with those foreign powers.
So I think Rajapaksa doesn't even have to give 13th amendment or devolution. He just needs to beg his masters to give development aid for the Northeast. And he just needs to appease all of his masters by parcelling out various parts of Sri Lankan sovereignty to them.
In theory, the Tamil heart and mind can be defeated with pure development and infrastructure aid. alongside global isolation.
Not to mention the third factor: heartless colonization that will reduce Tamils to a minority within the Tamil North.
But I love your article, because it brings into question the virtues, pitfalls, and unforseen consequences of this dangerously aggressive path being tread by the Sinhala hawks in power.
And DJ, please don't have the delusion that Sri Lanka could become a meritocracy like Singapore. Singaporean Chinese are way more pragmatic. At least 50% of the Sinhalese people enjoy when Jaffna gets bombed.
And the majority of Tamils enjoyed when Colombo got bombed by Tiger planes. -to be fair.
We need a good amount of our respective populations to develop their mind and personality before we can have the chance to be cosmopolitan and form a liberal commercial state.
Because in Sri Lankan democracy it seems that the ethnic entrepreneur always seems to win the election!
President Rajapakse serendipitiously finds himself in the enviable position of carrying with him the Sinhalese to peace and unity in the present mood of the country. The time is NOW when he has the “consciousness of his close allies” well wrapped up - with little questions likely to be asked by anyone.... DJ’s claim “the SL crisis began in 1983” will be contested by many. Curiously, he does not tell us, in his reckoning, when and by whom it flared.
“Southern (Sinhala?) establishment is not the staunchest (serious?) in its commitment to provide autonomy- even within a unitary State" - is sadly one crucial factor at the very heart of the problem.
This cannot be attributed to the Tamil side. It is to help overcome this obstinate impasse Liam Fox and other friends of Sri Lanka (of Ranil, CBK and MR) came out with acceptable formulae.... The 2-Party reality cannot be held as an excuse any longer... As to the belief the economic-development carrot may mitigate those Tamils nursing Separatism, the current ground reality shows even an anti-LTTEr like Pillaiyan is openly bitter the whole theatrics of "enabling EP Tamils (and Muslims) to run their affairs in the Province" is an illusion.
ISS, I didn't say the crisis began in 1983; I said it didn't. Please re-read. In any case, how could I, when I was writing on it from 1979?
I strongly recommend Jolly Somasundaram's most recent essay to all those who have commented here. I don't have a word to add to or subtract from it. It contains the best possible counsel from a Tamil intellect to a Tamil audience. (And I think Nesiah's was a lame critique).
Malaysia really illustrates the opposite
Dear Dayan,
Although I agree with most of what you write, I have to say that sometimes you overstate your case. In particular, the use of the Malaysian example is both misleading and also incorrect.
Before moving to the Malaysian case, let me state that I strongly agree that the only possible and just alternative to regional devolution in the Sri Lankan context would have to involve a full-blooded embrace of secularism, meritocracy, democratic governance, and equal individual rights at the centre, and that it is clear that not all constituencies in Colombo understand or accept this. I think you agree with this, but tend to the view that devolution is the preferred or more viable option. But that's a legitimate difference of opinion in my view. I also concur that to the extent that the 13th Amendment is the law of the land, it must be sincerely implemented.
That said, the Malaysian case only shows that the solutions may be more diverse than you imply. Here I want to point to two errors in the analysis.
First, in contrast to your implication, federalism or provincial autonomy in Malaysia has never been or is a compensatory counterweight to discrimination in favour of the Malay majority. This would be hard, given that all the Malaysian states, with the exception of Penang - have a Malay majority or plurality, and that Malaysian federalism predates the pro-Malay policies of the Malaysian state. Federalism in the Malaysian context is primarily a reflection of its history that Malaysia - unlike Sri Lanka - did not ever have a legacy of being a single state. Malaysia - unlike Sri Lanka - was a modern historical construct of the British - who put together the Malaysian federation from many and almost all Malay majority, independent kingdoms. Federation was thus the compromise to accommodate largely ethnic Malay regional (read "kingly") concerns. To the extent that the Chinese minority was accommodated by federalism, it largely failed in preventing secession, since the only over-whelmingly Chinese state - SIngapore - eventually seceded/was expelled from the Federation. I doubt whether the Singapore-Malaysia example is one that will reassure many "Sinhala hawks".
Second, the degree of devolution in Malaysia is in many respects far less than in the 13th Amendment. I will leave aside the historical reality that the same political party has dominated in the centre and in almost all states for the past five decades - which is more a political outcome and not a constitutional necessity - making regional autonomy in Malaysia tepid at best. When Malaysia was constructed, the British carefully considered what should be devolved and what should not, and that led them to centralize health and education for reasons of social equity. These are incidentaly, the very areas where the centralised Sri Lankan state has been a global over-achiever - achievements that we should be proud of and should cherish. Although the same social equity arguments dictate the need to federalize health and education in Sri Lanka today, these are in fact the most important areas which are devolved under the 13th Amendment. The paradox is that whilst Sri Lanka calls itself unitary, it is already more devolved than the real thing - Malaysia.
Malaysia - I would argue - has quite different lessons. First, devolution as a solution in Sri Lanka should not be pursued in a maximalist manner without recognition that social and ethnic equity might be also served better in some sectors by less - not more devolution. For example, in health in practice there is widespread consensus amongst stakeholders even at provincial level that the current devolutionary set-up has more negatives than pluses. A more honest debate in Sri Lanka is needed on whether devolution means devolving everything without regard for practicalities. And the devolutionistas should shed their ideology to discuss the nuances in each sector of governance and service delivery - something that has never happened and is a glaring omission if we genuinely seek a Sri Lankan solution. This ideological fervour is perhaps one of the main reasons why devolution continues to lack genuine grass-roots support - it has been sold too much as a solution to an ethnic problem, and not as a solution to the real problems that ordinary Sri Lankans face in their day to day lives.
Second, Malaysia surely should be an inspiration for what we don't want in Sri Lanka. Do we really want a Sri Lanka - where the state officially discriminates in jobs, education, allocation of capital to the private sector, etc in favour of the SInhalese, and in which multiculturalism means the reinforcement of ethnic segregation? and where Sinhalese is enthroned as the sole official language? and where to be honest the press is far less free than in Sri Lanka? I, for one, think we can do much better than that, and I hope Dayan - you can aspire so too.
Hi Dr.D.J,
Thanks for writing this article.
The ball is in MR's court. Hope he seize the opportunity and define a solution acceptable to all ethnics in the Island.
D.J, Hope you are doing well in your new post and wish you all the best.
A breath of fresh air from you Dayan for a change. For the first time it seems you have are putting forth the Tamil case, albeit a substantially dilluted one, which no Tamil will accept. But, nevertheless, a shift from the xenophobic jingoism you get from Sinhala academics. The reality is this, and, that is unless there is a sea change in Sinhala thinking which puts forth a solution which is acceptable to the Tamils, at every point the Sri Lankan state will be countered by a generation in the diaspora which is educated, affluent, influential and determined in the West than their parents who fled Sri Lanka.